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L Introduction
Picture yourself having just been convicted of a relatively minor criminal
offense. Imagine that you are living in a country in which the judge could
prohibit you from participating in political speech or protest, prohibit you
from associating with "known homosexuals," prohibit you from associating
with your spouse or fianc6, prohibit you from belonging to the religious
organization of your choice, require you to submit to a search of your person
or your home at any time of day or night, require you to wear a flourescent
pink bracelet proclaiming your offense, or banish you from the country
altogether. This country must be an authoritarian dictatorship of some kind,
a country that is not governed by a constitution or the rule of law, right?
Wrong. This nation is the United States of America as the legal system exists
today. A trial judge has imposed each of the sentences just listed, and an
appellate court has allowed each to stand.'
1. See United States v. Bortels, 962 F.2d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding probation
condition prohibiting defendant from associating with her fianed); United States v. Sharp, 931
F.2d 1310, 1311 (8th Cir. 1991) (approving probation condition requiring defendant to submit
to warrantless searches); United States v. Janko, 865 F.2d 1246, 1247 (1 lth Cir. 1989) (sustain-
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The continuing existence of this sweeping deference to the quirks and
peculiarities of individual sentencing is particularly striking in today's politi-
cal climate in which state and federal legislatures cannot seem to act quickly
enough to reduce judicial discretion through the imposition of rigid sentencing
schemes and mandatory minimum sentences. In the face of an overwhelming
national movement toward the enforcement of uniformity and predictability
in sentencing, a significant and growing trend has emerged toward the use of
probation conditions as a means for the imposition of a vast array of unusual,
idiosyncratic, and often quite alarming criminal sentences.2 Published cases
and media accounts provide a seemingly endless array of examples that
involve significant infringements on constitutional and basic human rights.3
One particularly disturbing thread of the case law reflects a growing move-
ment toward sanctions that are designed primarily to inflict shame or humilia-
tion on the offender.4
The published cases in the area of probation conditions reveal an extraor-
dinary level of judicial reliance on the judge's own values and sense of
morality combined with the judge's best guess or intuition about the potential
deterrent or rehabilitative impact of a particular sanction.' The sentencing
judge's broad discretion leaves significant room for racial, ethnic, and reli-
gious bias to enter into the sentencing judgment. Very little empirical data
documents the impact of any ofthe more common "innovative" sentences, but
substantial anecdotal evidence documents unpredicted outcomes, such as the
destruction of families, vigilantism, and even suicides.6
ing probation condition banishing defendant from United States); Malone v. United States, 502
F.2d 554, 556-57 (9th Cir. 1974) (allowing probation condition prohibiting defendant from
belonging to or participating in "any Irish Catholic organizations or groups"); United States v.
Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973) (permitting probation condition prohibiting
defendant from associating with "known homosexuals"); State v. Nickerson, 791 P.2d 647, 648-
49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding condition prohibiting defendant from associating with his
wife without consent of parole officer); People v. Mason, 488 P.2d 630, 632-34 (Cal. 1971)
(sustaining probation condition requiring defendant to submit to warrantless searches); People
v. King, 73 Cal. Rptr. 440, 445-48 (Ct App. 1968) (upholding probation condition prohibiting
defendant from "making speeches" or participating in demonstrations); Ballenger v. State, 436
S.E.2d 793, 794-95 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (approving probation condition that drunk driving
defendant wear pink floureseent bracelet identifying his crime); State v. Karan, 525 A-2d 933,
934 (R.I. 1987) (upholding probation condition banishing defendant from United States);
Edwards v. State, 246 N.W.2d 109, 110-12 (Wis. 1976) (sustaining probation condition
prohibiting defendant from associating with her fianc6).
2. See infra Part II (discussing wide variety of probation conditions).
3. See infra Part I (giving numerous examples of how probation conditions infringe
upon rights of defendants).
4. See infra Parts flLB.1 & MIE-I (discussing humiliation as sentencing approach).
5. See infra Part III (exploring impact of judicial morality and intuition in sentencing).
6. See infra Part fI.H (exploring negative effects of humiliation as sentencing approach).
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Currently, appellate scrutiny of probation conditions is highly unlikely.
The primary reason that appellate courts seldom address the issue is that
defendants rarely challenge probation conditions on appeal.7 Because defen-
dants often accept the conditions as part of a negotiated plea agreement,
defendants frequently believe they cannot challenge the probation conditions,
no matter how inappropriate or unconstitutionally intrusive. Case law often
supports this belief. Moreover, if the judge has suggested that the probation
conditions were imposed as an alternative to incarceration, the defendant often
is unwilling to risk filing an appeal for fear of going to prison if appellate
review overturns the conditions.
When the defendant does appeal a probation condition, that appeal fre-
quently is doomed to failure for several reasons. Many appeals fail because
the court finds that the defendant consented to the condition, sometimes
merely by accepting probation in lieu of incarceration and sometimes by fail-
ing to note an objection at the time of sentencing.8 Of course, the voicing of
an objection at the time of sentencing commonly would result in incarceration.
Other appeals fail because the conditions were part of a negotiated agreement,
in which case many courts look at the plea itself as a form of waiver or at the
agreement as some sort of an enforceable contract.' Of course, these theories
completely ignore the enormous disparity in bargaining power and the highly
coercive environment in which the agreement is generally reached.
Even when an appellate court reaches the merits of a challenge to a
probation condition, often a poorly articulated and extraordinarily deferential
standard of review guides the court's consideration. A survey of the case law
involving challenges to probation conditions reveals that appellate courts most
often simply defer to the trial court's broad sentencing discretion; inthe cases
in which appellate courts do something more than simply defer to the trial
court, they tend to be extremely result-oriented, often applying the exact same
legal standard in seemingly indistinguishable cases to reach conflicting
results.1" In a number of those relatively rare cases in which a condition of
probation is overturned, the appellate court often does little more than substi-
tute its own intuition or morality for that of the trial court." The general rule
appears to be that if the appellate court cannot categorically describe the
probation condition as irrational, the condition survives.' 2 As a consequence,
trial courts currently operate under virtually no restraints, even when imposing
7. See infra Part IIAI (describing defendants' failure to appeal).
8. See infra Part IIA2 (explaining contract and waiver theories).
9. See infra Part 11A2 (considering courts' reliance on contract and waiver theories).
10. See infra Part I (discussing appellate review of probation requirements).
11. See infra Part IMI (providing examples of cases in which appellate courts substitute
their judgment for judgment of trial courts).
12. See infra Part ILB (describing limitations on substantive appellate review).
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probation conditions that severely restrict the probationer's exercise of his or
her constitutional rights.13
In Part II ofthis Article, I begin with a brief overview ofthe use ofproba-
tion as a sentencing tool and of the statutory authority for the imposition of
probation conditions. I then explore the significant barriers to appellate review
of probation conditions, including the various reasons why defendants rarely
file appeals and why the appeals that are filed rarely succeed. Part III of this
Article catalogues some of the more significant judicial abuses of probation
conditions, with a particular emphasis on the extraordinary infringement on the
constitutional rights ofthe probationers. I explore some ofthe more disturbing
motivations and reasoning underlying these special conditions, including the
judge's personal pop-psychology, the judge's personal morality and values,
and the judge's desire for publicity and electoral support. In addition, I con-
sider the use of probation conditions as a vehicle for addressing perceived
problems or injustices unrelated to the criminal offense or as a vehicle for
circumventing statutory maximum sentences. In Part IV of this Article, I
propose some potential solutions to the various problems that the Article
identifies and describes. At the outset, I suggest that sentencing innovations
belong in the legislative domain, where lawmakers can give serious consider-
ation to the theory underlying the sanction, rather than in the domain of an
individual judge's fancy. But perhaps more importantly, I propose specific
changes in the system for appellate review that would allow the challenge of
special conditions that the defendant accepted under adverse circumstances
without the fear that a challenge may result in further incarceration.' 4 At the
outset, courts should eliminate the most significant barriers to appellate review,
such as the objection requirement, the waiver theory, and the contract theory.
With those barriers removed, courts then should create meaningful appellate
review by adopting clear appellate standards, involving a de novo review and
a true strict scrutiny approach concerning the defendant's constitutional rights.
Moreover, courts should discard the antiquated notion that cruel and unusual
punishment analysis is inapplicable to probationary sentences.
I. The Sad State ofAffairs
Although the concept of probation in a criminal case has its origins in the
common law,'" the current probationary disposition is entirely a creature of
13. See infra Part III (surveying infringements of various constitutional rights).
14. See infra Part IVA (proposing elimination of barriers to appellate review).
15. See Bruce D. Greenberg, Probation Conditions and the First Amendment: When
Reasonableness Is Not Enough, 17 COIJM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 45,47-48 (1981) (discussing
evolution of probation); Jeffrey C. Filcik, Note, Signs of the Times: Scarlet Letter Probation
Conditions, 37 WAsH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 291,293 (1990) (same).
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statute. Massachusetts enacted the first probation statute in 1878,6 basing it
largely upon the groundwork laid by a Boston cobbler named John Augustus,
commonly referred to as the inventor ofprobation. 7 A number of other states
quickly followed," joined by the federal probation legislation passed in
1925.19 Currently, all fifty states and the federal government have probation
statutes,2 ° and a truly extraordinary number of people are under probationary
supervision at any given time. In 1984, for example, there were 1.7 million
people - one out of every thirty-five adult American males - on probationary
supervision." By 1996, that number had skyrocketed to well over three
million probationers.' The numbers are equally staggering when one looks
at the percentage of convicted criminals who are placed on probation: Forty-
nine percent of the defendants convicted of a felony in a state court in 1994
were placed on some form of probation. 3
Despite the heavy reliance that sentencing courts place on the use of
probation, legislatures tend to phrase probation statutes in broad language that
offers very little guidance to a sentencing court. Most statutes neither define
the term "probation" nor enunciate any specific rationales underlying the
appropriate use of probation.24 After setting out numerous conditions of
probation that courts either may or must impose, these statutes include a
"nearly ubiquitous clause"' authorizing the addition of any special condition
that the sentencing court deems to be appropriate.26 Courts have quite accu-
rately described the scope of the sentencing court's discretion as "breathtak-
ing,"27 and commentators have observed that any legislative limitations on that
16. ANDREW R. KLEIN, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS AND
PROBATION 68 (2d ed. 1997); Greenberg, supra note 15, at 49-50.
17. See KLEIN, supra note 16, at 68 (documenting evolution of probation).
18. Greenberg, supra note 15, at 50:
19. Id. at 51-52.
20. See Filcik, supra note 15, at 293-94 nn.1 1-12 (listing all 50 state statutes and federal
statute).
21. KLEIN, supra note 16, at 68-69.
22. Id. at 70.
23. JODI M. BROWN & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT
SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, 1994, at 30 (1998).
24. See Greenberg, supra note 15, at 53 (stating that very few states define "probation").
25. Developments in the Law -Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1863,
1947 (1998) [hereinafterAlternatives to Incarceration].
26. See KLEIN, supra note 16, at 80 (noting that state statutes frequently allow
nonstatutorily defined conditions); Leonore H. Tavill, Note, Scarlet Letter Punishment:
Yesterday's Outlawed Penaly Is Today'sProbation Condition, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 613,621
(1988) (noting that probation statutes give judges significant latitude).
27. Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652,655 (Fla. Dist Ct App. 1992).
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discretion are "conspicuously absent."' One recent media account suggested
that the content of special conditions "is limited only bythe sentencing judge'simagination.129
In light of the lack of legislative guidance or limitation, one might hope
that appellate courts would step in to fill the vacuum. Quite the opposite is
the case, however, as appellate courts historically have shown a tremendous
reluctance to establish any meaningful standards with respect to the imposi-
tion of special conditions." Indeed, as this Article discusses below, appellate
courts frequently have interposed numerous barriers to any substantive review
of probation conditions, and the appellate standards of review that are in place
when a court reaches the merits tend to be vague, malleable, and extraordi-
narily deferential.3'
A. Procedural Obstacles to Appellate Review
1. Failure to Appeal
Neither the nature of probation statutes nor the reluctance of appellate
courts to engage in any serious review poses the most significant barrier to
appellate review. The sad truth is that most defendants, having received
probation as part of a negotiated disposition, feel that they are in no position
to challenge the propriety of any conditions that have been attached to proba-
tion ostensibly in lieu of incarceration. Moreover, many defendants fear, with
good cause, that a successful appeal of a condition may result in the imposi-
tion of incarceration.32 Indeed, in Fiore v. United States,33 the Second Circuit
28. Louis K. Polonsky, Note, Limitations upon Trial Court Discretion in Imposing
Conditions of Probation, 8 GA. L. REV. 466, 468 (1974); see also Note, Judicial Review of
Probation Conditions, 67 COLLIL L. REV. 181,181 (1967) [hereinafterJudicialReview] (stating
that legislatures are reluctant to devise pervasive standards of control).
29. Kelly McMurry, For Shame: Paying for Crime Without Serving Time, But with a
Dose of Humility, TRIAL, May 1997, at 12,12.
30. See Judah Best & Paul L Birzon, Conditions ofProbation: AnAnalysis, 51 GEO. L..
809, 811 (1963) (noting appellate courts' reluctance to review probation conditions); Heinz IL
I-Enk, The Application of Constitutional Standards of Protection to Probation, 29 U. CBL L.
REV. 483, 484 (1962) (stating that appellate courts are reluctant to establish criteria to guide
trial judges);Judicial Review, supra note 28, at 181-82 (same).
31. See infra Part I3 (discussing limitations on substantive appellate review).
32. See Edward FelsenthalEnvironmentalSentences Upset Some Lawyers, WALL ST. J.,
Sept 7, 1993, at B1 (noting that "defendants think twice before appealing [because] [tlhe threat
of more jail time 'is quite a heavy hammer" (quoting defense attorney James Neal)); Patrick E.
Gauen, Making Felon Put Up Sign Ruled Illegal, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCII, Apr. 18, 1997, at
1B (noting recognition by defense attorney in People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315 (I. 1997), that
pursuing appeal of validity of probation condition created risk of prison sentence upon remand).
33. 696 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1982).
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decided against remanding a case for resentencing after invalidating a proba-
tion condition, reasoning that "[florcing defendants who raise valid claims to
take such a gamble could 'chill' the assertion of defendant's rights."34 Unfor-
tunately, many jurisdictions do not follow that practice.3" As a consequence,
the validity of even some of the most extreme conditions of probation rarely
faces litigation at all, as many offenders choose an inappropriate or unconsti-
tutional probation condition over the threat of incarceration. 36
A prime example of the magnitude of this problem is the sentencing
practices of Judge Ted Poe, who sits in a state district court in Houston, Texas.
Poe has become a nationally recognized figure, sometimes referred to as the
"King of Shame," for imposing probation conditions intended to humiliate the
offender.37 Some ofthe conditions he has imposed have required offenders to
parade in front of the courthouse with placards declaring their offenses, to
apologize publicly on the courthouse steps to the victims of their crimes, and
34. Fiore v. United States, 696 F.2d 205,211 (2d Cir. 1982).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Tomy, 605 F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 1979) (explicitly leaving
open question of whether, had it invalidated challenged conditions, court would have remanded
for resentencing, including possibility of "a longer term of confinement"); State v. Evans, 796
P.2d 178, 180 (Kan. Ct App. 1990) (remanding for resentencing before different judge after
invalidating condition requiring attendance at church); People v. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146,
147, 151 (N.Y. 1995) (vacating entire plea agreement after invalidating challenged condition,
despite fact that defendant had rejected this option in trial court); State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d
410,412 (S.C. 1985) (remanding for resentencing after invalidating condition requiring surgical
castration, suggesting possibility of imposing specified alternative 30-year sentence); State v.
Whitchurch, 577 A.2d 690,693 (Vt 1990) (suggesting that invalidation of challenged condition
might have "constituted such a breach of the plea agreement that the original judgment and
sentence could be reopened"); State v. Dean, 306 N.W.2d 286,289 & n.4 (Wis. 1981) (remand-
ing for resentencing after invalidation of challenged condition and explicitly inviting trial court
to "reconsider the appropriateness of probation").
36. See I NEIL P. CoHEN, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PARoLE § 7:32, at 7-58 (2d ed.
1999) (suggesting that probationers rarely litigate validity of probation conditions because most
are "delighted to receive probation"); Melissa Burke, Note, The Constitutionality of the Use of
the Norplant Contraceptive Device as a Condition of Probation, 20 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q.
207,217 n.74 (1992) (noting that imposition of probation conditions as part of plea negotiation
process circumvents constitutional scrutiny of those conditions); Tavill, supra note 26, at 624
(stating that "[tlhe scarcity of challenges is due mainly to the fact that most offenders are
delighted merely at the thought of not having to go to prison"); Jeffrey Abramson, Are Courts
Geting Too Creative?,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,1999, atA27 (noting that unauthorized "creative"
sentences are typically imposed as conditions of probation, thereby evading appellate review);
Martha Brannigan & Karen Blumenthal, Courts Using Humiliation as Punishment, WAIL ST.
J., Nov. 9, 1989, at B1l (noting that probation conditions designed to humiliate defendant are
rarely challenged because defendant has most often "readily agreed to the punishment as a
preferred alternative to prison").
37. See McMurry, supra note 29, at 12 (discussing Poe's sentencing record); Sentencing
Criminals to Shame, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Apr. 26, 1998, at Al9 [hereinafter Sentencing Crim-
inals] (same).
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to shovel manure in the Houston Police Department's horse stables.3 1 But
Judge Poe does not limit his probation conditions to those involving humilia-
tion. Another condition that he imposes with some regularity requires offend-
ers who are single and who have illegitimate children either to marry the
mother or to file the papers necessary to pay child support. 9 He ordered a
forger who had fathered thirteen illegitimate children to attend Planned Parent-
hood meetings and instructed a piano teacher who molested two students not
to play the piano for twenty years.40 He also ordered a car thief to hand over
the keys of his Trans Amto the seventy-five-year-old victim of his theft.4 One
recent media report revealed that although Judge Poe imposed over fifty such
sentences during the previous three years, not a single defendant challenged
one on appeal.42
A similar pattern has emerged as judges impose the surgical insertion of
the Norplant contraceptive device43 as a condition of probation. One noted
commentator has aptly called it "shocking that some judges have tried to
compel convicted child abusers to have the contraceptive device Norplant im-
planted as a condition of probation."" Such a condition is an extraordinary
intrusion into the constitutionally protected realm of privacy and reproductive
freedom, carrying with it further First Amendment implications if the use of
contraceptives is inconsistent with a probationer's religious beliefs. None-
theless, ofthe four cases reported in an early commentary on the subject, only
one had been appealed, and for procedural reasons even that appeal was never
heard.46 Similarly, while trial courts in a number of states have required
38. See Nicole Koch, Houston Judge Teaches "Humiliation in Sentencing," WICHITA
EAGLE, May 22, 1997, at 17A (explaining Poe's sentencing record); McMurry, supra note 29,
at 12 (same).
39. See Koch, supra note 38 (summarizing Poe's practices in sentencing).
40. See Henry J. Reske, ScarletLetter Sentences, ABA 3., Jan. 1996, at 16,17 (discuss-
ing sentences Poe has imposed).
41. See id. (discussing Poe's sentencing record); Koch, supra note 38 (same).
42. See Sentencing Criminals, supra note 37 (noting that Poe's sentences have not been
challenged); see also Reske, supra note 40, at 16-17 (noting that, although Poe has been hand-
ing down similar sentences since 1980s, most are never challenged because they are "tied to
plea agreements").
43. For a description of the Norplant contraceptive device, see Burke, supra note 36, at
208-11; Kristyn M. Walker, Note, Judicial Control of Reproductive Freedom: The Use of
Norplant as a Condition ofProbation, 78 IOWA L. REV. 779,787-89 (1993).
44. Abramson, supra note 36.
45. For two sound discussions supporting these contentions, see generally Burke, supra
note 36, and Walker, supra note 43.
46. See Burke, supra note 36, at 214-17 & n.74 (discussing early Norplant probation
cases). A recent Supreme Court of Michigan decision suggests one other case in which the
defendant filed an appeal after the trial court imposed the implantation of Norplant as a proba-
tion condition. People v. Walsh, 593 N.W.2d 558, 558 (Mich. 1999) (table decision) (denying
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probationers to join or to make charitable contributions to advocacy groups
with whose agendas they disagree, defendants rarely have challenged those
probation conditions."
2. Reliance on the Contract and Waiver Theories
When a defendant actually challenges a probation condition, either on
direct appeal or in some other post-conviction setting, he or she frequently
encounters one of several procedural obstacles that make such challenges
unlikely even to be heard on the merits, let alone to prevail. The obstacle that
is by far the most pervasive and intractable appears in several different
formulations, but each leads to the same result. The basic concept is that an
offender is free to reject the imposition of probation and to accept the alterna-
tive, presumably incarceration.' Therefore, once the defendant has accepted
the imposition of probation and has failed to file a specific objection to any
ofthe conditions attached to that probation, the theory precludes the defendant
from challenging the validity of any of those conditions.
Perhaps the most common formulation of this preclusion theory is the
"contract theory," which analogizes the acceptance of probation to the forma-
tion of a contractual agreement between the defendant and the sentencing
court.49 The United States Supreme Court has noted that probation should not
be viewed as a contract,"° and the United States Congress disavowed the
appeal). Because the defendant decided to undergo a tubal ligation, the case was rendered moot
and leave to appeal was denied. Id.
47. See Felsenthal, supra note 32 (noting lack of challenge).
48. Some scant authority does support the proposition that a defendant may not refuse to
be placed on probation. See, e.g., Cooper v. United States, 91 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1937)
(rejecting contention that defendant may refuse probation). Because a probationer can effec-
tively force the imposition of a sentence by simply violating any one of the conditions of
probation, this rule makes little practical sense. Consequently, it is a fair summary of the law to
state that a defendant does have some "choice" in accepting or refusing the imposition of proba-
tion. See, e.g., People v. Osslo, 323 P.2d 397,413 (Cal. 1958) (noting that although defendant
has "no right to probation[] he does have the right, if he feels that the terms of probation are
more harsh than the sentence imposed by law, to refuse probation and undergo such sentence");
People v. Samoff, 4 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Mich. 1942) (explaining that defendant could "exercise
the option of either [abiding by the conditions of probation] or of serving the full sentence
required by law").
49. See Greenberg, supra note 15, at 57 (discussing contract theory); Alternatives to
Incarceration, supra note 25, at 1950 (same); Jaimy M Levine, Comment, "Join the Sierra
Club!": Imposition of Ideology as a Condition ofProbation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1841, 1853
(1994) (same); JudicialReview, supra note 28, at 191 (same).
50. See Bums v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932) (finding that "probation is a
matter of favor, not of contract"); see also Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 274 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (maintaining that probation should not be treated as "a kind of
bargain").
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contract theory of probation in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.1 Never-
theless, courts have continued to use the contract theory either to evade
completely review on the merits or to justify an exceptionally deferential form
of review.52 Appellate courts have cited or suggested the contract theory in
upholding some extraordinary probation conditions, including those imposing
surgical sterilization,'m banishment,5 4 and significant infringements on First
Amendment rights."m The Supreme Court of South Dakota recently relied on
this theory to justify the imposition of a period of probation extending beyond
the statutory maximum sentence for the underlying crime.56
Other formulations of the same basic notion speak in broader terms about
the concept of waiver. In some instances, the courts find that by accepting or
consenting to the conditions of probation, a defendant has forfeited the right
to challenge them.57 In other cases, the courts conclude that the absence of a
51. See Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 25, at 1950 (reporting congressional
rejection of contract theory); Levine, supra note 49, at 1853-54 (same).
52. See Greenberg, supra note 15, at 57 (explaining that use of contract theory had
"flowered" despite Supreme Court's rejection of analogy); Alternatives to Incarceration, supra
note 25, at 1950 (noting that "many courts have continued to rely" on contract theory even after
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984).
53. See People v. Blankenship, 61 P.2d 352, 354 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936) (upholding
probation condition that required sterilization). In upholding the condition, the court explained
that the defendant "was permitted to elect whether he would comply with the condition and
receive the clemency which he asked or decline to submit to the operation and accept the
penalty which the law provides as punishment for his offense." Id. at 353-54. The defendant's
alternative to surgical sterilization was a prison term of five years. Id. at 352.
54. See State v. Karan, 525 A.2d 933,934 (R. 1987) (per curiam) (upholding probation
condition banishing defendant from United States even though banishment was outside
sentencing court's authority, reasoning that defendant was precluded from "complain[ing] of
an agreement that he proposed and voluntarily entered into"); see also United States v. Janko,
865 F.2d 1246, 1247 (1lth Cir. 1989) (sustaining probation condition requiring defendants to
leave United States, reasoning that "condition of probation is not unconstitutional where it
resulted from a negotiated plea agreement and was requested by the defense as an appropriate
sentence").
55. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 414 F.2d 630, 636 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 65 (1970) (upholding probation
condition prohibiting defendant from associating with Students for Democratic Society or
Humanists because, having "chose[n] to enjoy the benefits of probation," defendant "must also
endure its restrictions"); State v. D'Amario, 725 A.2d 276,280 (R.L 1999) (upholding proba-
tion condition severely limiting defendant's right of access to courts, reasoning that "defendant
may not now succeed in claiming that his rights were violated by the very plea agreement he
designed to avoid facing trial and a possible prison sentence").
56. State v. Macy, 403 N.W.2d 743, 745 (S.D. 1987) (upholding duration of defendant's
probation and reasoning that defendant "chose probation but now challenges what he volun-
tarily accepted").
57. See, e.g., State v. Bynes, 403 S.E.2d 126, 127 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding
probation condition requiring restitution for crimes that prosecutor had not charged because
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specific objection at the trial level constitutes a waiver of the defendant's right
to challenge a probation condition.5
For quite some time, scholars have criticized each formulation ofthe pre-
clusion theory. Virtually all scholars believe that the extraordinary inequality
in bargaining power and the highly coercive setting in which parties negotiate
probation conditions make any analogy to contract law entirely unpersua-
sive.59 As one commentator noted, "It requires no sophisticated analysis to
demonstrate that the acceptance of probation by the offender bears little
resemblance to a contract.I' A few notable court decisions have expressed
the same viewpoint.'
On the broader question of whether any objection requirement or waiver
theory ought to apply, the scholarly consensus seems equally strong.62 In addi-
defendant had "consented" to condition rather than face 14-year sentence on crimes that pros-
ecutorhad charged); 24 C.J.S. Criminal § 1556 (1989) (suggesting general rule that one who has
accepted probation condition cannot subsequently challenge its validity).
58. See, e.g., State v. Nickerson, 791 P.2d 647, 648 (Ariz. Ct App. 1990) (permitting
probation condition prohibiting defendant from having any contact with his wife without written
consent of his probation officer and noting that defendant "waived any objection to the condition
by failing to raise it" at trial level); State v. Topovski, No. 2870, 1994 WL 619786, at *3 (Ohio
Ct. App. Nov. 9, 1994) (upholding probation condition prohibiting farmer from "hav[ing] any
livestock on his property or under his control" because defendant did not establish that he had
objected to condition "at the time the trial court imposed it"); State v. Dziuba, 435 N.W.2d 258,
262 (Wis. 1989) (sustaining probation condition requiring sale of defendant's home, despite state
constitutional provision prohibiting such condition, on theory that "it is unsustainable in
principle to now grant the defendant relief when the defendant failed to object to a condition
of probation which infringed on this constitutional right").
59. See, e.g., Best & Birzon, supra note 30, at 832-34 (criticizing contract theory); Green-
berg, supra note 15, at 57 (discussing disparity in bargaining power between state and defen-
dant); Levine, supra note 49, at 1853 (noting disparity in bargaining power); Judicial Review,
supra note 28, at 192-93 (criticizing contract theory); Note, LegalAspects ofProbation Revoca-
tion, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 311,324 (1959) (same). But see Stephen S. Cook, Selected Constitu-
tional Questions Regarding Federal Offender Supervion, 23 NEW ENG. . ON CRM & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 1, 27 (1997) (approving court holding that "defendant's approval of conditions
waives any argument of constitutionaity ... unless, of course, acceptance of these conditions
is somehow coerced").
60. JudicialReview, supra note 28, at 192.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F2d 259,265 n.15 (9th Cir. 1975)
(noting that Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), implicitly rejected contract theory in
parole setting and opining that contract theory is "equally inappropriate when applied in the
probation setting"); Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100, 104 (7th Cir. 1970) (finding contract theory
"unpersuasive" because "[tlhe probationer does not enter into the agreement on an equal status
with the state"); cf. Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91,100 (6th Cir. 1968) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting)
(rejecting contract theory in parole context and asserting that "when the 'choice' of the parolee
is to remain in prison or accept... a burdensome provision, the 'choice' to accept parole can
hardly be termed a voluntary waiver ofthe right [to challenge the provision at issue]").
62. See, e.g., Best & Birzon, supra note 30, at 833-34 (referring to contract and waiver
theories as "misleading"); James C. Weissman, Constitutional Primer on Modern Probation
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tion to highlighting the "nominal" or "hypothetical" nature of any purported
consent to probation conditions negotiated under the threat of incarcera-
tion,"a commentators and a handful of courts have argued that for public
policy reasons appellate courts should prevent trial courts from imposing
unfair, unlawful, or unreasonably burdensome conditions.' Moreover, a
number of sources have discussed the obvious reason that prevents most
defendants from voicing an objection at the time that an offensive condition
is imposed: the fear, often justified, that the government will withdraw the
offer of probation.65
Despite the apparent consensus among commentators that these preclu-
sive rules are inappropriate, many courts continue to employ them as a means
of avoiding any substantive appellate review of the validity of probation
Conditions, 8 NEw ENG. J. ON PRISON L. 367, 391 (1982) (advocating repudiation of "act of
grace" and waiver theories); Polonsky, supra note 28, at 483 (criticizing procedural obstacles
to challenging probation conditions); JudiciaReview, supra note 28, at 193-95 (same).
63. See Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 274 (Wright, J., dissenting) (noting that "con-
sent" under threat of incarceration "is more likely to be nominal than real"); Polonsky, supra
note 28, at 483 (calling agreement under threat of incarceration "glaringly hypothetical con-
sent"); see also Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHL L. REV.
733, 762 (1998) (asserting that if sentence "should be straight probation and not imprisonment
then what looks like an offer is in fact a threat, and the offender's consent to [a probation
condition] is coerced and thus invalid").
64. See, e.g., Dear Wmg Jung v. United States, 312 F.2d 73, 75-76 (9th Cir. 1962)
(rejecting waiver theory and noting that "[i]t is not enough for the government to answer that
[the imposition of an unlawful] condition merely gave the defendant a 'choice"'); People v.
Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290,294 (Ct App. 1967) (rejecting waiver theory because "[t]he law
can not suffer the state's interest and concern in the observance and enforcement of [fundamen-
tal public] policy to be thwarted through the guise of waiver of a personal right by an individ-
ual"); People v. Becker, 84 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Mich. 1957) (rejecting waiver theory and noting
that, although defendant was "given an alternative," appropriate question was "whether the
alternative [was] lawful"); Best & Birzon, supra note 30, at 833-34 (maintaining that "[t]he
conduct of the defendant is largely irrelevant if the real question is the legality or illegality of
a condition" and that "the public policy of the state should mark [inappropriate conditions] as
invalid regardless of any consent of the parties"); Judicial Review, supra note 28, at 192
(asserting applicability of doctrine that "agreements which are contrary to public policy will be
denied enforcement in both law and equity").
65. See, e.g., People v. Welch, 851 P.2d 802, 810 (Cal. 1993) (Arabian, J., concurring)
(explaining that "the trial court may respond to a defendant's valid objection by improperly
refusing to grant probation on the remaining, adequate terms and conditions"); People v.
Higgins, 177 N.W.2d 716, 717 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) (refusing to apply waiver theory because
"[t]he defendant could understandably have believed that if he did not accept the probationary
terms set down by the trial judge, the offer of probation would be revoked and he would be sent
to jail"); State v. Burdin, No. 02C01-9306-CR-00121, 1994 WL 716262, at *2 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Dec. 28, 1994) (stating that when defendant accepted probation on condition that he place
sign on his property declaring him to be child molester, he "[o]bviously... knew, at that point,
that if he declined the placement of the sign, he would be denied probation"), affid, 924 S.W.2d
82 (Tenn. 1996).
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conditions.a If a discernable trend characterizes the evolution ofthe case law,
it appears to be moving in the direction of erecting, not eliminating, this sort
of procedural barrier to review.67
3. Reliance on the Act of Grace Theory
Another significant procedural obstacle to substantive appellate review,
generally referred to as the "act of grace" theory, suggests that courts impose
probation as a pure act of leniency and the decision therefore is immune from
review.68 The act of grace theory has its origins in two United States Supreme
Court cases from the 1930s: Burns v. United States69 and Escoe v. Zerbst.70
66. See, e.g., Welch, 851 P.2d at 808 (embracing waiver theory);Alternatives to lncarcer-
ation, supra note 25, at 1950 (reporting continued reliance on contract and waiver theories);
supra Part I1Ad2 (listing cases upholding probation conditions based on contract and waiver
theories); see also Larson v. State, 572 So. 2d 1368, 1370-71 (Ba. 1991) (adopting contempora-
neous objection rule unless condition is "illegal," which court defined as "so egregious as to be
the equivalent of fundamental error"); State v. McSweeney, 860 P.2d 305, 306 (Or. Ct. App.
1993) (noting that, by statute, guilty plea limited appellate review to claims that sentence
exceeded statutory maximum or constituted cruel and unusual punishment); State v. Vasby, 788
P.2d 1024, 1025 n.1 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (refusing to review challenges to probation conditions
because defendant did not raise objections before trial court); State v. Cantwell, No. OlCO1-
9701-CC-00035, 1998 WL 792220, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 16, 1998) (suggesting that
defendant could negotiate plea agreement with State to establish probation condition, even
though law did not authorize imposition absent agreement). But cf Thomas v. State, 519 So.
2d 1113, 1114 (Fa. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (noting lack of preservation for review, but "in the
interest of justice" striking condition that defendant not become pregnant unless married);
People v. Warren, 452 N.Y.S.2d 50, 51 (App. Div. 1982) (stating that lack of preservation,
although perhaps otherwise applicable, is not bar to review in light of "the serious constitutional
issue presented" by probation condition requiring contribution to gun control advocacy group).
67. Compare Welch, 851 P.2d at 08 (embracing waiver theory) with In re Bushman, 463
P.2d 727, 733 (Cal. 1970) (rejecting implicitly waiver theory). California is the prime example
of this trend. Prior to 1993, many California cases held that a defendant's acceptance of
probation did not preclude his or her challenge of a condition of probation on appeal. See, e.g.,
Bushman, 463 P.2d at 733 (rejecting implicitly waiver theory); People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr.
2d 681, 684 (Ct. App. 1993) (same); People v. Hernandez, 277 Cal. Rptr. 444, 445 (Ct. App.
1991) (same). Indeed, the Hackler court referred to the rejection of the waiver theory as
"established law." Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 683. In 1993, however, the Supreme Court of
California reversed itself, holding in People v. Welch that the "failure to timely challenge a
probation condition... in the trial court waives the claim on appeal." Welch, 851 P.2d at 808.
68. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 15, at 55-56 (discussing act of grace theory);Alterna-
tives to Incarceration, supra note 25, at 1949-50 (same); Levine, supra note 49, at 1852 (same);
JudicialReview, supra note 28, at 188-89 (same).
69. 287 U.S. 216 (1932). The Supreme Court observed in passing that "probation is a
matter of grace." Bums v. United States, 287 U.S. 216,223 (1932).
70. 295 U.S. 490 (1935). According to the Court, "Probation or suspension of sentence
comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime." Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93
(1935).
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Although the statements about grace were not central to the Court's holdings
in either case, other courts began to rely heavily on the concept, thereby
avoiding any appellate review of the validity or propriety of probation condi-
tions." As explained by one early commentator, the theory holds that
the convicted defendant has no right to expect anything less than the full
penalty prescribed by law. Thus, the sentencing judge has untrammelled
[sic] discretion to grant or withhold probation, and should he decide to
offer the offender a modicum of freedom, he may make the grant subject
to any conditions he believes to be proper. The probationer will not be
heard to complain of this voluntary act of clemency, even though the
conditions imposed are arbitrary, unfair, vague, or otherwise invalid.'
Not surprisingly, this theory has been the subject of significant criticism from
scholars and from the occasional appellate court.73 Perhaps the Supreme
Court of Oregon said it best in State v. Martin:74 the court noted that over
seventy percent of the state's defendants received probation and then con-
cluded that it was "unrealistic to approach a probation case as one of unusual
clemency when probation is in fact resorted to by the trial courts in the
majority of cases."75
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court seemed to call for an end to
any reliance on the act of grace theory, declaring it to be "clear... that a
probationer c[ould] no longer be denied due process in reliance on the dictum
in Escoe v. Zerbst that probation is an 'act ofgrace.""'6 Despite this unambig-
uous language, some appellate courts continue to rely on the theory, in whole
or in part, as a justification for denying substantive appellate review of
probation conditions.77
71. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 15, at 56 & n.109 (citing cases invoking act of grace
theory); Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 25, at 1949-50 & n.49 (same); Judicial
Review, supra note 28, at 188-89 (same).
72. JudicialReview, supra note 28, at 189 (footnote omitted).
73. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 580 P.2d 536, 539 n.3 (Or. 1978) (noting decline of act of
grace theory in Oregon); Greenberg, supra note 15, at 56-57 (criticizing act of grace theory);
Weissman, supra note 62, at 371 & n.21,391 (same); JudicialReview, supra note 28, at 189-91
(same).
74. 580 P.2d 536 (Or. 1978).
75. Martin, 580 P.2d at 539 n.3.
76. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 nA (1973) (citation omitted) (quoting Escoe
v. Zcrbst, 295 U.S. 490,492 (1935)).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189,1190 (9th Cir. 1973) (relying on
act of grace theory to uphold several probation conditions, including one that precluded associ-
ation with "known homosexuals"); State v. Kohlman, 854 P.2d 318, 319 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993)
(relying on act of grace theory to uphold unspecified probation conditions); State v. Means, 257
N.W.2d 595, 600-02 (S.D. 1977) (relying on act of grace theory and applying probation review
standards to uphold several bail conditions that prohibited defendant from participating in activ-
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This same concept frequently appears in a slightly different formulation,
in which courts suggest that, because probation is "not a right but a privilege,"
the defendant has little or no standing to complain about the fashion in which
the trial court has exercised its sentencing discretion.78 Like the "act of grace"
theory, the courts cite this language as a justification for minimizing or
completely denying substantive appellate review.
B. Limitations on Substantive Appellate Review
Potential challenges to probation conditions fall into two broad categories:
statutory challenges, which focus on the reasonableness of a challenged condi-
tion, and constitutional challenges, which focus on the extent to which a chal-
lenged condition infiinges upon a defendant's constitutional rights. 9 Although
a resemblance of a national consensus exists on how to address the merits of
a statutory challenge, widespread confusion surrounds whether a constitutional
challenge lies at all and, if so, what the standard of review should be.
1. Statutory Challenges
a. Articulating the Standard
Appellate review of a statutory challenge to a probation condition gener-
ally begins with the proposition that the statute authorizing the use of proba-
tion either explicitly or implicitly limits trial courts to the imposition of
conditions that are reasonable.80 Beyond this point of widespread agreement,
however, courts have so diverged in the precise application of the concept of
reasonableness that several observers have concluded that no coherent stan-
dard exists for this sort of appellate review."1 In additionto the conception of
ities ofAmerican Indian Movement); see also People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357,363 n.7 (Ct.
App. 1984) (noting that "some reviewing courts continue to give lip service to [the act of grace]
theory" even though United States Supreme Court has "repudiated" it); Greenberg, supra note
15, at 56 (explaining that, "though the doctrne is 'thoroughly discredited,' courts continue ritu-
alisticallyto mouth it" (quoting F. COHEN,THELEGALCHALLENGETO CoRRECTIONS 32 (1969)));
Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 25, at 1949-50 (stating that many courts still employ
act of grace theory); Levine, supra note 49, at 1853 (asserting that even though "the Supreme
Court [has] disavowed the 'act of grace' theory, lower courts continue to pay it homage").
78. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Los Angeles Mun. Ct, 159 Cal. Rptr. 74, 77 (Ct. App. 1979)
(commenting that probation is privilege, not right); State v. Heyn, 456 N.W.2d 157, 160 (Wis.
1990) (same).
79. See 1 CoHEN, supra note 36, § 7:32, at 7-59 (outlining grounds for challenging
probation conditions).
80. Id. § 7:33-7:35, at 7-59 to 7-64 (discussing statutory challenges to probation condi-
tions).
81. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 15, at 55 (maintaining that "the courts have not devel-
oped a uniform, well-defined rule" for deciding challenges to probation conditions); Thomas E.
Bartrum, Note, Birth Control as a Condition ofProbation-A New Weapon in the WarAgainst
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reasonableness, another common thread runs through the case law: that courts
should review the conditions using the extremely deferential "abuse of discre-
tion" standard.' Because trial courts' decisions receive such deference
regardless of the specific test applied, appellate courts have upheld the major-
ity of challenged conditions.'
Several variants on the concept of reasonableness appear with frequency
in the case law. Although the most basic formulation merely asserts that
probation conditions must be "reasonable," this formulation is generally
accompanied either by the specific adoption of some other mode of analysis
or by a broader discussion that reveals several factors that the court has
considered. 4 Perhaps the most common formulation of the reasonableness
standard flowed in large part from early editions ofthe American Bar Associa-
ChildAbuse, 80 KY. L.. 1037,1044 (1992) (contending that "confusion in imposing conditions
on probation is apparent' and that "a more coherent approach is desirable"); Jon A. Brilliant,
Note, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter: A CriicalAna4sis ofModern Probation Conditions,
1989 DuKE L.J. 1357, 1384 (asserting that "[n]o coherent limitation is currently available to
appellate judges who review [the] lower court's imposition of probation conditions"); Levine,
supra note 49, at 1848 (declaring that "courts have defined several different standards, none of
which have [sie] been applied with any certainty or regularity").
82. See, e.g., United States v. Showalter, 933 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1991) (explaining
that court reviews conditions "under the deferential 'abuse of discretion' standard"); United
States v. Clark, 918 F.2d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1990) (observing that court reviews conditions "for
an abuse of discretion"); United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 467 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that
court conducts "review for abuse of [the sentencing court's] discretion"), overruled on other
grounds, United States v. Keys, 95 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 1996); People v. Burleigh, 727 P.2d 873,
874-75 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (applying abuse of discretion standard to review); State v. Allen,
506 P.2d 528, 529 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (same); Cook, supra note 59, at 2 (noting that probation
conditions "are reviewed through the 'abuse of discretion' standard, which substantially defers
to the trial court").
83. See, e.g., 1 COHEN, supra note 36, § 7:32, at 7-58 ("Irrespective of the stage at which
they are questioned,... most probation and parole conditions are upheld."); Best & Birzon,
supra note 30, at 832 (explaining that because conditions that trial court imposes "normally are
not such as would shock the conscience, invariably all manner of conditions are termed
reasonable"); Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 25, at 1968 (describing statutory and
judicial constraints on the imposition of probation conditions as "little more than ... surface
barrier[s]").
84. See, e.g., Ballenger v. State, 436 S.E2d 793, 794-95 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that
standard was that "any reasonable condition" should be upheld, but evaluating relationship
between challenged condition and underlying purposes of probation); State v. Livingston, 372
N.E.2d 1335, 1337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (asserting that "[r]easonableness is the test of the
propriety of the conditions of probation," but citing ABA Standards and evaluating relationship
between challenged condition and underlying purposes of probation); State v. Allen, 506 P.2d
528, 529 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (declaring that appellate court's task is to "assessI the reasonable-
ness of probation conditions," but that in doing so the appellate court "will bear in mind the
purposes sought to be served by probation"); State v. Macy, 403 N.W.2d 743, 745-46 (S.D.
1987) (observing that "[t]he test is one of reasonableness," but referring to "nature of the crime"
and nature of condition).
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tion's Standards for Criminal Justice."5 It focuses on whether the condition
is "reasonably related" to the underlying purpose of probation.86 Another
formulation that appears with some regularity, although somewhat less fre-
quently than the American Bar Association formulation, analyzes whether the
probation condition is reasonably related to the underlying criminal offense."
Some states, such as Rhode Island, have never articulated any standard of
review at all.
In the cases that focus on the relationship between a probation condition
and the purposes underlying the imposition of probation, courts have applied
varying approaches to the analysis. As a starting point, the majority of states
continue to treat probation as an alternative to criminal sentencing rather than
as a sentence, finding that the primary or exclusive purpose of probation is
the rehabilitation of the offender."8 As a consequence, many courts have
85. Cf ABASTANDAaDSFORCRIMINALJUSTICE § 18-2.3(e) (2d ed. 1979) (providingthat
probation conditions "should be reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing"). Similar
formulations appear in the Model Penal Code, which provides that probation conditions should
"be reasonably related to the rehabilitation ofthe defendant," MODEL PENAL CODE § 301.1(2XI)
(1962), and the Model Sentencing and Corrections Act, which provides that probation condi-
tions should be "reasonably related to the purpose of [the] sentence," MODEL SENTENCING AND
CoRREcTIoNs ACT § 3-302(aX9) (1978). The United States Code requires that probation
conditions imposed in federal courts be reasonably related to the underlying purpose of the
sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b) (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 44 F.3d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that
probation conditions are "consistently upheld" if they "bear a reasonable relationship to the goals
of probation"); Malone v. United States, 502 F-2d 554,556 (9th Cir. 1974) (upholding probation
conditions after finding "reasonable nexus between the probation conditions and the goals of
probation"); State v. Pieger, 692 A.2d 1273, 1277 (Conn. 1997) (explaining that probation
conditions must be reasonably related to purposes of probation); State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d
82, 85 (Tenn. 1996) (noting that Tennessee probation statute provides that conditions must be
"reasonably related to the purpose of the offender's sentence" (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-303(d) (Supp. 1995))); 1 COHEN, supra note 36, § 7:34, at
7-61 (noting that general standard is whether condition is reasonably related to underlying
purpose of probation).
87. See, e.g., State v. Asher, 595 P.2d 839, 841 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that "condi-
tions imposed must be 'reasonably related to the offense for which the defendant was convicted
or to the needs of an effective probation'" (quoting State v. Age, 590 P.2d 759, 763 (Or.
1979))); State v. Whitchurch, 577 A.2d 690, 692 (Vt. 1990) (stating "general rule that a proba-
tion condition is valid if it is reasonably related to the crime for which the defendant was con-
victed" (citing State v. Peck, 547 Ad 1329, 1333 (Vt 1988))); KLEIN, supra note 16, at 80
(explaining that "appellate courts typically allow conditions of probation that are reasonably
related to the crime committed or to the prevention of future criminal behavior by the defendant
or [that] satisfy other legitimate probationary goals"); Filcik, supra note 15, at 308-09 (stating
that, under "traditional standard of review," probation conditions "must be reasonably related
to the crime committed, the defendant's rehabilitation, or the public safety").
88. See, e.g., Young v. State, 692 S.W.2d 752,755 (Ark. 1985) ("The broad objectives
sought by probation are education and rehabilitation."); People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681,
686 (Ct App. 1993) ("The purpose of probation is rehabilitation."); State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d
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restricted their review to whether the condition is reasonably related to the
offender's rehabilitation.89 A number of other courts, however, have con-
ducted a slightly different review, exploring whether the condition is reason-
ably related not only to the offender's rehabilitation but also to the protection
ofthe public.' Still other courts have explored whether a condition is reason-
ably related to "future criminality."' A small minority of states as well as,
notably, the federal legislature have explicitly declared probation to be a
sentence, thereby broadening the permissible purposes of probation to include
deterrence or retribution.92 Commentators have agreed for some time, how-
ever, that even in those systems in which trial courts are ostensibly limited to
imposing rehabilitative conditions of probation judges use conditions of
probation to effect deterrence or to extract retribution.93
82, 86 (Tenn. 1996) ("The primary goal of probation, under the [state's Criminal Sentencing]
Act and the decisions of the appellate courts of [Tennessee], is rehabilitation of the defendant");
Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 25, at 1956 (noting that by 1998 "[s]tate legislatures
ha[d] yet to broaden the statutory goals of probation beyond public protection and rehabilita-
tion"); Brilliant, supra note 81, at 1368-70 (explaining that both case law and state statutes
generally provide that rehabilitation is primary purpose of probation); Levine, supra note 49,
at 1850 ("The primary purpose of probation is rehabilitation.").
89. See, e.g., Ines v. State, 358 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978) (noting that trial court may
"impose any valid condition of probation which would serve a useful rehabilitative purpose");
State v. Mummert, 566 P.2d 1110,1112 (Idaho 1977) (explaining that "terms of probation must
be reasonably related to the purpose of probation, rehabilitation"); State v. Norman, 484 So. 2d
952, 953 (La. Ct. App. 1986) ("Probation conditions, to be valid, must be reasonably related to
rehabilitation of the defendant").
90. See, e.g., United States v. Bortels, 962 F.2d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 1992) (asserting that
if condition "is reasonably related to the dual goals of probation, the rehabilitation of the
defendant and the protection of the public, it must be upheld"); United States v. Bolinger, 940
F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1991) (maintaining that condition is valid if it is "primarily designed to
meet the ends of rehabilitation and protection of the public" and if it is "reasonably related to
such ends");Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 25, at 1956 (noting that "many courts have
found that probation conditions may limit a probationer's rights only if they are 'primarily
designed' to effect" goals of "public protection" and "offender rehabilitation"); Tavill, supra note
26, at 622 (asserting "the well settled rule" that "probation conditions must have a reasonable
relationship to bath the rehabilitative treatment of the accused and the protection of the public").
91. See, e.g., Young v. State, 692 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Ark. 1985) ("[C]onditions for
probation will be upheld if they bear a reasonable relationship to the crime committed or to
future criminality."); Coulson v. State, 342 So. 2d 1042, 1043 (la. Ct. App. 1977) ("[C]on-
ditions of probation are valid if the activities restricted bear a reasonable relationship to the past
or future criminality of the probationer.").
92. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) (1994) (identifying probation as sentence); Bartrum,
supra note 81, at 1039 (noting "trend... toward expanding the permissible goals of proba-
tion"); Filcik, supra note 15, at 296 (commenting that "an increasing number of states ... are
treating probation as a sentence").
93. See, e.g., Best & Birzon, supra note 30, at 811 (explaining, in 1963, that probation
conditions were sometimes "used as a vehicle for ends wholly unrelated to the reformation of
the offender"); Greenberg, supra note 15, at 96 (writing, in 1981, that judges "ha[d] frequently
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Some jurisdictions have adopted language that appears to provide some
protection for probationers beyond the requirement of reasonableness. The
American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice Sentencing are
again a common reference point, providing that probation conditions "should
not be unduly restrictive of an offender's liberty or autonomy."'94 Many
jurisdictions have not adopted this limiting language,' and even within those
jurisdictions that have, the restriction frequently adds little to the analysis
given the extremely deferential abuse of discretion standard applied to the
review.96 Indeed, a fair summary of this entire discussion is that the courts
tend to employ a variety of formulations to arrive at the same end point: a
standard of appellate review that can be extraordinarily deferential but that
imposed conditions which punish the probationer and unnecessarily burden his rights"); Hink,
supra note 30, at 494 (noting, in 1962, "increased use of probation as a modem substitute for
traditional forms of legal punishment"); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American
CriminalLaw, 89 MIcIL L. REv. 1880,1884 (1991) (discussing, in 1991, reemergence ofpublic
shaming as condition of probation and concluding that such condition is "a retributive spectacle
that is devoid of other positive... content").
94. ABASTANDARDsFORCRIMINALJuSICE SENTENCING § 18-3.13(cXii) (3d ed. 1994).
The analogous sections of the Model Penal Code and the Model Sentencing and Corrections
Act each provide that conditions should not be "unduly restrictive of [the probationer's] liberty"
nor "incompatible with [the probationer's] freedom of conscience." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 301.1(2)(1) (1962); MODEL SENTENnCNG AND CORRECTIONS ACT § 3-302(aX9) (1978). The
federal legislative configuration is similar, providing that probation conditions may "involve
only such deprivations of liberty... as are reasonably necessary for the purposes" of the
sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
95. See, e.g., People v. Burleigh, 727 P.2d 873, 874 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that
only limitation on trial court's "broad discretion" is that probation conditions must be "'reason-
ably related to [the probationer's] rehabilitation and the purposes of probation"' (quoting COLO.
REV. STAT. § 16-11-204(2)(1) (1978))); State v. Pieger, 692 A.2d 1273,1277-78 (Conn. 1997)
(describing extent of appellate review as follows: "If it appears [to the appellate court] that the
trial court reasonably was satisfied that the terms of probation had a beneficial purpose consis-
tent with the defendant's reformation and rehabilitation, then the order must stand."); Land v.
State, 426 S.E.2d 370, 374 (Ga. 1993) (upholding broad restrictions on association and travel
because condition was "tied to the rehabilitative purpose of [the] probationary sentence" and
"rationally related to the purpose underlying the sentencing objective").
96. See, e.g., United States v. Showalter, 933 F.2d 573, 575 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding
probation condition prohibiting participation in or association with members of skinhead or
neo-Nazi organizations and applying abuse of discretion standard to question of whether
condition involved "'no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary'" (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2) (Supp. 1999))); State v. Emery, 593 A.2d 77, 79-80 (Vt. 1991) (sustain-
ing probation condition requiring probationer to participate in sexual offender treatment
program that violated his religious beliefs, despite requirement that probation conditions "not
be unduly restrictive of the probationer's liberty or autonomy" (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIUMINAL JUST[CE SENTENCING § 18-2.3(e))); Edwards v. State,
246 N.W.2d 109, 111-12 (Wis. 1976) (approving probation condition prohibiting contact with
probationer's fianol, despite requirement that probation conditions not be "unduly restrictive
of [the probationer's] liberty").
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has enough teeth in it to enable a court to overturn a condition that it finds
offensive or troubling.
b. Applying the Standard
At this point, a select series of examples from the case law should illus-
trate the malleability of the standards of review, the selective fashion in which
courts apply those standards, and the extent to which some appellate courts are
willing to defer to trial courts. Florida's Court of Appeals makes a useful case
study, as it has had the opportunityto decide a significant number of challenges
to conditions ofprobation. Rodriguez v. State,' decided in 1979 bythe Second
District ofthe Court of'Appeals, concerned the validity of probation conditions
that prohibited the defendant from getting married without the court's consent,
from getting pregnant, and from obtaining custody of any children, including
her own." The court laid down a series of broad principles and specific
standards by which to conduct the appellate review of probation conditions.
Initially, the court maintained that it would have "no constitutional difficulty"
with any conditions as long as they were "otherwise valid conditions ofproba-
tion."99 Then the court noted the overriding principle that "a trial court may
impose any valid condition of probation which serves a useful rehabilitative
purpose"'" if that condition is not "so punitive as to be unrelated to rehabilita-
tion."'" From there, the court quoted an earlier version of the American Bar
Association Standards, which required not only that conditions be "reasonably
related to [the probationer's] rehabilitation," but also that they not be "unduly
restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of religion."''10 In
order to determine whether a condition of probation was reasonably related to
rehabilitation, the court adopted a three-part test that was first established in a
California case.103 That test declared a condition invalid "if it (1) has no
relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to
conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct
which is not reasonably related to future criminality.'00
4
The court ostensibly applied all of these principles and standards to the
facts ofthe case, in which the defendant admitted by a plea ofnolo contendere
97. 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1979).
98. Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
99. Id. at9.
100. Id. (citing I-lines v. State, 358 So. 2d 183,185 (Fla. 1978)).
101. Id. (citing Coulson v. State, 342 So. 2d 1042, 1043 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1977)).
102. Id. (quotingABA STANDARDS RELATiNGTO PROBATION § 3.2(b) (1970)).
103. Id. (citing People v. Lent, 541 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1975)). This three-part test originated
inPeople v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290,293 (Ct App. 1967).
104. Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 9.
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that she had hit her nine-year-old child "about the face" and "against an auto-
mobile, causing bruises."'"5 The court upheld the condition that precluded the
defendant from maintaining custody of her child (and of the child that she was
expecting at the time of the sentence) for the duration of her ten-year proba-
tionary period, concluding without any explanation that the condition "ha[d]
a clear relationship to the crime of child abuse and [wa]s therefore valid."" s
Presumably, the court found that this condition was "not unduly restrictive of
[the defendant's] liberty," although the court neglected to specify how it
reached this somewhat startling conclusion. However, the court went on to
hold that the probation conditions prohibiting marriage without permission and
prohibiting pregnancy had "no relationship to the crime of child abuse" and
were "not reasonably related to future criminality" because the defendant was
already precluded from having custody of any minor children."° Thus, those
particular conditions were stricken from the sentence, which the court other-
wise affirmed10
Just seven years later, in ahighlypublicized case, the same court reviewed
a special condition attached to probation imposed after a drunk driving convic-
tion. In Goldschmitt v. State,1' 9 the Florida court upheld a probation condition
that required the defendant, a first-time offender, to affix to his automobile a
bumper stickerthatread "CONVICTED D.U.I.-RESTRICTED LICENSE."" 0
Although this particular condition had "become standard for all first-time
D.U.I. offenders sentenced by two of the county's four judges,""' the defen-
dant was apparently the first to challenge it on appeal. Remarkably, the Gold-
schmitt court's only citation to its extensive review in Rodriguez was in a
footnote, which simply stated that a probation condition "should bear some
relationship to the nature of the offense of conviction and should have some
105. Id. at 8.
106. ld.atl& n.5.
107. Id. In Howland v. State, a court in Florida's First District reached a similar conclu-
sion under similar facts. Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918, 919-20 (la. Dist. Ct App. 1982).
There, the court imposed several probation conditions on a defendant who stood convicted of
negligent child abuse involving his own child. The conditions included prohibiting contact with
that child, living with any children under the age of 16, and fathering any other children. Id.
at 919. The court upheld the first two conditions, finding them to be "reasonably related to the
crime of negligent child abuse and to appellant's future criminality," but struck down the third
as not reasonably related because the defendant was effectively prohibited from obtaining
custody of any such child. Id. at 919-20.
108. Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 10.
109. 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1986).
110. Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 124-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that
lower court's judgment that bumper sticker was rehabilitative was not "utterly without founda-
tion").
111. Id. at 125.
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reasonable rehabilitative basis.""' 2 In reaching its decision, the court addressed
the merits of the defendant's constitutional arguments," 3 an analytic step that
it expressly rejected in Rodriguez."4 After dispensing rather quickly with
those arguments," 5 the court started and ended its statutory review with the
following comment: "In the final analysis, we are unable to state as a matter
of law.. .that the lower court's belief that such a sticker is 'rehabilitative' is
so utterly without foundation that we are empowered to substitute our judg-
ment for its."116 At no point in the opinion did the court make reference to any
of the several tests and significant limitations that it enunciated in Rodriguez.
The case represents a striking but rather typical example of several pervasive
themes running through the case law: the malleability of the standards of
review, the unpredictable and result-oriented application of those standards,
and the significant degree to which most appellate courts will defer to the trial
court.
An examination of a few other Florida cases further emphasizes these
points. In 1977 in Coulson v. State,'" the Fourth District Court of Appeals of
Florida imposed what seemed to be a reasonably rigorous standard of review
in striking down a probation condition that precluded the probationer from
collecting unemployment benefits during the pendency of his probation.'
The court began by asserting a general rule that "conditions of probation are
valid if the activities restricted bear a reasonable relation to the past or future
criminality of the probationer."11 9 The court went on to state that it would
strike a condition of probation if the condition were "so punitive as to be
unrelated to rehabilitation," 20 which it described as "the primary purpose of
probation."' 21 In addition, the court stated that "the valid exercise of a valu-
able right" should be abridged only if "there are no other available alternative
112. Id. at 125 n.3 (citing Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1979))
(emphasis added).
113. Id. at 125-26.
114. See Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 9 (noting that probationer's constitutional rights "are
limited by conditions of probation which are desirable for the purposes of rehabilitation").
115. The defendant had maintained that the condition violated his First Amendment rights
by requiring him to display an ideological message and that the condition constituted cruel and
unusual punishment Goldschmitt, 490 So. 2d at 125-26. The court concluded that the message
on the bumper sticker was not ideological and that the sentence was not cruel and unusual. Id.
116. Id. at 126.
117. 342 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. Dist Ct App. 1977).
118. See Coulson v. State, 342 So. 2d 1042,1043 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (striking down
condition because other ways existed to insure probationer's continuous efforts to gain employ-
ment).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1042.
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means to accomplish the desired end."'" Relying on that set of standards and
referring to another condition that already required the defendant to try to
obtain and to maintain employment, the court found that the challenged
condition was unnecessary. 23
Fifteen years after Coulson and six years after Goldschmitt, the Fourth
District of the Court of Appeals decided another highly publicized drunk
driving case. In Lindsay v. State,24 the court upheld a probation condition
that required the probationer, another first time offender, to consent to the
placement of an advertisement containing his "mug shot" and the caption
"DUI-Convicted" in a local newspaper."2 Although the trial judge had appar-
ently imposed this condition on other probationers, this defendant, like the
defendant in Goldschmitt, was the first to have filed an appeal.'26 The court
began its analysis by noting that under established Florida law "a trial court
has the power to impose any valid condition of probation that serves a rehabil-
itational purpose." "2  Unlike its predecessor court in Goldschmitt, however,
the Lindsay court declined to reach the merits ofthe defendant's constitutional
arguments, asserting that "the fact that a valid condition of probation burdens
constitutional rights is no basis by itself to set it aside."'" That conclusion
left the court with only the defendant's claim that there was "no reasonable
relationship between the condition and [the defendant's] criminal conduct.' 29
The court then engaged in superficial speculation about whether "the humilia-
tion arising from the publicizing of the fact of a conviction" might have a
deterrent effect, but ultimately concluded that "[t]he question whether there
is a reasonable relationship between criminal conduct and a condition of
probation is one of fact, or at least mixed fact and law."'30 By reaching that
conclusion, the court effectively eliminated the prospect of any meaningful
appellate review. Thus, because it was "unable to say that the trial judge's
decision to add this particular condition of probation [was] ... 'utterly with-
out foundation,"' the court upheld the condition. 3 1 The court never referred
to or applied any of the limiting standards set out in its previous Coulson
122. Id. at 1043.
123. Id. The court also suggested in passing that the condition "could in fact have a very
detrimental effect on [the defendant's] rehabilitation." Id.
124. 606 So. 2d 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
125. Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
126. Id. at 654.
127. Id. at 657 (citing Himes v. State, 358 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1978)) (emphasis added).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 658 (quoting Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 126 (Fla. Dist. CL App.
1986)).
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opinion, nor did it even cite the case. It is clear that the Lindsay court never
contemplated whether the probation condition at issue was "so punitive as to
be unrelated to rehabilitation '"1 or whether there were "no other available
alternative means to accomplish the desired end."' 3
Indeed, the extraordinary level of deference seen in Goldschmitt and
Lindsay also stands in marked contrast to an earlier Florida case, Kominsky
v. State, 34 in which the appellate court showed a remarkable willingness
to substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court. 35 The case involved
a defendant convicted of marijuana possession, and the sentencing judge
imposed a curfew extending from 8:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m. as a condition
of probation.'36 After stating the principle that a probation condition could
not be "so punitive that it is unrelated to rehabilitation,"M37 the appellate
court found that the curfew restriction, which was to last for the duration of
the five year probationary term, was "so harsh that it w[ould] counteract the
concept of rehabilitation.' 38  The court then amended the curfew condi-
tion so that the curfew would begin each evening at 11:00 p.m. instead of
8:00 p.m., 139 thereby presumably eliminating the harshness that, at least in
the eyes of the appellate court, would have undermined the defendant's rehab-
ilitation. This holding is a rather far cry from the assertion in Goldschmitt,
repeated in Lindsay, that a condition will be invalidated only if the "lower
court's belief that [the condition] is 'rehabilitative' is ... utterly without
foundation.' 40
2. Constitutional Challenges
In a significant number of jurisdictions in the United States, appellate
courts will not hear, in any meaningful fashion, a direct challenge to the con-
stitutionality of a condition of probation. In some of these jurisdictions,
courts have directly held that the probationer is in no position to assert consti-
tutional protection if the infringement that the probation condition imposes is
otherwise lawful because the constitutional rights of probationers are inher-
132. Coulson v. State, 342 So. 2d 1042,1043 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
133. Id.
134. 330 So. 2d 800 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
135. See Kominsky v. State, 330 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. Dist CtL App. 1976) (directing trial
court to amend its probation order).
136. Id. at 801.
137. Id. at 802.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652, 657 (Fla. Dist Ct App. 1992) (quoting Goldschmitt
v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 126 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1986)).
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ently subject to limitation." Much more commonly, however, the standard
of review applied to constitutional challenges simply parallels the court's
review on statutory grounds because the constitutional standard is a variant on
the "reasonableness" test.142 As this Article discusses below, some jurisdic-
tions claim to take a more serious look at probation conditions that infringe
on constitutional rights, using language like "special scrutiny. 1 43 However,
the standard of review in these jurisdictions is some form of a loosely worded,
result-oriented balancing test, often still framed under the rubric of reason-
ableness and abuse of discretion. Thus, recent observers have noted appropri-
ately that, as a rule, challenges to probation conditions based on individual
constitutional rights "have made limited headway.""
141. See, e.g., Birzon v. King, 469 F.2d 1241, 1243 (2d Cir. 1972) (calling constitutional
argument "frivolous" because government can impose any condition that is "reasonably and
necessarily related to the advancement of some justifiable purpose of imprisonment"); Rodri-
guez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (finding "no constitutional difficulty
with [probation] conditions imposed, if they are otherwise valid conditions").
142. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 44 F.3d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Courts have
consistently upheld [the] imposition of conditions of probation that restrict a defendant's
freedom of speech and association when those conditions bear a reasonable relationship to the
goals of probation."); United States v. Bortels, 962 F.2d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding
prohibition on association with fiane6, noting that "where a condition of supervised release is
reasonably related to the dual goals of probation, the rehabilitation of the defendant and the
protection of the public, it must be upheld"); United States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371,374 (9th
Cir. 1988) (explaining that "test for validity of probation conditions, even where 'preferred'
rights are affected, is whether.., the sentencing judge imposed the conditions for permissible
purposes, and.., whether the conditions are reasonably related to the purposes"); State v.
Conkle, 717 N.E.2d 411, 412 (Ohio Ct App. 1998) (rejecting probationer's constitutional
challenge and stating that "[a]s long as a condition of probation meets [the reasonableness] test,
the imposition of the condition is not grounds for reversal"); Fileik, supra note 15, at 309
(noting that courts generally apply reasonableness standard "even when the defendant raises a
constitutional challenge to the imposed condition").
143. See, e.g., United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975)
("Conditions that unquestionably restrict otherwise inviolable constitutional rights may properly
be subject to special scrutiny."); People v. Keller, 143 Cal. Rptr. 184, 192 (Ct. App. 1978)
('hen a condition unquestionably restricts otherwise inviolable constitutional rights, it is
properly subjected to 'special scrutiny.'" (quoting Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 265));
Larson v. State, 572 So. 2d 1368, 1371 (Fla. 1991) ("[A] condition of probation that burdens
the exercise of a legal or constitutional right should be given special scrutiny."); State v. Emery,
593 A.2d 77, 80 (Vt 1991) (noting Ninth Circuit's use of special scrutiny standard (citing
Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 265)).
144. Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 25, at 1950; see Bartrum, supra note 81, at
1039 (explaining that, as general rule, "conditions of probation will not be overturned unless
an appellate court determines that the condition is not reasonably related to the crime committed
and to the prevention of future criminality"); Filcik, supra note 15, at 318 ("A constitutional
argument... adds little to a defendant's case and will not persuade a court to invalidate an
otherwise reasonable condition.").
CURBING JUDICIAL ABUSE OF PROBATION CONDITIONS 101
a. The Consuelo-Gonzalez Test
When an appellate court engages in a distinct constitutional review of
probation conditions, that review tends to take one of two forms. The form
that perhaps is more common first appeared in United States v. Consuelo-
Gonzalez,4 decided by the Ninth Circuit in 1975.146 In that case, the court
considered the legality of a probation condition that required the probationer
to "submit to [a] search of her person or property at any [t]ime when requested
by a law-enforcement officer.' 4 7 The court noted as a base-line proposition
that "even though the trial judge has very broad discretion in fixing the terms
and conditions of probation, such terms must be reasonably related to the
purposes of the [Federal Probation] Act."'48 The court then fashioned the
following standard for its analysis: "In determining whether a reasonable
relationship exists, we have found it necessary to give consideration to the
purposes sought to be served by probation, the extent to which the full consti-
tutional guarantees available to those not under probation should be accorded
probationers, and the legitimate needs of law enforcement."' 49
A number ofjurisdictions have adopted this three-part test as a means for
assessing the constitutionality of a challenged condition.5 0 As at least one
commentator has pointed out, however, "The crux of the standard of review
as defined by the Consuelo-Gonzalez court is the second prong, which re-
145. 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975).
146. See Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 266 (finding probation condition requiring
defendant to submit to search of her person or property at any time law enforcement officer so
requested invalid).
147. Id. at 261 n.1. The procedural posture of the case was not a direct appeal of this
condition, but rather a collateral attack on the condition after it was used to justify a warrant-
less search of the defendant Id. at 261-62. Ultimately, the court suppressed the fruits of the
search because it found the probation condition to be invalid. Id. at 262, 266. The court
concluded that the defendant could have been required to submit to warrantless searches by a
probation officer, but even then only when such a search was reasonable under the circum-
stances. Id. at 266.
148. Id. at 262.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362,1366 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that three-
part test "provides an appropriate standard to judge the constitutionality of conditions of
probation"); United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 150 (5th Cir. 1979) (adopting three-part test
to "determine whether a probation condition is unduly intrusive on constitutionally protected
freedoms"); Markley v. State, 507 So. 2d 1043, 1051 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (recognizing
three-part test as standard for constitutional review); Young v. State, 692 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Ark.
1985) (adopting three-part test to "determine whether a probation condition is unduly intrusive
on constitutional rights"); State v. Smith, 540 A.2d 679, 689 (Conn. 1988) (adopting three-part
test to determine "whether a condition of probation impinges unduly upon a constitutional
right"); Patton v. State, 580 N.E.2d 693, 698 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (adopting three-part test as
the "appropriate standard to judge the constitutionality of conditions of probation").
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quires determining the extent to which the probationer should be accorded
constitutional rights. 15' It is hard to imagine a constitutional standard that
could be less definitive or more subject to a result-oriented approach. Be-
cause each assessment is fact-specific, "each subsequent court is, in practice,
left without guidance to initially weigh the interests at issue. As a result, 'the
test allow[s] a court to reach either conclusion in almost every case.""n15 2
A few examples of the application of the Consuelo-Gonzalez test suffice
to expose its limitations. In United States v. Tonry,53 the Fifth Circuit consid-
ered a case in which the defendant, a former United States congressman,
pleaded guilty to four misdemeanor counts of violating the Federal Election
Campaign Act." 4 One of the conditions of the defendant's probation pre-
cluded the defendant from "engag[ing] in any political activity, be it federal,
state, local, municipal, or parochial, during the period of probation." '
Among other claims, the defendant maintained that this condition was "an
unconstitutional infiingement on rights protected by the [F]irst [A]mend-
ment." 56 Before reaching its constitutional analysis, the court determined that
the condition conformed with the federal probation statute. The court high-
lighted the "wide discretion" granted to the trial court, pointing out that "[a]
condition of probation satisfies the statute so long as it is reasonably related
to rehabilitation of the probationer, protection of the public against other
offenses during its term, deterrence of future misconduct by the probationer
or general deterrence of others, condign punishment, or some combination of
these objectives." ' 7 Finding that the ban on political activity "was evidently
intended to prevent [the defendant] from impairing the integrity of the elec-
toral and political process as a whole,. . . either for the purpose of rehabilita-
tion, so far as that might be possible, or for the purposes of public protection
and punishment,M5 8 the court concluded that it "[could] not say that the
formula reached by the district judge... was inappropriate. 1 5 9 Thus, the
court's statutory review consisted of little more than deferring to the trial
court's sense of what measures would accomplish rehabilitation, deterrence,
or retribution.
151. Levine, supra note 49, at 1862.
152. Id. at 1866 (quoting Thomas L Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,913 (1963)).
153. 605 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1979).
154. United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144,145 (5th Cir. 1979).
155. Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 150.
157. Id. at 148.
158. Id. at 147.
159. Id. at 148.
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Turning to its analysis of the defendant's First Amendment claim, the
court applied the three-part test first articulated in Consuelo-Gonzalez1
60
Having already determined that the condition served an appropriate probation-
ary purpose, the court proceeded to the second prong of the test, finding that
the district court had not been "unreasonable" in determining that "the very
limited activity" prohibited by the condition should not be constitutionally
protected for the defendant during the period of his probation.' The court
explained its extremely deferential finding by observing that the constitutional
deprivation seemed "appropriate to the nature of his crimes," that the ban on
all political activity would prevent the defendant from being "tempted to
engage in illicit electoral activity during his probation," and that the ban was
"not harsh."'62 Concluding that the condition served the "general purposes of
enforcement of the particular criminal law that [the defendant] violated," the
court upheld the challenged condition. 63 It cited a string of federal cases
upholding probation conditions that infringed upon First Amendment rights,"M
noting that the defendant could have avoided the condition altogether by
accepting a term of incarceration. 65 The court also asserted that the condition
did not "restrict [the defendant's F]irst [A]mendment rights totally" because
it "focused only on politically related activity.""1e
In United States v. Lowe, 67 the Ninth Circuit engaged in an equally def-
erential analysis of substantial First Amendment claims.16 There, the defend-
ants stood convicted of entering upon naval property in violation of federal
law.169 During the trial, the defendants admitted that they had entered the
naval base without permission as an act of protest against the government's
maintenance of nuclear weapons./'7 The trial court placed those defendants
160. Id. at 150. The court quoted from a slightly reworded version of the Consuelo-
Gonzalez test found in United Statesv. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1977).
161. Tonry, 605 F.2d at 151. The court did not explain its rather extraordinary use of the
term "very limited" to describe an absolute prohibition on any political activity.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. (citing United States v. Albanese, 554 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Adderly, 529 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1976); Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1974);
Porth v. Templar, 453 F2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971); and United States v. Smith, 414 F.2d 630 (5th
Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970)).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 152.
167. 654 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1981).
168. See United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1981) (considering proba-
tion condition).
169. Id. at 564.
170. Id.
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without prior criminal records on probation on the condition that they remain
at least 250 feet away from the naval base."' In imposing the condition, the
trial court "knew that the defendants would thereby be unable to distribute
literature to [naval base] employees on the public roadway at the entry to the
base or to attend weekly meetings" of anti-nuclear protesters conducted in a
privately owned building just outside the base." 2 Not surprisingly, the defen-
dants maintained that the condition violated their First Amendment rights of
free speech and association." 3
The court began its constitutional analysis by noting the "broad discre-
tion" of the trial judge in establishing probation conditions." 4 Claiming that
the "[e]xercise of this discretion is reviewed carefully where probation condi-
tions restrict fundamental rights," the court stated that "[t]he test for the
validity of probation conditions, even where 'preferred' rights are affected, is
whether they are primarily designed to meet the ends of rehabilitation and
protection of the public." '' s The court then set out a restated version of the
Consuelo-Gonzalez three-part test."6 First, the court found that the condition
"reasonably me[t] the goal of keeping the peace and deterring future criminal
activity."'7 7 Then, implicitly acknowledging significant interference with the
defendants' First Amendment rights, the court nonetheless concluded that,
"[a]bsent [a] compelling reason for appellate interference, the task of line-
drawing in probation matters is best left to the discretion of the sentencing
judge."' Apparently finding no such "compelling reason," the court upheld
the condition. 9 How to reconcile the court's absolute deference to the trial
court's discretion with the court's earlier claim that a sentencing court's dis-
cretion will be "reviewed carefully where probation conditions restrict funda-
mental rights" 80 remains a mystery.
Perhaps Judge Boochever's strongly worded opinion in Lowe, dissenting
from the portion of the majority opinion that upheld the condition, is the best
evidence of the proposition that the Consuelo-Gonzalez constitutional stan-
dard actually provides no appellate guidance.'8 Emphasizing that probation
171. Id. at 567.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. (citing United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975)).
175. Id.
176. Id. (citing United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1977)).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 568.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 567.
181. See id. at 568 (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
probation condition "substantially impedes" defendants' First Amendment rights),
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conditions infringing on constitutional rights merit "careful review,"'m Judge
Boochever concluded that the condition keeping the defendants away from the
naval base had "at best, a marginal relationship to protection against trespass,"
given that "[n]o planned legal leafletting [sic] or demonstration ha[d] ever
ripened into an illegal one" and that all previous "[a]cts of trespass [we]re
planned months in advance. 18 3 Moreover, because the condition prohibited
association with other protesters only in one particular area, Judge Boochever
concluded that the condition had "no effect on rehabilitation. " 184 His opinion
continued:
Weighing the minimal probational benefits against the infringement im-
posed, it is clear that the prohibition strikes at the core of constitutional
rights vital to the fabric of our political system, which permits free criti-
cism of governmental decisions. By this relatively innocuous appearing
condition, the appellants' right to protest and seek change is substantially
muzzled.185
Finally, in contrast to the majority, Judge Boochever concluded that "[t]he
application of any balancing test results in the conclusion that under the
circumstances of this case the restriction is unwarranted."186
b. The Unconstitutional Conditions Test
The only other constitutional standard that courts apply when testing the
validity of probation conditions is the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine.
As described by the United States Supreme Court in 1926, the principle
underlying the doctrine is that the government "is without power to impose an
unconstitutional requirement as a condition for granting a privilege."'" This
configuration merely begs the question of what constitutes an "unconstitu-
tional requirement." Because the "infringement of liberties is tolerated" under
the doctrine if the state action is "reasonably related to legitimate policy
objectives and substitute measures are unavailable,.. . [a] balancing test is
implicit."'188 This balancing test generally involves four factors: "(1) the
182. Id. (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
183. Id. at 569 (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184. Id. (Boochever, 3., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185. Id. (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186. Id. (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
187. Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 598 (1926). Put another way, "[t]he
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that government may not grant a benefit on the
condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may
withhold that benefit altogether." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
H v. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989).
188. Weissman, supra note 62, at 372-73.
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nature of the right affected; (2) the degree of the infringement of the right;
(3) the nature ofthe benefit conferred; and (4) the nature ofthe state's interest
in conditioning the benefit."'" 9 Although the doctrine is derived from regula-
tory and taxation principles,"9 a number of courts and commentators have
applied it to a constitutional analysis of probation conditions. 9"
Some examples from the case law reveal the analytical weaknesses ofthe
doctrine as applied to probation conditions. In In re Mannino," the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal wrestled with the validity of a number of broadly worded
probation conditions imposed on a defendant convicted of felonious assault
during a political demonstration on a college campus." Several conditions
imposed outright bans on otherwise constitutionally protected activities, in-
cluding the following:
[The defendant] shall... not become a member, either actively orpas-
sively, of any political or other organization... that participates in or
advocates any form of protest or change in existing conditions .... He
shall ... not contribute any newspaper articles or other writings to any
publication.... He shall not... speak for any organization on any college,
high school, or junior high school campus or at any public function....
He shall not participate in, actively or passively, nor shall he be an ad-
visor to any... demonstration for any purpose whatsoever.""
The sentencing judge told the defendant that he was "going to be gagged...
as far as participating in campus activities, not because I am opposed to pro-
189. Id. at 373 n.8 (citing Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117
U. PA. L. REV. 144, 151 (1968)).
190. Id. at372.
191. See, e.g., People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 n.11 (Ct. App. 1984) (asserting
that unconstitutional conditions doctrine requires that conditions impinging on constitutional
rights be reasonably related to compelling state interest in rehabilitation and that no less
restrictive alternative be available); In re Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880, 889 (Ct. App. 1971)
(applying unconstitutional conditions doctrine); Weissman, supra note 62, at 371 (maintaining
that unconstitutional condition doctrine "serves as the organizing concept for analyzing
probation conditions"); Michael 0. Honeymar, Jr., NoteAlcoholicsAnonymous as a Condition
ofDrunkDrivingProbation: When Does itAmount to Establishment ofReligion?, 97 CoLUM.
L. REv. 437,439-40 n.9 (1997) ("Various commentators have applied this doctrine to analyze
the constitutionality of certain probationary conditions."); Christopher K. Smith, Note, State
Compelled Spiritual Revelation: The First Amendment and Alcoholics Anonymous as a
Condition ofDrunkDrivingProbation, I WU & MARYBI.LRTS. 1.299,310 (1992) (maintain-
ing that "the prohibition on unconstitutional conditions applies to terms of probation").
192. 92 Cal. Rptr. 880 (Ct. App. 1971).
193. See In re Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880, 881 n.2 (Ct. App. 1971) (setting out probation
conditions). Specifically, the defendant was convicted of kicking the victim in the face while
wearing "heavy boots," severely fracturing the victim's jaw. Id. at 887 n.8. It was alleged at
sentencing that, during a prior demonstration, the defendant had kicked campus police officers
with heavy boots. Id. at 885.
194. Id. at 881 n2.
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test, but of the fact that you were not able to control yourself while you were
in fact engaged in a protest movement."195
In the first level of its analysis, the appellate court considered whether the
conditions were reasonably related to the statutory ends of probation. 96 The
court invalidated a number of the conditions, noting that "'[p]utting the gag'
on the convicted probationer, insofar as it [was] not directly related to a past
criminal abuse of the privilege of freedom of speech itselt or to the prospect
of future criminality, [did] not serve to further" the purposes of the probation
statft.197 The court "clarified" those portions of the challenged conditions
that it considered reasonably related to the purposes of the statute, creating a
new condition that precluded the defendant from "actively participat[ing] or
engag[ing] in any on-campus or off-campus demonstration, or protest, or
passive resistance for any purpose whatsoever."'"
Having determined that the condition quoted above was reasonably
related to the statutory purposes of probation, the court next engaged in a
constitutional analysis employing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.'
The court began by citing a previous decision of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, In re Allen,2"o which suggested that the doctrine was "applicable to
conditions of probation.""2 ' The court described the doctrine as requiring the
government to establish the following:
(1) that the conditions reasonably relate to the purposes sought by the
legislation which confers the benefit, (2) that the value accruing to the
public from imposition of those conditions manifestly outweighs any
resulting impairment of constitutional rights; and (3) that there are avail-
able no alternative means less subversive of constitutional right, narrowly
drawn so as to correlate more closely with the purposes contemplated by
conferring the benefit.2
One might think that such concepts as "manifestly outweighs," "no alternative
means," and "narrowly drawn" would imply a much more rigorous review
than a reasonably related analysis conducted under an abuse of discretion
195. Id. at 885 (internal quotations omitted).
196. Id. at 882-83 (explaining requirement that probation terms be reasonable).
197. Id. at 888.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 888-90 (finding that probation condition interfered with defendant's consti-
tutional rights).
200. 455 P.2d 143 (Cal. 1969).
201. Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 889; see In re Allen, 455 P.2d 143, 145 (Cal. 1969)
("[G]overnment is without constitutional authority to impose a predetermined condition on the
exercise of a constitutional right or penalize in some manner its use.").
202. Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 889 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Parrish v. Civil
Sen,. Comm'n, 425 P.2d 223,230-31 (Cal. 1967)).
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standard. However, the court strongly implied that the two tests were indistin-
guishable, stating that it was "unnecessary to determine whether the two tests
are coterminous."203 In just one sentence, the court concluded that the proba-
tion condition that it had essentially drafted satisfied the requirements of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.2 °
The majority opinion's use of the varying levels of review did not escape
at least one judge on the court, who filed a vigorous dissent.205 Although the
court could have invalidated most or all of the probation conditions by apply-
ing the rigorous review suggested by the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
it chose instead to find that the conditions constituted an abuse of the trial
judge's discretion.2' As the dissent pointed out, the majority "necessarily
sa[id] that no [r]easonable man, or judge, would have imposed similar condi-
tions under the facts of this case, for, 'discretion is abused whenever, in its
exercise, a court exceeds the bounds of reason, all the circumstances before
it being considered."' 2  The dissent suggested that the appellate court
reached its holding by merely substituting its factual findings for those of the
trial court,2' something that the abuse of discretion standard precludes but
that the application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine might well
require. In the end, the majority opinion's analysis rendered the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine meaningless.
A few months afterMannino was decided, the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia in People v. Mason2  considered the validity of a probation condition that
required a probationer convicted ofmarijuanapossessionto "submit his person,
place of residence, [or] vehicle, to search and seizure at any time of day or
night, with or without a search warrant, whenever requested to do so by the
Probation Officer or any law enforcement officer. 210 The court declared it to
be "beyond dispute" that the condition was "reasonably related to the proba-
tioner's prior criminal conduct and ... aimed at deterring or discovering sub-
203. Id.
204. See id. (concluding that condition "reasonably relates to [defendant's] reformation and
rehabilitation, that the value accruing to the public... outweighs the resulting impairment of
constitutional rights and the narrow restriction... correlates closely with the purposes to be
served by probation").
205. Id. at 890-98 (Elkington, 3., dissenting).
206. Id. at 892 (Elkington, J., dissenting).
207. Id. (Elkington, 3., dissenting) (quoting Crummer v. Beeler, 8 Cal. Rptr. 698, 702
(Dist. Ct. App. 1960)).
208. See id. at 894 (Elkington, 3., dissenting) ("Any rule which compels appellate courts
to substitute their factual findings for those of a trial court... must necessarily result in less
credible factual resolutions.").
209. 488 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1971).
210. People v. Mason, 488 P.2d 630, 631 (Cal. 1971) (internal quotations omitted).
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sequent criminal offenses." '' The court then turned to its purported constitu-
tional analysis. Without citationtoMannino orto its own opinion inAllen, the
court expressed the view that reasonable intrusions that would otherwise be
unconstitutional could be imposed upon probationers, "at least to the extent
that such intrusions are necessitated by legitimate governmental demands."212
The court then noted that a defendant granted probation under such a condition
"may have no reasonable expectation of traditional Fourth Amendment protec-
tion." '213 In any case, by agreeing to the condition, the defendant "voluntarily
waived whatever claim of privacy he might otherwise have had."214 Thus, the
court reduced to mere surplus language the notion of assuring that constitu-
tional infringements are "necessitated by legitimate governmental demands,"
which might imply a least-restrictive-alternative analysis.
Once again, a dissenting justice noted the complete absence of any genu-
ine constitutional review of the probation condition at issue: Citing both
Mannino and Allen, the dissent restated the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine and noted its applicability to probation conditions.2" 5 Under that analy-
sis, the dissenting justice stated his view that "such a total denial of Fourth
Amendment rights is [neither] necessary [n]or even desirable in rehabilitating
a criminal offender." 6 Acknowledging that the prospect of surprise searches
by a probation officer might deter future criminal conduct, the dissent found
"no justification" for allowing searches by law enforcement officers.2 17 Con-
sequently, the dissenting judge would have invalidated the condition as "over-
broad."21' Whether or not the dissent reached the proper legal conclusion, it
is clear that the majority did not subject the probation condition to substantive
constitutional scrutiny.
Not surprisingly, the disincentives to filing an appeal, the absence of
coherent legal doctrine inthe field, and the failure of appellate courts to engage
in substantive review have created an environment in which trial courts feel
free to impose probation conditions with little or no restriction. The next
section of this Article explores and analyzes the wide variety of probation
conditions found in case law, legal scholarship, and media accounts.
211. Id. at632.
212. Id. at 633.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 634. The court did state that a probationer is not "barred from objecting to the
unreasonable manner in which that condition is carried out by police officers." Id. at 633 n.3.
215. See id. at 634-35 (Peters, J., dissenting) (maintaining that doctrine limits judicial
impairment of constitutional rights and "applies to persons granted conditional freedom,
including... probationers").
216. Id. at 635 (Peters, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 636 (Peters, J., dissenting).
218. Id. (Peters, J., dissenting).
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11. The Parade ofHorribles
The previous section of this Article discussed the fact that probation
conditions are rarely subjected to any appellate review and that, whenthey face
review, the review is usually extremely deferential and occasionally and
idiosyncratically substantive. Many of the more unusual or constitutionally
invasive probation conditions are described only in media accounts because
defendants seldom appeal the conditions; many more undoubtedly escape any
notice whatsoever. What follows are examples of the wide variety of condi-
tions that judges have imposed. These judges feel progressively less con-
strained by the prospect of substantive appellate review, a trend that results in
an increasing reliance on pop-psychology, personal values and morality, and
various degrees of bias and prejudice.
A. Infiqngements on the Right to Free Speech
The most common and most constitutionally intrusive probation condi-
tions involve significant limitations on the probationer's right to free speech.
Frequently, courts impose these conditions when the defendants have engaged
in politically controversial activities or hold unpopular views - the very
defendants most in need of constitutional protection.219 As a number of courts
and commentators have noted, appellate courts routinely uphold probation
conditions that infringe on the right to free speech.2"
One need not delve very far into the case law to find examples of signifi-
cant free speech limitations that seem to be of questionable correctional utility.
A trio of California cases decided in the late 1960s and early 1970s suggests
the length to which political protest can be effectively silenced through the use
219. As Justice Jackson wrote prior to his elevation to the United States Supreme Court,
"[T]he very essence of constitutional freedom of... speech is to allow more liberty than the
good citizen will take. The test of its vitality is whether we will suffer and protect much that
we think false, mischievous and bad, both in taste and intent" Williamson v. United States, 184
F.2d 280,283 (2d Cir. 1950).
220. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 44 F.3d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Courts have
consistently upheld imposition of conditions of probation that restrict a defendant's freedom of
speech... when those conditions bear a reasonable relationship to the goals of probation.");
Cook, supra note 59, at 3 ("Courts have consistently upheld imposition of probation conditions
that restrict the defendant's freedom[] of speech."); Dan Connally, Note, When Hester Prynne
Drives Drunk: An Examination of the Constitutional Challenges to the Requirement of a
"ScarletBumper Sticker" as a Condition ofProbation on DUI Offenses, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 529,
534 (1988) (stating that "[tiraditionally, first amendment values were of little concern to courts
dealing with conditions of probation," and that, while "[]ater decisions have given the issue
more serious considertion,... the results are often the same"); Judicial Review, supra note 28,
at 203 ("[P]ersons convicted of offenses growing out of some form ofpolitical protest have often
been required, as a condition of their release, to refrain from participation in political demonstra-
tions.").
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of probation conditions." InPeople v. King, the California Court of Appeal
afrmed a probation condition imposed upon a defendant who had been
convicted of an assault that occurred during an anti-war demonstration.' The
probation condition, delivered orally in open court, precluded the defendant
from "tak[ing] an active or official part in any other demonstrations of this
kind. 024 When asked to elaborate, the trial judge clarified that his intention
was to preclude the defendant from a variety of activities, including "making
speeches."' Despite this clarification on the record, the appellate court
concluded that it "c[ould] not hold under the circumstances ofth[e] case [t]hat
the condition of probation in any manner abridge[d] [the] defendant's First
Amendment freedoms."' 26 Incredibly, the court then upheld the trial court's
revocation of the defendant's probation because the defendant had been
observed blowing up balloons at an entirely peaceful protest of the Dow
Chemical Company's campus recruitment efforts at the University of Califor-
nia at Los Angeles.'
The same court reached similar conclusions in two other political protest
cases: In re Mannino' and People v. Arvanites.y In each ofthese cases, the
defendants had been convicted of criminal activity that took place during a
college campus political protest." ° Although the appellate courts engaged in
a reasonably rigorous review of the various conditions that each trial judge
imposed, each court left in place a broadly worded and restrictive probation
condition. In Mannino, the court upheld the condition that the defendant "not
actively participate or engage in any on-campus or off-campus demonstration,
or protest, or passive resistance for any purpose whatsoever.""1 InArvanites,
the court upheld a "prohibition against planning and engaging in demonstra-
tions. 112
221. See infra notes 222-32 and accompanying text (discussing People v. King, In re
Mannino, and In re Arvanites).
222. 73 Cal. Rptr. 440 (Ct App. 1968).
223. People v. King, 73 Cal. Rptr. 440,448 (Ct. App. 1968) (finding no abuse of discretion
in trial court's revocation of probation in light of defendant's violation of probation condition).
224. Id. at443.
225. Id. at 447 n.6.
226. Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
227. Id.
228. 92 Cal. Rptr. 880 (Ct App. 1971). For a more complete discussion of this case, see
supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
229. 95 Cal. Rptr. 493 (Ct. App. 1971).
230. People v. Arvanites, 95 Cal. Rptr. 493,494-96 (Ct. App. 1971); In re Mannino, 92
Cal. Rptr. 880,885 (Ct. App. 1971).
231. Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 888.
232. Arvanites, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
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The imposition of restraints on free speech has not been confined to the
California courts or to the political turmoil of the Vietnam War era. Various
courts also have directed limitations on free speech at those espousing other
politically charged views, including those advocating the legalization of
marijuana, 3 members of the American Indian Movement, 4 members of the
Ku Klux Klan,23 and, perhaps most commonly, members of the anti-abortion
movement. 6 Broadly worded bans on political activity have also been
imposed in cases in which the underlying criminal offense has nothing to do
with speech, but rather to do with the functioning of the political process.23'
Perhaps the most striking example of the restraint of free speech comes
from a recent Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Richey,"5 in which the
court's procedural history of the case revealed an extraordinary sentence
handed down by a judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Washington. 9 A jury convicted the defendant, a former Internal
Revenue Service agent, of conspiracy to defraud the government and of aiding
and assisting in the preparation of false and fraudulent tax returns.24 The trial
judge imposed a probationary sentence, but as a condition of probation
"enjoined [the defendant] from making derogatory remarks about the United
States government."'" The Ninth Circuit never reached the validity of the
condition because it found the defendant to have otherwise violated the
conditions of his probation.242
233. See Activist Banned from Talking About Marijuana, THE WEEK ONLINE WIH
DRCNET, No. 96 (June25,1999) <http'/www.drnet.org/wol/096.html#nospeech> (discussing
probation condition that marijuana activist refrain from speaking publicly about marijuana).
234. See State v. Means, 257 N.W.2d 595, 599-601 (S.D. 1977) (upholding bail condition
that defendant refrain from participating in any American Indian Movement activities).
235. See Land v. State, 426 S.E.2d 370,373-74 (Ga. 1993) (sustaining probation condition
prohibiting participation in Ku Klux Klan activities).
236. See United States v. Turner, 44 F.3d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1995) (allowing probation
condition that prohibited picketing and harassment by defendant); Markley v. State, 507 So. 2d
1043, 1051-52 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (upholding prohibition of anti-abortion protest activities
as requirement of probation); State v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 509, 515-17 (Minn. 1989) (sustain-
ing probation condition that defendants stay 500 feet away from abortion clinic).
237. See United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 146 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding probation
condition precluding defendant from "engag[ing] in any political activity"). But see State v.
Davis, 499 N.E.2d 1255, 1260 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (striking probation condition precluding
defendant from "engag[ing] in any political activity" because it "border[ed] on the infringement
of [the defendant's] First Amendment rights").
238. 924 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1991).
239. United States v. Richey, 924 F.2d 857, 858 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that condition of
probation prohibited defendant from making derogatory comments about government).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 865 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Richey, 874 F.2d 817
(9th Cir. 1989) (unpublished memorandum disposition)).
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These cases provide but a few examples of significant free speech in-
fringements trial courts have imposed upon probationers. Because probation
conditions are so rarely appealed, these examples should make the magnitude
of the issue readily apparent. While the First Amendment clearly prohibits
content-based censorship, these cases precisely reflect such censorship. Total
deference to the trial court's discretion grossly undervalues the central impor-
tance of freedom of speech in a democratic state, thereby establishing danger-
ous possibilities for the repression of unpopular speech underthe guise of cor-
lrectional policy. Moreover, prohibiting free speech seems a peculiar means,
if not a totally counter-productive means, of attempting to reform and rehabili-
tate an offender.
B. Infringements on the Right to Refrain from Speaking
As the United States Supreme Court recognized in its landmark decision
Wooley v. Maynard,243 "the right of freedom of thought protected by the First
Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all."244 Despite the apparent breadth of that
constitutional protection, probation conditions frequently require defendants
to speak in a fashion that involves the adoption of a particular ideological
perspective.245 When probationers appeal those conditions, which appears to
be infrequently,246 courts almost invariablyupholdthem. Two broad categories
of court-ordered ideological speech are readily apparent from the case law and
from media accounts: a public acknowledgment of guilt and apology, most
often in the form of an essay, speech, or newspaper advertisement; and forced
contributions ofmoney or time to organizations with an ideological viewpoint.
1. Public Apologies
The first of these categories, the public apology, has grown in popularity
as part of a relatively recent trend toward imposing probation conditions in-
tended to shame or humiliate the probationer.247 Little to no research focuses
243. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
244. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,714 (1977). The specific holding of the case was
that the State of New Hampshire could not constitutionally require a motorist to display the
slogan "Live Free or Die" on his automobile license plates. Id. at 707, 717.
245. See infra Part lII.B.2 (discussing mandatory contributions); infra Part III.C (address-
ing mandatory association with political and social groups).
246. See supra Part II.A (discussing procedural barriers to appellate review).
247. A good indication of the strength of this trend is that NewsweekMagazine ran a cover
story in February of 1995 on the increasing popularity of shaming punishments. Jonathan Alter
& Pat Wingert, The Return of Shame, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 1995, at 20, 21. Numerous law
review articles and popular publications have commented on the trend. See, e.g., Dan M.
Kahan, WhatDoAlternative SanctionsMean?, 63 U. CHL L. REV. 591,631 (1996) (discussing
rediscovery of shaming penalties in America); Massaro, supra note 93, at 1884-86 (arguing that
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on the efficacy of shaming sentences in general, 248 and despite the current
popularity of such sentences among judges, many experts have theorized that
shaming is either totally ineffective or counter-productive as a response to
criminality.249 Nonetheless, the few appellate courts that have addressed the
imposition of a public apology as a probation condition have upheld the con-
dition.2 °
In United States v. Clark,251 the Ninth Circuit upheld the imposition of
a probation condition that required the defendants to speak a particular mes-
sage.25 2 The defendants were former police officers who had been tried and
convicted of perjury for statements made under oath concerning a dispute over
sick leave.23 As a condition of probation, the judge ordered the defendants
to publish an apology composed by the judge in the local newspaper and in
the police department's newsletter. 4 In its review of the defendants' First
Amendment attack on the condition, the Ninth Circuit concluded that because
"a public apology may serve a rehabilitative purpose," its imposition "was not
an abuse of discretion."2'' Apparently, neither the trial court nor the Ninth
discontent with existing punishment has led to revival of shaming penalties); Aaron S. Book,
Note, Shame on You: An Analysis ofModern Shame Punishment as an Alternative to Incarcer-
ation, 40 WM. & MaRY L. REV. 653, 654 (1999) (reporting trend of sentencing judges to rely
on sentences of shame); Abramson, supra note 36 (recognizing increase in experimentation with
creative alternative penalties); Brannigan & Blumenthal, supra note 36 (documenting recent
trend of humiliation as punishment); Douglas Litowilz, The Trouble with "Scarlet Letter"
Punishments, 81 JUDICATURE 52, 52-53 (1997) (analyzing trend towards more "scarlet letter"
punishments); Reske, supra note 40, at 16 (describing comeback of sentences that humiliate).
248. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 63, at 753-54 (reporting lack of empirical inquiry into
effectiveness of shame penalties); Kahan, supra note 247, at 638 (same); Massaro, supra note
93, at 1918 (same); Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 25, at 1957 (same); Book, supra
note 247, at 656 (same).
249. See, e.g.,Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 25, at 1957 (discussing numerous
claims that shaming is counter-productive); Litowilz, supra note 247, at 55-57 (examining
explanations of why shaming is either ineffective or counter-productive); Courtney Guyton
Persons, Note, Sex in the Sunlight: The Effectiveness, Efficiency, Constitutionality, and
Adi'sability ofPublishingNames andPictures ofProstitutes'Patrons, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1525,
1572-73 (1996) (exploring reasons why shaming can be counter-productive).
250. See Weissman, supra note 62, at 384 (recounting that appellate courts "sustain the
practice" of "requiring the probationer to write essays of contrition or present expiatory
speeches"); Litowitz, supra note 247, at 53 (stating that "state and federal courts have rejected
th[e] argument" that "requiring criminals to publish confessions scripted byjudges... violate[s]
the criminal's right to free speech").
251. 918 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1990).
252. See United States v. Clark, 918 F.2d 843, 848 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that public
apology served purpose of rehabilitation and therefore imposition was not abuse of discretion).
253. Id. at 845.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
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Circuit did any more than engage in idle speculation about the potential rami-
fications of forcing both defendants to speak against their will.
In People v. Stocke,2 6 the Appellate Court of Illinois similarly upheld a
condition that required a series of public speeches with a content specified by
the trial judge.7 The defendant, an eighteen-year-old special education
student who had been involved in a serious motor vehicle accident, was con-
victed of the petty offense of "driving too fast for conditions."" 8 As a conse-
quence, the court ordered him to "prepar[e] a speech about the disastrous
effect of driving a motor vehicle too fast for conditions and presentH it to
driver's education classes throughout the school district."'' 9 Again, the
appellate court held thatthe trial court "did not abuse its discretion in ordering
defendant to perform this public service."26 And again, neither the trial nor
the appellate court appeared to have seriously considered or sought expert
advice on the impact of this serious infringement of this young man's First
Amendment right to refrain from speaking.
The court's decision in Stocke stands in rather stark contrast to a decision
that the same court issued just three years earlier: In People v. Johnson,2" the
court struck down a condition of supervision requiring a drunk driving defen-
dant to place a newspaper advertisement containing her booking photograph
and an apology.262 The court noted that the defendant was "a young lady with
a history of being a good student, ha[d] no prior criminal record, and ha[d]
been evaluated as not having an alcohol or drug problem," and it expressed
concern that the condition would subject the defendant to "public ridicule."2 6 '
Because "[n]either the trial court nor [the appellate] court, without professional
assistance, c[ould] determine the psychological or psychiatric effect ofthe pub-
lication" and because "[an adverse effect upon the defendant would certainly
be inconsistent with rehabilitation," the court vacated the condition.2  In a
concurring opinion, one judge criticized the majority's speculation about
potential harm to the defendant, particularly in the absence of citation to a
256. 571 N.E.2d 192 (11. App. Ct 1991).
257. People v. Stocke, 571 N.E.2d 192, 193 (11. App. Ct. 1991). In this particular case,
the condition was imposed as a part of a conditional discharge, not as a condition of probation.
Id. However, it is clear from the court's decision, which engages in a discussion of reasonable-
ness, that the court applied the same standard of review as it would have applied had the case
involved a probation condition. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 196.
261. 528 N.E.2d 1360 (1. App. CL 1988).
262. People v. Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360,1362 (1l. App. Ct 1988).
263. Id.
264. Id.
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treatise or article to that effect.26 His opinion misread the apparentthrust ofthe
majority opinion, which suggested by its holding that the benefit of any doubt
ought to be given to the defendant, not to the whim of the trial judge. The
remainder ofthe concurring opinion seemed to pick up on this theme, however,
condemning the condition because ofthe judge's expressed fear that upholding
the condition "would encourage other courts to impose other unusual, dramatic
conditions."2 Because "the proliferation of these types of conditions would
cause problems ofa greater magnitude thantheir propensityto rehabilitate," the
concurring judge preferred to "ftirly strictly limit the unspecified type of
reasonable conditions of supervision that can be imposed and let those condi-
tions similar to that imposed here await legislative study and definition." 67 To
that extent, the views expressed in the concurrence, although not shared by a
majority of trial or appellate judges, mirror those of this author.2"
It is clear from a survey of law review articles and media accounts that
the published cases involving the imposition of public speech provides only
the smallest window into this area of probation conditions. Dean Toni M.
Massaro has documented a wide variety of apology conditions, including one
that required a defendant to confess his crime before a church congregation.269
Professor Dan M. Kahan similarly has collected accounts of what he refers to
as "contrition penalties," noting that when judges impose these conditions,
"the sincerity of the offenders' remorse seems largely irrelevant.""0  An
article in the Los Angeles Times in 1991 not only verified the widespread use
of newspaper apology advertisements, but also reported that a number of
newspapers had decided not to publish these types of advertisementsY 1 The
article described "an incipient backlash" against participating in this sort of
probation condition, "caused, in part, by the newspapers' concerns over the
propriety of accepting these so-called 'humiliation' ads." 22
Humiliation as a sentencing approach raises other concerns beyond those
already described. Judges, particularly those who obtain or retain their status
by popular election, have a strong incentive to impose conditions that achieve
public notice. A handful of judges have been the object of national media
attention as a result of the imposition of conditions intended to shame or
humiliate the offender. If the goal is attention, the message to the judges
265. Id. at 1363 (Green, J., specially concurring).
266. Id. (Green, J., specialy concurring).
267. Id. (Green, J., specially concurring).
268. See infra Part V (giving author's proposed response).
269. Massaro, supra note 93, at 1888.
270. Kahan, supra note 247, at 634.
271. Robin Abcarian, "Apology Ads" Raise Issue of Fair Play Punishment, LA- ThMES,
Feb. 4, 1991, atEl.
272. Id.
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seems to be that the more outrageous the condition, the wider the coverage is
likely to be. In addition, there is good reason to fear that judges will impose
these sorts of punishments, which they create episodically and idiosyncrati-
cally, in a fashion that represents the class, gender, and racial biases of the
individual trial judges.
2. Mandatory Contributions
The second broad category of probation conditions that require a proba-
tioner to speak involves court orders requiring probationers to make "charita-
ble contributions" to, participate in, or sometimes even join an organization
that espouses a particular political or social viewpoint. The most common of
these types of conditions appears to be in the environmental realm, where a
number of courts have ordered defendants convicted of environmental crimes
to attend meetings of, join, and make cash contributions to the Sierra Club and
other environmental advocacy groups.' 3 Of the many documented cases of
such environmental sentences, only one appears to have resulted in a legal
challenge; in that case, a conservative think tank filed a disciplinary complaint
against the sentencing judge for imposing such a sentence, but the Ohio
Supreme Court dismissed the complaint without comment. 4 Other examples
that have appeared only in media reports include two hunters who were
required to make cash contributions to the National Wildlife FederationFS and
a forgery defendant with thirteen illegitimate children who was required to
attend Planned Parenthood meetings. 276
Several published court opinions have dealt with the issue of court ordered
"charitable contributions," upholding those conditions of probation in all but
one case. In State v. Pieger,"7 the Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld a
probation condition imposed upon a defendant convicted of leaving the scene
of an accident."5 Even though the defendant had been acquitted of reckless
driving, he was ordered as a condition ofprobation to make a $2,500 contribu-
tion to a local hospital where the accident victim received treatment. 9 Simi-
larly, the Colorado Court of Appeals in People v. Burleigh ° upheld a proba-
tion condition requiring a doctor convicted of the unlawful distribution of a
273. See Levine, supra note 49, at 1841-42 & n.7 (documenting several cases in which
defendants were forced to make contributions to or to join environmental advocacy groups);
Felsenthal, supra note 32 (same).
274. Felsenthal, supra note 32.
275. Id.
276. Reske, supra note 40, at 17.
277. 692 A.2d 1273 (Conn. 1997).
278. State v. Pieger, 692 A.2d 1273, 1274 (Conn. 1997).
279. Id. at 1275.
280. 727 P.2d 873 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
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controlled substance to contribute $5,000 to a drug treatment program. 1 In
federal court cases, judges have required defendants to make a $10,000 contri-
bution to the United States Probation Office 2 and a $3,000,000 contribution
to a program "dedicated to alleviating the problem of the homeless."' Most
recently, inthe highly publicized case against Stephen Fagan, who was accused
of kidnaping his own daughters in order to keep them from his ex-wife for
twenty years, Fagan was sentenced to make a contribution of $100,000 to a
children's charity to be selected by his ex-wife. 4 In just one published case
involving a court-ordered "charitable contribution" did the court appropriately
acknowledge the magnitude of the First Amendment impact of compelling a
probationerto speak. In People v. Warren," theNewYorkAppellate Division
struck down a condition that required a defendant convicted of the attempted
possession of a pistol to contribute $2,500 to an organization advocating gun
control.286 The court declared the conditionto be "patently unconstitutional."u8
In light of the infrequency with which such conditions face appeal and
the limited success that such appeals have had, it seems clear that significant
intrusions on the First Amendment right to refrain from speaking will continue
to be imposed with regularity. The issue is particularly troubling not only
because of the fact that it significantly undervalues the importance of the right
to refrain from speaking, but also because it allows an individual trial justice
to impose his or her morality and values onto an unwilling offender.
C. Infringements on the Right to Freedom ofAssociation
Court have trampled upon and virtually disregarded the right of a defen-
dant to freedom of association perhaps more than any other cherished consti-
tutional right. The Second Circuit has gone so far as to label a freedom of
association attack on a condition of parole as "frivolous," maintaining that "no
one has questioned the Government's power totally to deprive a convicted
person of his freedom of association.""5  A number of commentators have
agreed that appellate courts are particularly deferential when probation condi-
tions abridge the right to freedom of association. 9
281. People v. Burleigh, 727 P.2d 873, 874-85 (Colo. Ct App. 1986).
282. United States v. Carlston, 562 F. Supp. 181, 183 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
283. United States v. Posner, 694 F. Supp. 881,883 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
284. Father Spared Prison in Abduction, PROV. J., May 29,1999, at A2.
285. 452 N.Y.S.2d 50 (App. Div. 1982).
286. People v. Warren, 452 N.Y.S.2d 50, 51 (App. Div. 1982). In this case, the condition
was part of a conditional discharge, not a condition of probation. Id.
287. Id.
288. Birzon v. King, 469 F.2d 1241, 1243 (2d Cir. 1972).
289. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 59, at 3-4 (stating that "[c]ourts have consistently upheld
imposition of probation conditions that restrict the defendant's freedoms of speech and associa-
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1. Association with Political or Social Groups
One need not dig very far into the case law to find extraordinary restric-
tions on association when the defendant is a member of an unpopular or
controversial group or when the defendant has been engaged in controversial
political activity. Perhaps the most shocking condition that a federal appellate
court has upheld is found in United States v. Kohlberg,' in which the Ninth
Circuit upheld a probation condition that the probationer could not "associate
with any known homosexuals." 1  Because the underlying criminal charge
was the mailing of obscene matter,' it seems hard to imagine that the result-
ing sentence was anything short of an outrageous display of ignorance, bias,
and bigoted stereotyping on the part of the trial judge. Indeed, nothing in the
Ninth Circuit's opinion even suggested any connection at all between the
pornographic materials involved and homosexuality, not that such a connec-
tion could justify the condition. The court's opinion did nothing more than
assert that the trial judge "is afforded the widest latitude in the imposition of
conditions"' 3 before summarily concluding that the defendant's constitutional
arguments had "no merit."2
94
Other courts have imposed equally onerous associational restrictions on
those who belong to unpopular groups. In United States v. Showalter, 5 the
Seventh Circuit upheld a probation condition that the defendant "not partici-
pate in, or associate with those who do participate in, the organization known
as 'skinheads,' or in any neo-Nazi organization."' As much as most of us
wish such organizations would cease to exist, it seems quite hard to justify
using the defendant's conviction for the possession of an unregistered
firearmF as an excuse to obliterate his constitutional right to free association.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Georgia has upheld a probation condition
precluding a defendant from participating in any activities of the Ku Klux
tion" and that "[a]ttempts by courts to restrict associations have been much more successful"
than attempts to restrict speech); Weissman, supra note 62, at 376 ("For the most part, associa-
tional restrictions supported by evidence of a reasonable relationship to crime prevention will
be upheld."); Polosky, supra note 28, at 480-81 n.98 (citing several appellate decisions that
"reflect the failure of some courts properly to limit" restrictions on probationer's freedom of
association).
290. 472 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1973).
291. United States v. Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189,1190 (9th Cir. 1973).
292. Id.
293. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. Chapel, 428 F.2d 472, 474
(9th Cir. 1970)).
294. Id.
295. 933 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1991).
296. United States v. Showalter, 933 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1991) (internal quotations
omitted).
297. Id.
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Klan.298 In addition to its decision in Kohlberg, the Ninth Circuit has also
upheld a probation condition that a defendant, apparently a motorcycle
enthusiast, could not "participate in the activities, or be a member of any
motorcycle clubs" after his conviction for being a felon in possession of a
firearm.2 Along somewhat similar lines, the Supreme Court of Hawaii has
upheld a probation condition that a probationer convicted of marijuana posses-
sion "refrain from the company of people of questionable character."
3 °
Perhaps even more common than the imposition of onerous restrictions
on the associational rights of unpopular defendants is the imposition of such
restrictions on defendants who have engaged in political activity. Often, these
conditions seem designed effectively to prevent the defendant from continued
political activity. In United States v. Smith,301 the Fifth Circuit upheld a
probation condition requiring the defendant to "forego any association what-
ever with the Students for Democratic Society" and to "[d]iscontinue [his]
association with the members of the Humanists group with which [he] vio-
lated the law."13 2 Unlike in some of the political protest cases mentioned in
the section describing limitations on free speech,303 the protest that led to this
defendant's conviction was entirely peaceful, involving a two hour gathering
in front of an Army induction center intended to protest the United States's
involvement in the Vietnam war.3° The sole charge lodged against the
defendant, and therefore the sole conviction against the defendant, was for the
"unauthorized wearing of a distinctive part of an Army uniform.130 5 Rather
than question the justification for such an extraordinary restriction of the
defendant's constitutional right to free association, the Fifth Circuit merely
noted that the defendant "could have rejected probation and elected prison,"
and that, having "chose[n] to enjoy the benefits of probation," the defendant
had to "endure its restrictions."
3 6
298. Land v. State, 426 S.E.2d 370, 374 (Ga. 1993). In this case, there was at least a
marginally better excuse for this incredibly broad restriction in that the underlying conviction
was for "inciting to riot" while the defendant was "dressed in the ceremonial garb and pointed
hood of a knight of the Ku Klux Klan." Id. at 372.
299. United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478,480-81 (9th Cir. 1991).
300. State v. Martinez, 580 P.2d 1282, 1286-88 (Haw. 1978).
301. 414 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Schacht v. United
States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970).
302. United States v. Smith, 414 F.2d 630,636 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'don other grounds sub
noma. Schaeht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970).
303. See supra Part DIA (discussing cases in which probation conditions resulted from
convictions following violent political protests).
304. Smith, 414 F.2d at 631-32.
305. Id. at632.
306. Id. at 636; see also supra Part IIA.2 (discussing contract theory as procedural obstacle
to appellate review).
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Similarly, in Malone v. United States,3 the Ninth Circuit heard an
appeal involving a defendant who had been convicted of the unlawful exporta-
tion of firearms from the United States to the United Kingdom, apparently as
part of an effort to aid the Irish Republican movement.s The trial court
imposed an array of probation conditions that set out broad associational
restrictions, including a restriction that the defendant "not participate in any
American Irish Republican movement," that he "belong to no Irish organiza-
tions, cultural or otherwise," that he "not belong or participate in any Irish
Catholic organizations or groups," that he "not visit any Irish pubs," and that
he "accept no employment that directly or indirectly associates him with any
Irish organization or movement."3"9 Noting the "[g]reat discretion" vested in
the trial court, the Ninth Circuit upheld the conditions because it concluded
that there was "a reasonable nexus between the probation conditions and the
goals of probation.""'0 Likewise, the Supreme Court of South Dakota has
upheld a broad associational restriction prohibiting the defendant, a well
known Native American activist, from "participating in any American Indian
Movement activities."3"' Because it found that the trial court had "a rational
basis upon which to impose [the] condition," the court found "no infringement
of [the] defendant's right[ ] to freedom of association." '312 Several federal
circuit courts have upheld probation conditions prohibiting tax resisters from
associating with groups or people that advocate tax resistance. 33
2. Association with Spouse or Fianc=6
Another area of restrictive probation conditions involves an intersection
of the right to freedom of association and the right to privacy. A number of
courts have upheld restrictions upon a defendant's association with his or her
spouse or fiance, presumably based on the trial judge's personal opinion that
such association would be detrimental to the defendant's rehabilitation.
307. 502 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1974).
308. Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554,555 (9th Cir. 1974).
309. Id. at 555.
310. Id. at556-57.
311. State v. Means, 257 N.W.2d 595, 596 (S.D. 1977). The restrictive condition was
actually a condition of bail, not of probation, but the court explicitly stated that its standard of
review was identical. Id. at 600. The condition did allow for narrow exceptions in the areas of
fundraising and litigation within the court system. Id. at 596.
312. Id. at 601.
313. See, e.g., United States v. Schiff, 876 F.2d 272, 276-77 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding
probation condition prohibiting tax resister from associating with those advocatiang noncompli-
ance with tax laws); United States v. Lawson, 670 F.2d 923, 929-30 (10th Cir. 1982) (same);
United States v. Patterson, 627 F.2d 760,760-61 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); United States v. Smith,
618 F.2d 280,282 (5th Cir. 1980) (same).
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While such familial restrictions have "received more equivocal treatment" by
appellate courts than other associational restrictions,"' most such conditions
continue to be upheld.
In In re Peeler,31 the California Court of Appeal upheld a probation
condition that, while not directly so worded, was acknowledged by the court
to be "a command that she live apart from her husband." '316 The defendant had
been convicted of possession of marijuana, and, in an entirely unrelated set of
charges, her husband stood accused of distributing marijuana. 1 7 Despite its
claim that it "ha[d] not lost sight of the [possible] eventual acquittal of the
presumptively innocent husband,"3 18 the court approved of the condition. In
support of its holding, the court deferred completely to a balancing test that
it merely assumed the trial court had conducted: "The trial court in the matter
before us undoubtedly weighed [the] public policy [supporting the integrity
of marriage] in relation to the public policy involved in an attempt to rescue
[the defendant] from involvement in narcotic violations to her possible perma-
nent destruction. " 319 Along similar lines, the Court of Appeals of Arizona in
State v. Nickerson32° upheld a probation condition that allowed the defendant
to have contact with his wife only upon the "prior written consent of his
probation officer.1321 In that case, the defendant had been convicted of one
count of theft involving property valued at under $250.'z The court found
that "the record amply support[ed] the trial court's apparent conclusion that
separating [the defendant] and his wife for a period of time .. . serves a
rehabilitative purpose,"323 apparently because the defendant and his wife had
been arrested together - with no mention of conviction or acquittal - on a
total of three occasions."
By contrast, the Supreme Court of Oregon seems to have taken a harder
look at the imposition of a probation condition that restricted a defendant's
association with her husband. In State v. Martin,31 the court narrowed the
scope of a probation condition that precluded a convicted forger from associ-
ating with "any person who has ever been convicted of a crime" so that the
314. Weissman, supra note 62, at 376-77.
315. 72 Cal. Rptr. 254 (Ct App. 1968).
316. In re Peeler, 72 Cal. Rptr. 254,256-58 (Ct App. 1968).
317. Id. at 256-58.
318. Id. at261.
319. Id. at260.
320. 791 P.2d 647 (Ariz. Ct App. 1990).
321. State v. Nickerson, 791 P.2d 647, 648 (Ariz. Ct App. 1990).
322. Id.
323. Id. at 649.
324. Id. at 648.
325. 580 P.2d 536 (Or. 1978).
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condition no longer included the defendant's husband.326 Although the defen-
dant's lawyer had argued for leniency at the time of sentencing by arguing that
the defendant's husband was "largely to blame for [her] crimes," '327 the court
maintained that the "factual record in th[e] case was incomplete."'3  In
particular, the court felt that the trial court "should have determined from the
record whether as a matter of fact the spouse would be a bad influence so as
to endanger rehabilitation or public safety and, if so, what interference with
marital rights less than complete separation would serve to protect society's
interests."132 In deciding to narrow the probation condition to exclude the
defendant's husband, the court highlighted its general rule that "where funda-
mental rights are involved, the sentencing court has less discretion to impose
conditions in conflict therewith. "3 ' This sort of general rule, while not widely
adopted, makes perfect sense, as does the notion that restrictive conditions
should be based upon findings of fact from the trial court record. It is unclear
whether the court meant to imply that such facts could have been found from
the record without any professional or expert testimony, but the better rule
would require such testimony in order to avoid judicial guesswork or reliance
on pop-psychology.
Conditions restricting association with flanc6s have received much the
same treatment. For example, in Edwards v. State33 the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin upheld a condition prohibiting the defendant from associating with
her fiancd, who had been her co-defendant.332 Interestingly, a dissenting
justice argued that because a less restrictive condition could have been de-
vised and because "[t]here is reason to believe that freedom of association
promotes rehabilitation by enabling a probationer to establish and maintain
normal relationships," the condition should have been vacated.333 In United
States v. Bortels,334 the Sixth Circuit similarly upheld a condition that prohib-
ited the defendant from associating with her fianc6, deferring to the trial
court's conclusion that "her rehabilitation would be aided if she avoided
future contact with her flanc. "335 In State v. Allen,336 the Court of Appeals of
Oregon upheld a probation condition that required the court's permission to
326. State v. Martin, 580 P.2d 536, 540 (Or. 1978).
327. Id. at 538.
328. Id. at 540.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. 246 N.W.2d 109 (Wis. 1976).
332. Edwards v. State, 246 N.W.2d 109,110 (Wis. 1976).
333. Id. at 112 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
334. 962 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1992).
335. United States v. Bortels, 962 F.2d 558,559 (6th Cir. 1992).
336. 506 P.2d 528 (Or. Ct. App. 1973).
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"enter into any marriage contract."337 Although the defendant's fianc6 did not
appear to have had any direct involvement in the defendant's criminal activity,
the fianc6 had a number of criminal convictions on his record. 38 Stressing the
"wide discretion of the trial court," the appellate court upheld the condition
because "[aJpparently the sentencing court concluded that [the] defendant's
criminal activity was related to her association with [her fianc6] and that her
chances for success on probation would be enhanced if she stayed away from
him."3 9 The court's use of the word "apparently" made it clear that appellate
court's speculation about the trial court's reasoning was sufficient to justify
upholding the condition.
One disturbing - and undoubtedly not coincidental - element ofthe cases
involving restrictions on association with a spouse or a fianc6 is that, almost
without exception, the defendant subject to the restriction is a woman.
Indeed, a fair reading of this set of cases reveals an extraordinary level of
paternalism. One can almost hear the father figure in each of the judges doing
his best to keep his teenaged daughter away from the evil influence of the bad
boyfriend. It becomes hard for that father to accept the inevitable: that the
daughter must take personal responsibility for her actions, and that she can
grow and mature only if she is allowed to make her own choices about with
whom she will associate.
D. Infringements on the Right ofAccess to the Courts
Several published cases reveal efforts on the part of a sentencing judge
to place significant limitations, if not total prohibitions, on a probationer's
constitutionally protected right of access to the courts. These cases seem to
be prime examples of another easily recognizable pattern that emerges from
the probation condition case law: the use of probation conditions to address
issues or perceived problems above and beyond the underlying criminal
behavior. One set of access to court cases involves the use of probation
conditions to resolve tangentially related legal issues that could and should be
litigated in another forum specifically designed for that purpose; another
involves the use of probation conditions to muzzle the active pro se litigator.
1. Resolving Tangentially Related or Unrelated Issues
One broad category of judicial abuses in this area involves the use of
probation conditions not in such a way as to categorically restrain access
to the courts, but rather to resolve in a preemptive fashion legal issues that
could and should be litigated in another forum specifically designed for that
337. State v. Allen, 506 P.2d 528,529 (Or. Ct. App. 1973).
338. Id.
339. Id. (emphasis added).
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purpose. The most common examples involve probation conditions that
regulate custody or visitation issues involving the defendant's children, that
regulate the defendant's employment or professional licensing status, that
regulate the defendant's immigration and naturalization status, and that
require the payment of restitution for offenses for which the defendant was
not convicted.
a. Regulation of Custody or Visitation
Several appellate cases have upheld probation conditions that preclude
a parent from having custody of or any contact with his or her natural chil-
dren.34° Not surprisingly, the majority of these cases involve convictions
for some form of child abuse. 4 What is surprising is that these cases do not
even acknowledge, let alone defer to, the pre-existing legal mechanisms
designed specifically to regulate these vital constitutional rights and relation-
ships. In only a very small handful of cases has a court appropriately recog-
nized that these issues are best resolved in a family court setting, where the
defendant's due process rights are accorded full weight and where the best
interests of the child or children can be determined, normally with some
expert assistance.
In Smith v. State,342 for example, the Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land vacated a probation condition that precluded the defendant from seeking
custody of her children without permission form the trial judge.343 Unlike in
the ordinary case, in which the judge imposes sentence with little or no input
from those with any professional expertise, the judge in this case, which
involved a charge of child abuse, heard testimony from a representative of the
Department of Social Services. 3" When that representative indicated that the
defendant's custody of her children could eventually be restored if she "dem-
onstrated her fitness," the judge responded by imposing the condition at
issue.34' As the appellate court aptly noted, the trial judge "inject[ed] himself
into a matter that the Legislature ha[d] decided best rests in the jurisdiction of
340. See, e.g., People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365-66 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting, in
case ruling condition that defendant refrain from becoming pregnant was overbroad, that
defendant did not challenge condition that she have no contact with her children); Howland v.
State, 420 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fi. Ct. App. 1982) (affirming condition of probation prohibiting
defendant from having contact with his child); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1979) (affirming condition prohibiting custody of children); State v. Whitchurch, 577
A.2d 690,693 (Vt 1990) (affirming condition prohibiting contact with children).
341. See supra note 340 (citing relevant cases).
342. 563 A.2d 1129 (Md. Ct Spec. App. 1989).
343. Smith v. State, 563 A.2d 1129,1130 (Md. Ct Spec. App. 1989).
344. Id.
345. Id.
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the juvenile court.''346 The court pointed out that, because '"te trial judge was
without jurisdiction to decide custody directly, he [was] seeking to do indi-
rectly that which he could not do directly, i.e., nevertheless control custody
of the children insofar as their mother... is concerned. ' 347 The court con-
cluded its opinion by maintaining that "custody matters are best not decided
in a criminal proceeding. 3
48
The Supreme Court of Oregon reached a similar conclusion in State v.
Donovan, in which the defendant had been accused of custodial interference
after absconding with his children during a period of court-ordered visita-
tion.350 Much like in Smith, the trial court imposed a probation condition
precluding the defendant from moving for custody of the children without the
trial court's permission.3 1 The court there emphasized that "[t]he public [did]
not need protection from [the] defendant's recourse to the courts," concluding
that "barring such recourse [is not] a proper means of rehabilitation."352 But
perhaps more to the point, the court recognized that "how custody should be
decided in the children's best interests [is a] question[] for a domestic rela-
tions or juvenile court proceeding, not for a criminal sentencing proceed-
ing.1353 Unfortunately, particularly given the very small number of sentences
that are ever appealed, decisions in line with Donovan and Smith undoubtedly
represent only the tiniest percentage of cases in which custody determinations
are handed down at the whim of a sentencing judge.
b. Regulation of Employment or Professional Licensing
Another series of cases that involve the same concept - keeping the
defendant from litigating an issue in its appropriate forum by deciding it with
a condition of probation - involves conditions that regulate the defendant's
employment or professional licensing status. One common example arises
when probation conditions preclude defendants who are licensed attorneys
from engaging in the practice of law, thereby side-stepping the appropriate
disciplinary proceedings in effect inthe jurisdiction. In Yarbrough v. State,5 4
for example, the Court of Appeals of Georgia upheld such a probation condi-
tion imposed upon an attorney who had pled nolo contendere to a charge of
346. Id. at 1131.
347. Id. at 1130.
348. Id. at 1131.
349. 770 P.2d 581 (Or. 1989).
350. State v. Donovan, 770 P.2d 581,582 (Or. 1989).
351. Id.
352. Id. at 584.
353. Id. at 583.
354. 166 S.E.2d 35 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969).
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forging a warranty deed. 355 Similarly, the Court of Appeal of Louisiana in
State v. Matthews 356 upheld a probation condition precluding the defendant
from practicing law for the duration of his probation.35
When it comes to the issue of permanent disbarment, however, the
appellate courts have shown a little more interest in the argument that sentenc-
ing courts should leave professional licensing decisions to the established
procedural channels. The Second Circuit held this way in United States v.
Pastore,355 vacating a probation condition that required an attorney convicted
of filing a false income tax return to resign as a member of the bar.359 The
essence of the court's opinion was summarized in the following passage:
[B]efore any defendant is required to give up his job, or trade or profes-
sion, he shouldbe givenameaningful opportunityto demonstrate why such
a condition might be inappropriate. If there is already in existence a well-
defined procedure for resolution ofthat issue, it makes sensetoutilizeit.'
While some other courts have likewise vacated conditions that have the effect
of permanent disbarment of attorneys, they have generally done so on the
theory that only the highest court in the jurisdiction has the authority to
impose such a condition.3" Probation conditions have also been used to
temporarily or permanently terminate the professional careers of physicians,362
law enforcement officers363 and labor union officials."
355. Yarborough v. State, 166 S.E.2d 35,36-37 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969).
356. 572 So. 2d 250 (La. CL App. 1990).
357. State v. Matthews, 572 So. 2d 250,255 (La. Ct. App. 1990)
358. 537 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1976).
359. United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 682-84 (2d Cir. 1976).
360. Id. at 682.
361. See, e.g., People v. Battershell, 569 N.E.2d 308, 311-12 (Il. Ct. App. 1991) (ruling
that trial judge did not have power to prohibit defendant from practicing law); State v. Mat-
thews, 572 So. 2d 250, 255 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (ruling that defendant could not be precluded
from representing himself as condition of probation).
362. See, e.g., People v. Frank, 211 P.2d 350, 352 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949) (ruling
condition prohibiting defendant from practicing medicine was not abuse of discretion); State
v. Dean, 306 N.W.2d 286, 289 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that defendant was required to
refrain from practicing psychiatry during probation).
363. See, e.g., United States v. Brockway, 769 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1985) (ruling
condition that defendant not serve as law enforcement officer did not exceed trial court's
discretion); United States v. Villarin Gerena, 553 F.2d 723, 726 (1st Cir.1977) (ruling trial court
did not abuse discretion by requiring defendant to resign as law enforcement officer).
364. See, e.g., United States v. Barrasso, 372 F.2d 136, 137 (3d Cir. 1967) (ruling that
condition defendant refrain from seeking employment by labor union was proper); People v.
Osslo, 323 P.2d 397, 412-13 (Cal. 1958) (ruling that restriction that defendant not hold any
union position was proper).
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c. Regulation oflmmigration Status
The banishment of a criminal defendant is frequently held out as the
prototypical example of a probation condition that will -be vacated as violative
of public policy.36 Nonetheless, a number of courts have upheld probation
conditions that have effectuated the deportation of the defendants without any
involvement by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. In United States
v. Janko,3" for example, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a probation condition
requiring two defendants to leave the United States.3 67 The court held that by
entering into a plea agreement that included this condition, the defendants
"waived any right to have their deportation determined by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service's exclusion proceedings."131 Similarly, the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island in State v. Karan369 upheld a probation condition
requiring the defendant to leave the United States and not return.370 In that
case, the court acknowledged the obvious fact that a state court "does not have
the power to deport an individual from the United States" because "[s]uch
power is conferred solely upon the appropriate federal authorities pursuant to
[federal law]. "371 Despite those acknowledgments, however, the court upheld
the condition at issue, reasoning that the defendant, by entering into the plea
agreement had waived the right to object to its terms.3 72 These cases serve as
excellent examples both of the lengths to which some trial courts are willing
to go to circumvent normal channels of litigation concerning important
rights,37 3 and the lengths to which some appellate courts are willing to go to
avoid any substantive appellate review even of sentences that appear to be
patently unlawful.
365. See, e.g., KLEIN, supra note 16, at 87 (calling banishment "an obvious and consistent
example" of probation conditions "rejected by the courts for contravening public policy");
Polonsky, supra note 28, at 469-70 (noting that "[b]anishment has consistently been held void
as a condition of probation").
366. 865 F.2d 1246 (1lth Cir. 1989).
367. United States v. Janko, 865 F.2d 1246, 1247 (1 lth Cir. 1989).
368. Id.
369. 525 A.2d 933 (RI. 1987).
370. State v. Karan, 525 A.2d 933, 933-34 (RI. 1987).
371. Id. at 934.
372. Id.
373. In the immigration and deportation setting, a number of courts have vacated conditions
on the theory suggested by this argument, holding that such a condition is outside the sentencing
judge's authority in that it circumvents the established deportation procedures. See, e.g., United
States v. Abushaar, 761 F.2d 954, 960-61 (3d Cir. 1985) (ruling that condition that defendant
serve probation period outside country was impermissible); United States v. Hernandez, 588
F.2d 346, 350-52 (2d Cir. 1978) (ruling that condition that defendant leave country exceeded
authority of court); United States v. Castillo-Burgos, 501 F2d 217, 219-20 (9th Cir. 1974)
(ruling that sentence of deportation following jail time exceeded authority of court).
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d. Requirement ofRestitution
The last major category of probation conditions that seem designed to
avoid the proper use of normal judicial channels of litigation involves condi-
tions that require the defendant to pay restitution for offenses for which he was
not convicted. In perhaps the most extreme example of this sort of condition,
the California Court of Appeal upheld in People v. Miller74 the imposition of
restitution for various outstanding debts under circumstances in which "there
[was] no indication that any of the claims ... were based on criminal
conduct."375 The court upheld the condition because the trial court "may have
concluded" that the rehabilitation of the defendant, who was a building con-
tractor, "could best be achieved in a context of complete reparation for the
harm done to his former customers."376 Although these aggrieved parties could
certainly have sought a legal remedy for their alleged harms through civil
litigation, it seems that the court was content to play the role of a collection
agency, at the same time eliminating any potential defenses that the defendant
might have raised through the appropriate litigation of the issues involved. 77
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of South Carolina has upheld the imposi-
tion of restitution for crimes for which the defendant had not been indicted.3 8
In that case, State v. Bynes 3 the defendant had been indicted for and pled
guilty to two counts of forgery.380 At the time of his sentencing, however, the
defendant was presented with information aboutuncharged forgery accusations
and offered a rather stark "choice." As described by the Court of Appeals, the
trial judge told the defendant that "he could either agree to pay the restitution
[for the uncharged forgeries] and receive a reduced sentence and probation or
face a fourteen year sentence for the two forgeries on which he had been
indicted, without probation." '381 Not surprisingly, the defendant chose to
minimize his jail time and to pay restitution for the uncharged crimes. The
374. 64 Cal. Rptr. 20 (Ct. App. 1967).
375. People v. iller, 64 Cal. Rptr. 20,25 (Ct. App. 1967) (emphasis added).
376. Id. (emphasis added).
377. This sort of argument seems to have persuaded the Supreme Court of Michigan in
People v. Becker, 84 N.W.2d 833 (Mich. 1957). In that case, the defendant had pled guilty to
a charge of leaving the scene of a personal injury accident Id. at 834. As a condition of his
probation, the defendant was ordered to pay restitution for the medical bills of the parties who
were injured in the accident Id. The court focused on the fact that "the act of which the
defendant was convicted was not that of striking down but of leaving," id. at 835, pointing out
that, in arguing against the condition, the defendant was simply demanding what he was due:
"a hearing as to his civil liability, with all his constitutional safeguards." Id. at 836. Based on
that reasoning, the court vacated the condition. Id. at 840.
378. State v. Bynes, 403 S.E.2d 126,127 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991).
379. 403 S.E.2d 126 (S.C. Ct App. 1991).
380. Id. at 126.
381. Id. at 127.
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Court of Appeals concluded that the defendant's "consent to full restitution as
a condition of his probation preclude[d] him from challenging the condition on
appeal.1382 Any regard for the presumption of innocence or for procedural
fairness on the uncharged crimes seems to have been abandoned, presumably
in the name of judicial efficiency. A similar conclusion seems justified con-
cerning a decision by the Supreme Court of California in People v. Lent, 83 in
which the court upheld the imposition of restitution for a charge of theft for
whichthe defendanthad actually beentried and acquitted."4 Empowering trial
judges to use the full weight of their authority in order to right what they
personally perceive to be wrongs raises a very dangerous specter indeed.
2. Silencing the Pro Se Litigant
In a rather extreme example of cases in which a trial court seeks to deny
access to the courts altogether, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in State v.
D 'Amario35 upheld a probation condition imposed on an active pro se litiga-
tor that precluded him from proceeding pro se in any court or agency within
the state and also required him to dismiss all of his pending litigation, much
of which was against the State. 6 As described by the court, the defendant
had "an extensive history as a litigant in the Rhode Island courts," including
the instigation of at least seventeen state court actions and at least nine federal
court actions.3" The criminal charges in the case involved one count of
obstruction ofthe judicial system, which stemmed from a letter written by the
defendant that "appeared to threaten [a public official's] life," and one count
of disorderly conduct, which stemmed from a courtroom argument with a
different public official. 88 Without any supporting evidence or expert testi-
mony to this effect, and despite the isolated nature of these episodes in the
context of a litigation history spanning almost two decades, the trial judge
found that the defendant's proceeding pro se presented "a real threat to the
judiciary, opposing counsel and to [the defendant's] own well being .... ,38 9
382. Id.
383. 541 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1975).
384. People v. Lent, 541 P.2d 545, 549 (Cal. 1975). For an opinion reaching the opposite
conclusion, see State v. Labure, 427 So. 2d 855 (La. 1983), in which the court struck down a
probation condition requiring restitution for a charge that had been dismissed. The court
described the condition as "patently erroneous" because the defendant "did not plead guilty to
that offense and was not convicted of it" Id. at 857.
385. 725 A.2d 276 (R.. 1999). It should be noted that the author of this Article repre-
sented the defendant, Mr. D'Amario, in the post-conviction aspects of this case.
386. State v. D'Amario, 725 A2d 276,278-81 (ILL 1999).
387. Id. at 277.
388. Id. at277-78.
389. Id. at 281.
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The trial judge then imposed a probation condition that completely precluded
the defendant from engaging in pro se litigation 90 and that required the dis-
missal of all pending litigation."
On its face, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island's decision relied almost
exclusively on its holding that the defendant waived any objection to the
probation conditions by agreeing to them in order to obtain his release from
incarceration.3" A close reading of the case reveals a somewhat different
agenda, however, as the court makes repeated references to preserving court
resources and preventing frivolous or abusive litigation. 93 The trial court did
not find that the defendant's pending litigation was frivolous or abusive," 4
and the supreme court neglected even to mention the most troubling aspect of
the mandated dismissal of that pending litigation: the fact that the state
appeared to have used its significant leverage in the criminal case to obtain
final resolution of pending civil matters in which it was the defendant.
395
Even the supreme court recognized the excesses ofthe trial court's conditions.
Thus, the court held that precluding the defendant from defending himself pro
se or from petitioning a court for permission to proceed pro se was going too
far, and it modified the condition accordingly.3 96 The court did not discuss
whether the remaining conditions were necessary as a matter of correctional
policy or whether some other, less constitutionally intrusive conditions might
have sufficed.
The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin reviewed a similar probation condi-
tion in State v. Peckham.3' After the defendant's conviction on "various theft
and forgery charges," the trial court imposed a probation condition that,
390. Id. at 278-79. The probation condition did allow the defendant, "[t]hrough counsel,"
to file a petition to proceed pro se. Id. at 278. Because the defendant was indigent, however,
this provision would offer him little assistance in the vast majority of circumstances.
391. Id. at 278-79. Again, the probation condition did allow the possibility that the
defendant could avoid dismissal of two pending matters if he could prevail upon private counsel
to enter an appearance. Id. That caveat turned out to offer the defendant no relief from the
severity of the condition.
392. Id. at 279-80.
393. Id. at280-81.
394. Indeed, much of the litigation had been pending for years. The fact that the cases had
never been dismissed on summary judgment grounds suggests that it would be difficult to
characterize them as frivolous.
395. This apparent conflict of interest was exaggerated by the fact that the very same office
represents the State of Rhode Island in both civil and criminal matters and by the fact that the
complainant in the more serious criminal charge was an attorney within that office. Although
these issues were fully briefed and argued before the Supreme Court, see Appellant's Brief at
32-38, State v. D'Amario, 725 A.2d 276 (R.IL 1999) (No. 97-0567-CAL) (on file with Washing-
ton andLee Law Review), the court chose to ignore them entirely in rendering its opinion.
396. D Amario, 725 A.2d at 281.
397. No. 95-1862-CR, 1996 WL 544096, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept 26,1996).
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among other restrictions, precluded the defendant from sending "communica-
tions of any type to any court... without the written permission of her proba-
tion agent.,''3 Unlike D 'Amario, however, the court properly recognized that
the probation condition was "overly broad" because it "unduly restrict[ed the
defendant's] right of access to the courts."s  The court remanded the case for
resentencing and, citing the defendant's "undisputed record of harassing
people involved in prosecuting her or supervising and regulating her behav-
ior," suggested that the trial court could "refashion the condition so that it
[was] directed solely toward the prevention of harassing behavior."u400 Even
if a record of harassment were indeed undisputed, the court did not clarify
why a probation condition in a theft and forgery case, rather than the rigorous
enforcement of the pre-existing criminal statutes prohibiting harassment, was
the appropriate mechanism for controlling that behavior.
E. Infringements on the Right to Freedom of Religion
It has been suggested that, for whatever reason, probation conditions that
either prohibit or require participation in religious activities are subjected to
more rigorous appellate scrutiny than many other fundamental rights.0 1 One
commentator, writing in 1982, described "regular church attendance" as "thae
typical challenged condition," but opined that the imposition of the condition
was on the decline.4" Because he based that opinion largely on the condemna-
tion of such conditions by other commentators and on-the absence of published
cases on point,43 it seems hard to credit the notion that any appreciable decline
has actually occurred. Indeed, neither this opinion nor the broader notion that
the religious liberties ofprobationers are better protected than their other funda-
mental constitutional rights is supported by a reading ofthe case law in the field
or by a reading of media accounts of sentences imposing such conditions.
Much as with the imposition of other constitutionally invasive probation
conditions, there is good reason to believe that a very high percentage of cases
goes unchallenged in the legal system. In a 1984 opinion striking down a
probation condition requiring the defendant to "attend an organized church of
his choice on a regular basis," the Court of Appeal of Louisiana noted that,
398. State v. Peckham, No. 95-1862-CR, 1996 WL 544096, at *1 (Wis. Ct App. Sept 26,
1996).
399. Id.
400. Id. at *1-*2.
401. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 15, at 94-96 (arguing conditions implicating religious
freedom are unlikely to be upheld); Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 25, at 1951
(stating probation conditions implicating religious freedom violate Free Exercise clause).
402. Weissman, supra note 62, at 383 (arguing probation conditions implicating religious
freedom are unconstitutional and becoming less frequent).
403. Id. at 383 n.86.
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while this was "not the first time that church attendance ha[d] been made a
condition ofprobation in Louisiana," it was the first time such a condition had
been challenged." 4 In that same year, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
commented in dicta on a similar condition of probation, this time requiring
weekly church attendance for the judge's articulated purpose of "keep[ing the
defendant] within the light that [he had] seen."40 Although the defendant had
not challenged the legality of the condition on appeal, the court felt compelled
to comment on it "as a cautionary note to courts below."4" The court then
concluded that the requirement of church attendance was "most likely uncon-
stitutional."007 It is hard to imagine any reason for the court to extend this
cautionary note on an issue that had not been raised on appeal other than its
concern that this sort of condition was being imposed on a regular basis,
because the court's holding in the case affirmed both the conviction and the
sentence, including the requirement of church attendance. Indeed, media
accounts of probation conditions involving court-ordered participation in
religious activities certainly seem to substantiate this concern.4"
At least two appellate courts have explicitly upheld conditions of proba-
tion that squarely implicated the defendants' First Amendment right to reli-
gious freedom. In Malone v. United States,4°9 the Second Circuit upheld a
probation condition providing that a defendant could "not belong [to] or par-
404. State v. Morgan, 459 So. 2d 6, 8-10 (La. Ct.App. 1984) (citing State ex rel. Wright,
387 So. 2d 75,76-77 (La. Ct. App. 1980)).
405. Commonwealth v. Kuhn, 475 A.2d 103, 108 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (quoting trial
judge).
406. Id.
407. Id. This position is consistent with that expressed in a few other court opinions. See
State v. Evans, 796 P.2d 178, 178-80 (Kan. CtL App. 1990) (reversing imposition of probation
conditions requiring church attendance and community service at that church); State v. Morgan,
459 So. 2d 6, 10 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (vacating probation condition requiring church atten-
dance); Jones v. Commonwealth, 38 S.E.2d 444,448-49 (Va. 1946) (concluding in dicta that
requiring regular church attendance violates Constitution).
408. See, e.g., Mark CurridenMakingPunishmentFit Crime Often NotPopularATLANTA
CONST., Jan. 9, 1992, at A3 (describing sentence requiring defendant convicted of having sex
with minor to observe "three months of faithful Sunday school attendance"); Robert A. Mintz,
Judge Turns Confessing to a Crime into a Religious Experience, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 6, 1984, at
47 (describing sentence requiring defendant convicted of car theft to confess his crime before
church congregation); Paul J. Toomey, Rude Driver Ordered to Serve Time in Church, THE
REc., Feb. 1, 1996, at Al (describing sentence requiring defendant convicted of disorderly
conduct to "go to church, talk to a minister, and give the court a note from the minister saying
he had counseled his congregant"); World of Religion: ACLU Attacks Church Attendance
Ruling, WASH. PosT, May 3,1986, at H12 (describing rescission of eight to twenty-three month
prison sentence for defendant convicted of receiving stolen property on condition that he attend
church every Sunday). There is no evidence that any one of the conditions described in the
articles cited here was the subject of a legal appeal.
409. 502 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1974).
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ticipate in any Irish Catholic organizations or groups."41 The defendant, who
had apparently been active in the American Irish Republican movement, stood
convicted of exporting firearms to the United Kingdom.4" In the face of the
defendant's First Amendment challenge, the court did little other than to
highlight the breadth of the trial court's discretion and to find a "reasonable
nexus between the probation condition[s] and the goals of probation.i4 12 The
court never explicitly mentioned the defendant's free exercise rights, let alone
tried to justify what appeared to be the total preclusion of the defendant's
exercise of that right.
In a more interesting and more justifiable decision, the Supreme Court of
Vermont in State v. Emey 413 upheld a probation condition against a First
Amendment Establishment Clause challenge. In that case, the defendant pled
nolo contendere to a charge of"lewd and lascivious behavior" with a minor and
was sentenced to probation on the condition that he actively participate in and
complete a particular sex offender program.414 , The defendant maintained that
participating in the program would force him to violate his religious beliefs
because the program required him to engage in sexual fantasy and masturba-
tion.415 The court acknowledged the "impact ofthe program onthe defendant's
federal and state constitutional rights to religious freedom," but still held that
the condition requiring the program was "not overly restrictive of [his] liberty
or autonomy."416 To the credit ofboththe trial and appellate courts, each relied
heavily on what appeared to be a well-developed record, including testimony
from at least two psychologists and one mental health consultant who had some
significant experience with sex offenders." 7 According to the Vermont
Supreme Court, the testimony of these experts "amply supported" the conclu-
sion that the challenged program represented "the best method of reducing
recidivism in sexual offenders."4 ' Unfortunately, the court's opinion failed to
articulate any clear standard for the review of fiture probation conditions
implicating fundamental constitutional rights, nor did it explicitly conclude
that the condition involved the least restrictive alternative available to the
sentencing court. Nonetheless, the opinion did seem to display a reasonably
appropriate level of respect for the constitutional rights of the defendant." 9
410. Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554, 555 (2d Cir. 1974).
411. Id.
412. Id. at 556.
413. 593 A.2d 77 (Vt. 1991).
414. State v. Emery, 593 A. 2d 77,78 (Vt 1991).
415. Id. at78-79.
416. Id. at 80-81.
417. - Id. at 78-80.
418. Id. at80.
419. The Eleventh Circuit showed a similarly appropriate level of concern for religious
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Perhaps the most common probation condition with serious religious
freedom implications is the requirement that a defendant participate in Alco-
holics Anonymous (AA).420 Although many sentencing judges may simply be
unaware that the basic precepts of AA and the manner in which the program
is administered are overwhelmingly religious in nature,421 that fact has not
escaped the appellate courts and commentators that have explored the issue.4'
The central teachings of the organization are published in a book that is
alternatively referred to by members of the organization as the Big Book or
the "Bible."4 ' That book contains the famous "Twelve Steps" that constitute
the heart of the AA recovery program; six of those twelve steps contain
freedom in Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362 (1lth Cir. 1982). The probationer in that case
brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge a number of probation conditions,
including a rehabilitation program entitled Emotional Maturity Instruction (EMI). Id. at 1364.
The probationer maintained that his forced participation in the EMI program violated the Estab-
lishment Clause because the program was "pervaded with Biblical teachings." Id. at 1365. While
the district court resolved this claim against the probationer on summary judgment, the Eleventh
Circuit remanded the case because it found "a material factual dispute" about the content of the
program. Id. The court provided the following guidance to the district court upon remand:
While we intimate no position on the ultimate resolution of this issue it is clear that a
condition of probation which requires the probationer to adopt religion or to adopt any
particular religion would be unconstitutional. It follows that a condition of probation
which requires the probationer to submit himself to a course advocating the adoption
of religion or a particular religion also transgresses the First Amendment.
Id. (citation omitted). This statement, which implies a categorical preclusion of probation
conditions infinging on the First Amendment right to freedom of religion, is in stark contrast
to the court's holding in the same case upholding a probation condition that completely elim-
inated the probationer's Fourth Amendment rights. The sentencing court imposed a probation
condition that required the probationer to "submit to a search of his person, houses, papers,
and/or effects... [at] any time of day or night with or without a search warrant whenever
requested to do so by a Probation Supervisor or any law enforcement officer." Id. at 1366. The
Eleventh Circuit held that the search condition passed "constitutional muster" because it was
"reasonably related to the purposes of probation." Id. at 1366-69.
420. Another probation condition that has been imposed with far less frequency, but that
also has significant freedom of religion implications, is a condition requiring the use of contra-
ception. See Jack P. Lipton & Colin F. Campbell, The Constitutionality of Court-ImposedBirth
Controlas a Condition ofProbation, 6 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 271,279-83 (1989) (discuss-
ing freedom of religion implications of such conditions). For more discussion of contraception
as a probation condition, see supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text and infra Part ]LF.1.
421. See Honeymar, supra note 191, at 469 n.148 (emphasizing public ignorance of AA's
religious nature).
422. See, e.g., Warner v. Orange County Dep't of Probation, 115 F.3d 1068, 1074-75 (2d
Cir. 1997) (finding probation condition to attend AA meetings violated Establishment Clause);
Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 102-03 (N.Y. 1996) (discussing religious nature of AA);
Honeymar, supra note 191, at 44348 (discussing AA's emphasis on theism and prayer); Smith,
supra note 191, at 302-06 (discussing religious character of AA).
423. Honeymarsupra note 191, at441.
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explicit references to God or a higher power.424 In addition, AA meetings
generally begin with the recitation of the Serenity Prayer" and end with the
recitation of the Lord's Prayer, frequently referred to as the "Our Father."
426
While it seems that participation in AA as a condition of probation is required
with extraordinary frequency,427 challenges to the legality of such a condition
seem rare indeed. The AA cases highlight the fact that requiring an objection
at the time of sentencing in order to preserve appellate rights is simply bad
public policy. As a preliminary issue, an offender may not be aware at the
time of sentencing of the highly religious nature of AA. More important,
however, focusing on an offender's individual objection misses the entire
objective of the Establishment Clause: to avoid governmental entanglement
with or support for a particular religious viewpoint.
F Infringements on the Right to Privacy
With a rather alarming frequency, trial judges have imposed probation
conditions that intrude on a defendant's constitutionally protected right to
privacy. Prior sections ofthis Article have explored probation conditions that
interfere with a defendant's relationships with his or her spouse42" and his or
424. Id. at 442.
425. Id. at 442; Smith, supra note 191, at 304. The Serenity Prayer is commonly recited
as follows: "God grant me the serenity to accept the things that I cannot change, the courage
to change the things I can, and the wisdom to knowthe difference." Honeymar, supra note 191,
at 442 n.20.
426. Honeymar, supra note 191, at 442; Smith, supra note 191, at 304. One common
version of The Lord's Prayer is recited as follows:
Our Father in heaven, hallowed be your name, your kingdom come, your will be
done on earth as it is in heaven. Give us today our daily bread, and forgive us the
wrong we have done as we forgive those who wrong us. Subject us not to the trial
but deliver us from the evil one.
Honeymar, supra note 191, at 442 n.20 (quotingMatthew 6:9-13).
427. See, e.g., Honeymar, supra note 191, at 437-38 (describing frequency with which
AA is imposed as probation condition on defendants convicted of drunk driving); Smith, supra
note 191, at 307-08 (documenting fact that "participation in AA has become an integral part of
drunk driving sentencing in many jurisdictions" and that, in some jurisdictions, AA participation
may be required for every drunk driver). Further evidence of the frequency with which AA is
imposed as a probation condition, even in cases that do not involve drunk driving, can be found
in the large number of cases in which the condition has been imposed but not challenged on
appeal. See, e.g., People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681, 682-87 (Ct. App. 1993) (invalidating
another probation condition, but not mentioning requirement that defendant attend three AA
meetings per week); State v. Bouldin, 717 S.W.2d 584, 586-87 (Tenn. 1986) (invalidating
another probation condition, but "applaud[ing] the trial court's resourcefulness" in requiring
attendance at weekly AA meetings); see also Karl v. State, 770 P.2d 299, 300 (Alaska Ct App.
1989) (vacating condition requiring attendance at three AA meetings per week, but on grounds
that record was inadequate to determine whether defendant was in need of alcohol treatment).
428. For a discussion of the impact of probation conditions that intrude on the marital
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her children.4 Two other common types of conditions that have a serious
impact on privacy rights include conditions that restrict the defendant's right
to reproductive freedom and conditions that restrict the defendant's right to
decide when and to whom he or she may get married. Although the courts
have repeatedly demonstrated their reluctance to uphold these sorts of condi-
tions, the frequency with which they appear in published cases and media
reports makes it clear that trial judges nonetheless impose such conditions
with some regularity. Because there is no reason to believe that conditions of
this nature are appealed in any higher percentage than is any other category
of constitutionally invasive conditions,43 one must assume a very high rate of
unreported instances of the imposition of these conditions.43'
1. Reproductive Freedom
The cases involving limitations on reproductive freedom generally fall
into two categories: those in which the trial judge, as a condition of proba-
tion, orders the defendant to use some form of birth control, such as contra-
ceptives, sterilization, or castration, and those in which the trial judge orders
the defendant to refrain from becoming pregnant. An early example of the
former category can be found in People v. Blankenship,432 a 1936 case in
which a California court upheld a probation condition requiring the defendant
to undergo surgical sterilization.433 Much more commonly, however, such
conditions have been stricken when challenged on appeal.434 Despite that fact,
a number of recent examples appear in the case law, in scholarly commentar-
ies, and in media accounts.43
relationship thereby implicating the defendant's constitutional right to free association, see
supra Part III.C.2.
429. For a discussion the impact of probation conditions that seek to regulate the parent-
child relationship, see supra Part ]]I.D.I.a.
430. See infra Part nJ.F.1 for evidence of the infrequency of appeals in cases involving
probation conditions that intrude on reproductive freedom.
431. Two commentators reached the conclusion in 1989 that "[u]ntil appellate courts defin-
itively rule that [imposing birth control as a probation condition is] unconstitutional, judicial
excess will continue." Lipton & Campbell, supra note 420, at 298. No such definitive ruling
has emerged.
432. 61 P.2d 352 (Cal. 1936).
433. People v. Blankenship, 61 P.2d 352,353 (Cal. 1936).
434. See, e.g., Weissman, supra note 62, at 383 (noting that appellate courts, "[a]cknowl-
edging the fundamental quality of reproductive interests ... deny these conditions"); Bartrum,
supra note 81, at 1038 (noting, incorrectly at least so far as Blankenship, that "no appellate
court has upheld the validity of imposing birth control as condition of probation").
435. See, e.g., People v. Walsh, 593 N.W.2d 558,558 (Mich. 1999) (discussing implanta-
tion of Norplant contraceptive device as probation condition); State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410,
411 (S.C. 1985) (discussing trial judge offering defendants choice of surgical castration or thirty
years in prison); Lipton & Campbell, supra note 420, at 298 (describing Indiana case in which
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Statev. Brown,436 a 1985 case outofthe Supreme Court of South Carolina,
presents a rather stark example of how trial courts attempt to impose such
conditions.437 In that case, three defendants pled guilty to charges stemming
from what the court called a "brutal sexual assault."438 The trialjudge imposed
a sentence on each defendant of thirty years incarceration, but ordered that
each sentence would be suspended and a five year term of probation imposed
ifthe defendant submitted to surgical castration. 439 Although each ofthe three
defendants initially appealed his sentence, by the time the case was heard in the
Supreme Court, each defendant was seeking permission to undergo the surgery
and obtainthe suspended sentence."0 The court nonetheless vacated the condi-
tion, finding it to be cruel and unusual punishment under the South Carolina
Constitution,"1 and remanded the case for resentencing. Interestingly, two
concurring justices would have simply imposed the thirty year sentences.442
While many of the cases in which trial judges have tried to impose
mandatory birth control have involved charges of child abuse or of some form
of sexual offense, this has not universally been the case. Even within the
limited class of cases involving child abuse or sex offenses, very troubling
issues of racial and economic discrimination emerge from the imposition of
these sorts of conditions. An early study of cases involving the mandatory
implantation of the Norplant contraceptive device as a probation condition
noted that "courts ha[d] imposed the condition exclusively on lower income
and minority women."' " Several commentators have pointed out the discrimi-
natory fashion in which these sorts of conditions are imposed. 4
judge proposed sterilization as condition of imposing more lenient sentence on defendant);
Burke, supra note 36, at 214-18 (documenting four cases in which implantation of Norplant
contraceptive device was imposed as probation condition); Abramson, supra note 36 (discuss-
ing cases involving court-ordered implantation of Norplant contraceptive device); Curriden,
supra note 408 (describing Pennsylvania case in which judge offered defendant choice of
surgical castration or thirty years in prison); Stephanie B. Goldberg, No Baby, No Jail: Creative
Sentencing Has Gone Overboard, A California CourtRules, 78 AB- J., Oct. 1992, at 90-92
(discussing cases involving court-ordered implantation of Norplant contraceptive device);
Joseph R. Tybor, Unusually Creative Judges Now Believe Some Punishments Can Fit the
Times, CBL TRIB., July 3, 1988, at 1 (discussing Arizona case in which judge offered reduced
sentence in exchange for sterilization).
436. 326 S.E.2d 410 (S.C. 1985).
437. State v. Brown, 326 S.E. 410, 411 (S.C. 1985) (discussing trial judge offer of
probation in exchange for castration).
438. Id. at411.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id. at 412 (citing S.C. CONsT. art. I, § 15).
442. Id. (Ness, J., concurring).
443. Burke, supra note 36, at 242.
444. See, e.g., Stephanie Denmark, Forcing Norplant on Poor Is Ploy to Control Women's
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When one considers the cases in which the probation condition simply
orders the defendant not to become pregnant, a significant number of these
cases involve neither child abuse nor sex offenses, and the imposition of the
trial judge's personal morality or discriminatory attitudes becomes all that
much clearer. In State v. Norman,"5 for example, a Louisiana trial judge
imposed a probation condition on a woman who had been convicted of forgery
that she "not give birth to any children outside of wedlock."" 6 In imposing
the condition on the twenty year old mother of two illegitimate children, the
trial judge had "characterized giving birth to illegitimate children as an
indication of 'irresponsible thinking."'" 7 The appellate court vacated the
condition, highlighting the fact that there had been "no indication of record
that [the] defendant's participation in the instant crime was in any way related
to the responsibilities of caring for her children."'
Similarly, in People v. Dominguez,"' a trial judge in California imposed
the following conditions of probation on a woman who had been convicted of
robbery: "[Y]ou are not to live with any man to whom you are not married
and you are not to become pregnant until after you become married. '450 As
in Norman, the defendant was an indigent mother of two illegitimate chil-
dren."' The fact that the defendant had been receiving assistance from the
Bureau of Public Assistance apparently prompted both the probation condi-
tions and a morality lecture from the trial judge: "If you insist on this kind of
conduct you can at least consider the other people in society who are taking
care of your children. You have had too many that some others are taking
care of other than you and the father."45 2 The defendant appeared before the
same judge some seventeen months later on an allegation that she had violated
the probation conditions by becoming pregnant.43 Although the uncontro-
Bodies, LA- DAILYJ., Nov. 5,1991, at 6; Ellen GoodmanAn Old Fix In a New Form, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 17, 1991, at 79. Also, an article that appeared in the ABA Journal in 1992
included several quotations on this subject from Simon Heller, a senior staff attorney with the
Center for Reproductive Law and Policy. See Goldberg, supra note 435, at 90-92. Mr. Heller
asserted that sentences infringing on reproductive rights involved instances of gender, race and
class bias, asking rhetorically. "Have you ever heard of these punishments being applied to a
wealthy woman? Or to a man?" Id. at 90. Heller maintained that such sentences are imposed
as "a way to stop undesirable, low-income people from reproducing." Id. at 90-92.
445. 484 So. 2d 952 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
446. State v. Norman, 484 So. 2d 952,953 (La. Ct App. 1986).
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Ct App. 1967).
450. People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290,292 (Ct. App. 1967).
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id.
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verted evidence suggested that the defendant was a good mother and that she
had become pregnant only due to a contraceptive failure, the trial judge found
her to be in violation of probation and ordered her immediate incarceration." 4
With little apparent understanding of the bitter irony of his remarks, the trial
judge sentthe mother offto jail, accusing her of being "irresponsible" because
she was "foisting obligations upon others" to care for her children."'
The court of appeal vacated the probation condition that she not become
pregnant while unmarried and reversed the orders revoking probation and
executing the judgment."' In doing so, the court made a number of telling
observations with respect to the relevant legal standards:
Appellant's future pregnancy was unrelated to robbery. Becoming preg-
nantwhile unmarried is amisfortune, nota crime. Appellant's futurepreg-
nancy had no reasonable relationship to future criminality. It is certainly
not pragmatically demonstrable that unmarried, pregnant women are dis-
posed to commit crimes. There is no rational basis to believe that poor,
unmarried women tend to commit crimes upon becoming pregnant Con-
traceptive failure is not an indicium of criminality.1'
The appellate court noted that the trial court's obvious motivation, which it
found was "[b]oth implicit and explicit in th[e] record," was "to prevent the
appellant from producing offspring who might become public charges."4 But
the appellate court concluded that a trial court "cannot use its awesome power
in imposing conditions of probation to vindicate the public interest in reducing
the welfare rolls by applying unreasonable conditions of probation.145 9 This
decision was rendered almost fourteen months after the trial judge ordered the
defendant's summary incarceration.ec
These cases do not stand in isolation, but rather they are part of a larger
body of cases that includes other orders not to get pregnant while unmarried461
and orders not to have sexual intercourse with anyone other than a lawfully
married spouse.462 While the injection of the defendant's marital status into
454. Id. at 292-93. Defense counsel's motion for a one week stay of execution so that the
defendant could explain the situation to her children and make suitable arrangements for their
care was denied. Id. at 293.
455. Id. at 292.
456. Id. at 294.
457. Id. at 293.
458. Id. at 294.
459. Id.
460. Id. at290-91.
461. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 519 So. 2d 1113, 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 1988) (review-
ing trial court imposition of probation condition that defendant not become pregnant during
probation term unless she became married).
462. See, e.g., Wiggins v. State, 386 So. 2d 46,47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (reviewing
probation condition prohibiting sexual intercourse -with individual other than spouse).
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these probation conditions makes the role of the trial judge's personal moral-
ity that much more obvious, the issue also lurks in the numerous cases in
which the probation condition bars any pregnancy at all."' In a 1992 deci-
sion, People v. Zaring,4" the California Court of Appeal addressed this issue
head on, reversing a condition that the defendant not get pregnant and publicly
chastising the trial judge for "the apparent imposition of personal social values
in the sentencing decision.""46 Much like the trial judge in Dominguez, the
trial judge in Zaring had given a lecture on morality to the defendant, a thirty
year old mother of five who had been convicted of possessing and using
heroin.4" And much like the appellate decision in Dominguez, the appellate
decision for the defendant in Zaring came rather late in the game, as she had
completed her sentence by the time the appeal was decided.467
2. Marital Freedom
A number oftrial courts have imposed conditions that significantly inter-
fere with the defendant's right to marry. In State v. Allen,468 the Court of
Appeals of Oregon upheld a condition that the defendant, who had been con-
victed of obtaining money under false pretenses, "not enter into any marriage
contract unless specifically authorized by Order of th[e] court. '469 The court
upheld the condition, noting that the trial judge was apparently concerned for
the defendant about the negative influence of the defendant's fiancd, who had
a significant criminal history." Of course, there was no indication that any
evidence had been introduced, expert or otherwise, to that effect.
463. Based on a survey of the case law, the total prohibition of pregnancy, whether within
or outside of marriage, appears to be a rather common probation condition. See, e.g., People
v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 265 (Ct. App. 1992) (reviewing trial court's imposition of
prohibition on becoming pregnant as condition of probation); People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr.
357, 359 (Ct App. 1984) (same); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 8 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
(same); State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313,314 (Kan. Ct App. 1989) (same); State v. Livingston,
372 N.E.2d 1335,1336 (Ohio Ct App. 1976) (same). InHowlandv. State, 420 So. 2d 918,919
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), the trial court imposed a probation condition on a male defendant
convicted of negligent child abuse that precluded him from "fathering any other children while
on probation." The appellate court vacated the condition, finding that it did not "reasonably
relate to the crime of child abuse" because any future abuse could result only from custody of
or contact with a minor child, both of which were prohibited by other probation conditions. Id.
at 919-20.
464. 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263 (Ct App. 1992).
465. People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263,270 (Ct App. 1992).
466. Id. at 265,270.
467. Id. at271.
468. 506 P.2d 528 (Or. 1973).
469. State v. Allen, 506 P.2d 528, 529 (Or. 1973).
470. Id.
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On the appellate level, Allen seems to be an exception to the general rule
that courts will strike probation conditions that intrude on a defendant's right
to marry whomever and whenever the defendant so desires. Thus, other
appellate courts have duly recognized the privacy issues at stake, striking con-
ditions that require a defendant to obtain court permission before marriage,471
that require a defendant to make his or her children legitimate,472 and that
preclude a defendant from living with a member of the opposite sex to whom
the defendant is not married.473 Of course, those rulings do not prevent trial
court judges from continuing to impose such conditions on a regular basis.
Indeed, a recent media account involving Ted Poe, a Houston trial judge,
suggested that he has a practice of sentencing men who are single and have
illegitimate children to "marry the mother or file the papers necessary to pay
child support."474 This sentencing practice seems to combine two of the
recurring forms of abuses that this article has endeavored to document: the
use of probation conditions to impose the trial judge's private morality, and
the use of probation conditions to circumvent established legal procedures in
order to resolve legal issues that are either entirely unrelated to or only
tangentially related to the underlying criminal behavior.
G. Infringements on the Right to Be Free from Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures
Perhaps more than any other individual right articulated in the Bill of
Rights, the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures seems to have fallen almost completely off the face of the legal
map for defendants placed on probation. Courts across the country have
upheld probation conditions that require a probationer to submit to unre-
stricted warrantless searches not only by his or her probation officer, but also
by any law enforcement officer at any time of day or night.47 While this sort
471. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1979) (invalidating
condition that defendant not marry without court permission as not reasonably related to future
criminality). In People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Ct App. 1967), such a condition was
imposed but not reviewed on appeal.
472. Michalow v. State, 362 So. 2d 456, 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1978) (finding trial court
condition that defendant make his child legitimate within one year was beyond that court's
authority).
473. See, e.g., Mays v. State, 349 So. 2d 792,794 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that
condition prohibiting defendant from living with member of opposite sex until married was
overbroad); State v. Goins, No. 03C01-9704-CR-00154, 1998 WL 597047, at *5 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Sept 10,1998) (same).
474. Koch, supra note 38.
475. See, e.g., United States v. Sharp, 931 F.2d 1310, 1311 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding
condition subjecting defendant to unrestricted warrantless searches); Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d
1362, 1366 (11th Cir. 1982) (same); State v. Montgomery, 566 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Ariz. 1977)
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of condition is most commonly imposed on defendants convicted of narcotics
offenses, it is not difficult to find cases in which trial judges have imposed it
on various other offenders." 6
In some instances, a trial court's complete disregard for the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights can be rather startling. Criminal Court Judge Joe
Brown of Memphis, Tennessee, frequently imposes an unusual probation con-
dition on those convicted of burglary: the probationer must allow the victim
of his or her burglary to enter his or her home at anytime of day or night (with
a police escort) and take an item of comparable value to that which was
stolen.477 In essence, the probationer must completely abandon any expecta-
tion of privacy within his or her home, at least until such time as the victim
has entered the home and removed the property. Judge Brown has been
rewarded with national media attention, much of it favorable, for the imposi-
tion of this condition.47 An editorial in the Chicago Tribune praised Judge
Brown's approach, citing it as "encouraging evidence that more judges are
going less by the book and more by the unconventional."479 The editorial
suggested that the probation condition sent "a lasting message" to the offend-
ers.48 'While that much is undoubtedly true, it is unclear whether the lasting
message involved any positive lesson on the rule of law or on the sanctity of
the home. Giving the victim of a crime license to commit the same "crime"
as that committed by the offender, thereby victimizing not only the original
(same); People v. Richards, 256 N.W.2d 793, 795 (Mich. CL App. 1977) (same); People v.
Santos, 298 N.Y.S.2d 526,528 (App. Div. 1969) (same); I-Emmage v. State, 496 P.2d 763,766
(Nev. 1972) (same); State v. Mtchell, 207 SSE.2d 263, 264 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974) (same); State
v. Schlosser, 202 N.W.2d 136,139 (N.D. 1972) (same).
476. See, e.g., People v. Welch, 851 P.2d 802, 804 (Cal. 1993) (reviewing unrestricted
warrantless search condition imposed on defendant convicted of welfare fraud); People v.
Bauer, 260 Cal. Rptr. 62, 63 (Ct. App. 1989) (reviewing condition imposed on defendant
convicted of false imprisonment and simple assault); People v. Oaxaca, 114 Cal. Rpfr. 178, 179
(Ct. App. 1974) (reviewing condition imposed on defendant convicted of solicitation for prosti-
tution). In some instances, these conditions have been stricken as not reasonably related to the
underlying offense. See, e.g., United States v. Stoural, 990 F.2d 372, 372 (8th Cir. 1993)
(reviewing condition imposed on defendant convicted of conversion of collateral); People v.
Keller, 143 Cal. Rptr. 184, 186 (Ct. App. 1978) (reviewing condition imposed on defendant
convicted of theft of forty-nine cent ball point pen).
477. See Garvey, supra note 63, at 788 (discussing Judge Brown's unusual probation con-
ditions); Abramson, supra note 36 (same); Alter & Wingert, supra note 247, at 20 (same);
Curriden, supra note 408 (same); Editorial, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, CHL Trn.,
May 28,1992, at 24 (same); Judge DevisesInstructionalPenalties, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26,1993,
atB16 (same).
478. Judge Brown's imposition of this probation condition has been described in News-
weekMagazine, the New York Times, the Atlanta Constitution, and the Chicago Tribune. See
supra note 477 (listing sources describing Judge Brown's imposition of probation condition).
479. Editorial, supra note 477.
480. Id.
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offender but also anyone who happens to live with the offender, seems an odd
and particularly ineffectual way to teach about the sanctity of the home.481
Indeed, on one occasion, a victim took a photograph of the offender's de-
ceased girlfriend and, with the offender in tears, burned the photograph as the
offender watched." One commentator noted that the sentence in that case
taught nothing but "a lesson in callousness."483
H. Infringements on the Right to Basic Human Dignity
Over the past decade or so, an extremely disturbing trend has emerged in
the imposition of probation conditions. With ever increasing frequency,
judges are turning to the imposition of probation conditions that are intended
to shame, degrade, or humiliate the offender." 4 Because many of these
sentences are not challenged on appeal, some of the more striking examples
can be found only in media accounts. These accounts include descriptions of
one offender convicted of spousal abuse ordered to allow his ex-wife to spit
in his face" s and others convicted of various offenses ordered to shovel horse
manure in police stables.486 Perhaps the most common shaming condition
requires the offender to publicize either the facts of the case or his or her
status as a convicted criminal through the use of a wide variety of media,
including wearing a T-shirt, bracelet, or placard; making a speech in front of
the courthouse; placing an advertisement in a newspaper; or posting a sign on
one's property.4" Apparently born out of frustration with the inability of
standard sentences to deter crime or reduce recidivism, judges have been
reduced to imposing these sorts of conditions on the basis of little more than
sheer speculation and pop-psychology. Indeed, while experts have consis-
481. Professor Stephen P. Garvey, an advocate of shaming punishments that are designed
to educate rather than to shame the defendant, has reached a similar conclusion about this
probation condition. Garvey, supra note 63, at 788.
482. Id. at 788 & n.255.
483. Id. at 788.
484. See supra note 247 (citing sources reporting increasing popularity of shaming punish-
ments).
485. See Garvey, supra note 63, at 787 & n.253 (citing Steven Greenhut, Gimmicky
Judges' 'Shame' Sanctions Unlikely to Curb Crime, MLWAUKEE I. SENTINEL, Apr. 13, 1997,
atAl11); Kahan, supra note 247, at 634 n.169 (citing Editorial, Punishment Judges Need More
Creative Ways to Handle Non-Violent Criminals, CINcINNATIENQUIRER, June 2,1994, at A10).
486. See Garvey, supra note 63, at 791 & nn.268, 269 (citing Elizabeth Levitan Spaid,
Humiliation ComesBack as a Criminal Justice Tool, CHRISTIAN ScL MONITOR, Dec. 17,1996,
at 1; Maryland Stable Duty Sentence, WASI. PoST, Aug. 10, 1989, at D5); Reske, supra note
40, at 16 (describing case in which court imposed stable-mucking punishment on defendant who
stole Clayton Moore's "Lone Ranger" revolvers).
487. See Kahan, supra note 247, at 631-34 (describing punishments); Massaro, supra note
93, at 1886-88 (discussing sign sanctions).
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tently pointed out the absence of empirical data on the efficacy of shaming
punishments, they are decidedly split on whether such punishments can be
useful or effective at all and on whether such punishments may be more harm-
ful than useful. 88
Case law concerning the imposition of such sanctions is sparse, largely
because the vast majority of probation conditions evade appellate review."'
Nonetheless, the few cases on point reveal not only the arbitrary and episodic
manner in which such conditions are imposed,490 but also the arbitrary and
episodic way in which appellate courts have viewed them. The most common
category of shaming probation conditions to face appellate scrutiny involves
conditions that require the defendant to publicize his or her offense. In
Ballenger v. State,49"' for example, the Court of Appeals of Georgia upheld a
probation condition imposed upon a convicted drunk driver that required him
to "wear a flourescent pink plastic bracelet imprinted with the words 'D.U.I.
CONVICT' until further order of the court."1492 In reaching its decision, the
court highlighted the trial court's broad discretion to impose any probation
condition it deemed reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation or to
the protection of society.493 The court then summarized its complete defer-
ence to the trial court's discretion in the following terms:
Being jurists rather thanpsychologists, we cannot say thatthe stigmatizing
effect ofwearingthebraceletimay not have a rehabilitative, deterrent effect
on [the defendant].... It may also serve the second purpose, that of pro-
tecting society, in the event someone notices the bracelet and chooses not
to ride with [the defendant] or refuses to allow him to drive.... [We do
not find the trial court's assessment that this condition has rehabilitative
value to be so totally withoutbasis that we will interfere with its broad dis-
cretion in matters of conditions of probation.494
A cogent dissent took a rather different view of the case, concluding that
the bracelet condition did not serve "any legitimate purpose of probation.""49
488. See supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text (stating that shaming punishments are
ineffective or counterproductive).
489. See supra Part IIA (discussing several circumstances under which probation condi-
tions are not reviewed).
490. See Massaro, supra note 93, at 1940 (concluding that modem shaming punishments
are "episodic, almost whimsical bursts of judicial, legislative, or prosecutorial inspiration");
Abramson, supra note 36 (describing the imposition of shaming and other "creative" sentences
as "haphazard, even whimsical at times").
491. 436 S.E.2d 793 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
492. Ballenger v. State, 436 S.El2d 793, 794 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
493. Id.
494. Id. at 794-95.
495. Id. at 795 (Blackburn, 3., dissenting).
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Asserting that "the clear purpose" of the condition "was simply to punish [the
defendant] by humiliation," the dissent reasoned that the state legislature, not
an individual judge, should determine whether or not such a punishment is
authorized by law.496 Moreover, the dissenting judge expressed his concern
that, rather than serving a rehabilitative purpose, the "imposition of unreason-
able conditions of probation may instill a sense of disrespect for the criminal
justice system."t497
Two Florida courts have rendered opinions that closely resemble the
majority opinion in Ballenger, granting extraordinary deference to a trial
judge's speculation about the potential rehabilitative impact of a condition
requiring the defendant to publicize his conviction. In Goldschmitt v. State,4
the district court of appeal upheld a probation condition requiring a drunk
driver to affix a bumper sticker to his car reading "CONVICTED D.U.I. -
RESTRICTED LICENSE."'499 The court upheld the condition because it was
"unable to state as a matter of law" that the "lower court's belief that such a
sticker is 'rehabilitative'[was] so utterly without foundation" that the appellate
court was "empowered to substitute [its] judgment" for that ofthe trial court." °
Several years later, in Lindsay v. State,501 another Florida court upheld a
probation condition that required a convicted drunk driver to publicize the fact
of his conviction by placing an advertisement containing his "mug shot" and
the caption "DUI - Convicted" in a local newspaper.5" The Lindsay court
quoted extensively from Goldschmitt, repeating the extraordinarily deferential
language quoted above."0 3 But the Lindsay court added another piece to the
deferential appellate picture; while the court was apparently content to rely on
the trial court's unguided speculation, it noted on more than one occasion that
the defendant "did not adduce any evidence" to suggest that the publication
would not serve a rehabilitative or deterrent purpose.5 '
The Ballenger court's explicit recognition of its lack of psycholog-
ical expertise, a trait that was presumably shared by the trial judge who
imposed each of the conditions described above, suggests that the court had
no significant concern about the actual consequences of the condition as
applied to the defendant. By inference, the same can clearly be said of the
Goldschmitt andLindsay courts. None ofthese courts required expertpsycho-
496. Id. at 796 (Blackburn, J., dissenting).
497. Id.
498. 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1986).
499. Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123,124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
500. Id. at 126.
501. 606 So. 2d 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
502. Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1992).
503. Id. at 657 (quoting Goldschmitt, 490 So. 2d at 126).
504. Id. at 657, 658.
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logical testimony of any kind, content to engage in rank speculation coupled
with complete deference with an untrained trial judge. One could just as
easily speculate that this sort of condition would have a counter-productive
impact on the defendant's rehabilitation. To use Ballenger as an example, it
is not hard to imagine that having to wear such a bracelet at all times might
effectively prevent the defendant from obtaining or keeping any gainful
employment, might destroy the defendant's ability to lead a healthy social life,
or might launch the defendant into a seriously detrimental psychological state,
perhaps including clinical depression. 5 Another Georgia case provides an
interesting but tragic case in point: A convicted drunk driver who was forced
to publicize the fact of his conviction, in that case by means of the local
newspaper, committed suicide when his mother expressed her disappointment
in learning of his conviction.5°6 While suicide is certainly not a common
response to public shaming, the Georgia case is not the only suicide case on
record,"° and shaming carries with it a number of other potentially destructive
consequences.sr
If a court were inclined to look for expert testimony on the impact of
shaming or humiliation as a condition of probation, it would find any number
of experts prepared to point out not only that the efficacy of such conditions
is almost totally untested, but also that such conditions can lead to unpredict-
able and undesirable results.5" A number of commentators have argued that
the notion that shaming can have a deterrent effect on the offender defies
current psychological knowledge, particularly when no effort is made to
reintegrate the shamed offender back into society. 0 Having deprived the
offender of whatever status he or she may have enjoyed in the local commu-
nity, it is argued that the offender's incentive to conform to societal norms has
been minimized or even eliminated.' There is also evidence to suggest that
the mere labeling of an offender as deviant can actually lead to further deviant
505. See Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3
PSYCHOL. PuB. PoL'Y& L. 645, 655 (1997) (noting that "emotional impact [of shaming] may
range from none, to mild discomfort, to a profound and complete loss of self that inspires a
desire to die").
506. See Book, supra note 247, at 684-85 (suggesting judges evaluate each offender's
suitability as shame candidate); Ann Woolner, When the Sentence Is a Shame, AM LAW., Nov.
1997, at 34, 35 (contrasting effects of publication in small towns versus large cities).
507. See Persons, supra note 249, at 1527 (documenting case in which shaming apparently
resulted in suicide).
508. See infra notes 515-19 (discussing additional consequences of shaming).
509. See supra notes 248-49 (citing works that discuss problems with shaming).
510. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 93, at 1884 (recognizing lack of federal or state
programs to reintegrate or forgive offenders); Litowitz, supra note 247, at 55-57 (stating that
offenders often lack value system or aspirations that might make shaming effective).
511. See, e.g.,Massaro, supra note 93, at 1919.
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behavior. 12 For the violent offender, the shaming punishment can induce
anger or rage, resulting in further violent and antisocial behavior."1 3 The
experts seem to agree that determining the potential impact of a shaming
penalty on a particular offender is beyond the expertise of most trial judges.1 4
A related set of problems created by probation conditions that are de-
signed to shame the offender stem from the impact of those conditions on
people other than the offender. The harshness of the shaming punishment
often spreads beyond the intended target, a problem that the experts call
"spillover," so that innocent family members, friends and neighbors suffer a
negative impact from the sentence." 5 In addition, some commentators have
expressed concerns about placing the power of punishment into the hands of
the public, not only because it can encourage vigilantism and other forms of
criminal behavior on the part of the public, but also because it delegates an
important state function to the whim of the masses. 16 Professor James Q.
Whitman, a proponent ofthis latter view, has noted that after the state imposes
a sanction involving public shaming, "[t]here is no way to predict or control
the way in which the public will deal with him, no rhyme or limit to the terms
the public may impose.""" He has warned of the dangers of "official action
that plays on the irrational urges of the public,""1 ' and has concluded that
"[t]he chief evil in public humiliation sanctions is that they involve an ugly,
and politically dangerous, complicity between the state and the crowd.
51 9
These sorts of concerns about conditions of probation designed to shame
a defendant have received attention in some of the few appellate courts that
512. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 63, at 752; Massaro, supra note 93, at 1919-20.
513. See, e.g., Book, supra note 247, at 683-84 (asserting that risk to public might be too
great to impose shaming of violent offenders); Abramson, supra note 36 (expressing psycholo-
gists' view that shaming could fuel rage and resentment); Litowitz, supra note 247, at 55 (assert-
ing that violent offenders would respond with "reactive emotions like anger, frustration, and rage
rather than complex emotions like shame"). One recent media account suggested thatthe shaming
of a man convicted of rape contributed to his subsequent commission of a first-degree murder.
JuneAmey, Shame andPunishment, VIRGINIANPILOT-STAR, Mar. 2,1997, atJ1.
514. See, e.g, Garvey, supra note 63, at 748 (stating that 'Judges will have a tough time"
deciding when to impose shame sentences); Massaro, supra note 93, at 1917-18 (introducing
five reasons why judges lack expertise to impose shame penalties).
515. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 63, at 749 n.78 (presenting spillover theory); Kahan,
supra note 247, at 643 n.215 (asserting that shame sentences "are likely to have a spillover
effect, stigmatizing not just offenders but their family members and friends"); Massaro, supra
note 93, at 1932 n.250,1938 (discussing possible effects of shaming on neighbors and spouses).
516. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107
YALE L.J. 1055, 1087-89 (1998) (contrasting effects of statist and liberal traditions of govern-
ment control of crowds).
517. Id. at 1090-91.
518. Id. at 1091.
519. Id. at 1059.
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have heard challenges. Several courts have stricken humiliation conditions,
most commonly on the grounds that such a radical departure from traditional
probation conditions should be left in the hands of the legislature, not in the
hands of an individual trial judge. In State v. Burdin,"2 ° for example, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee struck down a probation condition that required
a man convicted of sexual battery to post a large sign in the front yard of his
suburban home reading: 'Warning, all children. Wayne Burdin is an admit-
ted and convicted child molester. Parents beware. '5 21 In reaching its conclu-
sion, the court summarized its concerns as follows:
The consequences of imposing such a condition without the normal safe-
guards oflegislative study and debate are uncertain. Postingthe signinthe
defendant's yard would dramatically affect persons other than the defen-
dant and those charged with his supervision. In addition to being novel
and somewhat bizarre, compliance with the condition would have conse-
quences in the community, perhaps beneficial, perhaps detrimental, but in
any eventunforeseenandunpredictable. Though innovative techniques of
probation are encouragedto promote the lehabilitation of offenders andthe
prevention ofrecidivism, this legislative grant of authority maynotbeused
to usurp the legislative role of defining the nature of punishment which
may be imposed.'
The court of criminal appeals had also stricken the probation condition in
Burdin, but it did so with a somewhat different articulation of concerns." 2
That court highlighted what it called "the danger inherent in endorsing
government-directed branding," noting that "[h]istory is replete with examples
of tragic results." 24 Moreover, the court questioned the purported rehabilita-
tive value of the condition, pointing out that "no consideration was given to
the detrimental effect that undermining character and self-esteem has on the
rehabilitation effort. s"52s Lastly, the court noted its concern with the spillover
effect of such a sign, imagining what might happen ifthe defendant "relocated
to a multi-story apartment building, a hotel, or a homeless shelter. 5 26
520. 924 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1996).
521. State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tenn. 1996).
522. Id. at 87.
523. See State v. Burdin, No. 02C01-9306-CR-00121, 1994 WL 716262, at *5 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Dec. 28,1994).
524. Id. at *4. In fact, the trial judge who imposed the condition seemed to anticipate and
arguably even encourage the possibility of vigilantism in the case, warning the defendant in
open court about the parents of his child victims. Id. at *2. The judge suggested that "one of
these daddy's [sic] is going to get hold of [the defendant] one of these days and he's going to
stop breathing. And that daddy might get probation in my courtroom." Id.
525. Id. at*5.
526. Id. at *5 n.2.
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Relying heavily on the Supreme Court of Tennessee's opinion in Burdin,
the Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Meyer"' vacated a probation
condition that required a man convicted of aggravated battery to post a large
sign at each entrance to his property reading 'Warning! A Violent Felon lives
here. Enter at your own risk!""s In concluding that the condition was a
"drastic departure from traditional sentencing concepts" that was "not contem-
plated by" the state's sentencing code, the court emphasized that "[t]he
authority to define and fix punishment is a matter for the legislature."' Much
like the Burdin court, the court in Meyer focused much of its attention on the
dangers of imposing "unconventional conditions of supervision" that "may
have unknown consequences.""53 In particular, the court highlighted the lack
of expertise, on both the trial court and the appellate court level, to "'deter-
mine the psychological or psychiatric effect of the publication"' on the
defendant.53
1
The New York Court of Appeals went one step further in People v.
Letterlough,32 in which it invalidated a probation condition that required a
convicted drunk driver to attach a sign to his license plate that said "CON-
VICTED DWI" in flourescent block letters.5 33 Noting that the only permissi-
ble purpose of probation was the rehabilitation of the offender, the court
affirmatively concluded that the "punitive and deterrent nature of the disputed
'scarlet letter' component of the probationary conditions... overshadow[ed]
any possible rehabilitative potential that it may [have] generate[d].111 34 In the
end, however, the court rested its decision on its view that, by imposing the
condition, "the trial court invaded the legislative domain. '"5 35 Citing statutes
527. 680 N.E.2d 315 (111. 1997).
528. People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315,316 (111. 1997).
529. Id. at 320.
530. Id. at 319.
531. Id. (quoting People v. Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360, 1362 (. Ct. App. 1988)).
Somewhat ironically, this acknowledged lack of expertise did not stop the Meyer court from
being "persuaded by [the] defendant's contention that the sign, in fact, may hamper the goal of
rehabilitation." Id. at 318.
532. 655 N.E.2d 146 (N.Y. 1995).
533. People v. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146, 147 (N.Y. 1995).
534. Id. at 150. The California Court of Appeal reached a similar conclusion in People v.
Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681 (Ct. App. 1993), in which the court invalidated a probation
condition imposed on a man convicted of shoplifting a small quantity of beer from a supermar-
ket Id. at 682. The court ordered the offender, who had a prior criminal record, to wear a T-
shirt whenever he was outside his home that read "[m]y record plus two six-packs equals four
years" on the front and "I am on felony probation for theft" on the back. Id. The court con-
eluded that the trial judge's "true intent was to brand [the defendant] and expose him to public
ridicule and humiliation, rather than to facilitate his rehabilitation." Id. at 686.
535. Letterlough, 688 N.E.2d at 150.
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from other jurisdictions that explicitly authorize the imposition of a special
license plate condition, the court concluded that 'the public disclosure of a
probationer's conviction as a method of providing deterrence and warning to
the public is a reasonable policy choice that can be made after testing through
the deliberative process of a legislative body." 36 The aftermath of the court's
decision in Letterlough has two interesting features. In the legislative realm,
the New York State Legislature amended the probation statute to provide trial
judges with even broader discretion, eliminating the limitation that probation
conditions must be designed to rehabilitate the offender." 7 In the judicial
realm, the trial judge responsible for the condition has continued to impose it
in cases in which the defendant "consents," thereby insulating the imposition
of the condition from appellate review.53
. Infringements on the Right to Freedom of Thought
It is not particularly unusual to find cases in which judges have imposed
probation conditions that are clearly designed to indoctrinate an offender into
or out of a particular mode of thought. While the goals that these judges have
in mind might be considered lofty and admirable by most of us, the broader
concept of using probation conditions in this fashion raises the ugly specter
of governmental thought control.
Most of the cases involving a judicial effort at thought control, but
certainly not all such cases, involve offenders who hold discriminatory,
hateful, or otherwise offensive beliefs and an effort on the part of a judge to
"correct" those beliefs. In some cases, the attempt to exert thought control is
exercised somewhat subtly, primarily by preventing the offender from associ-
ating with others who share the offender's viewpoint. United States v.
Showalter,539 in which the trial court prohibited the offender from associating
with "skinheads" or with anyone involved with any neo-Nazi organization,
provides an example of this type of case.54° Although the defendant had been
536. Id. (citing IOWA CODE § 3213.4 (Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. § 168.041(6Xa) (Supp.
1999); OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 4503.231 (West 1995)).
537. See Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 25, at 1978 (linking this development
to holding in People v. McNair, 655 N.E2d 167 (N.Y. 1996) as well as to Letterlough).
538. Kahan, supra note 247, at 632-33 n.163 (citing Maureen Fan, Driver Asksfor DWI
TagPenalty, NEWSDAY, June 29, 1995, at A4); see supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text
(providing commentary on contract and waiver theories).
539. 933 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1991).
540. United States v. Showalter, 933 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1991). Along similar lines,
inLandv. State, 426 S.E.2d 370,374 (Ga 1993), an offender was prohibited from participating
in Ku Klux Klan activities. In a more shocking example of the use of associational restrictions
to enforce one view of morality, the Nimth Circuit in United States v. Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189,
1190 (9th Cir. 1973), upheld a probation condition that prohibited the offender from associating
with "known homosexuals."
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convicted solely of possession of an unregistered firearm, the trial judge was
clearly tying to address the offender's political and moral viewpoints. In fact,
the trial judge reprimanded the offender in open court for "writing a letter
espousing his white supremacist views to a newspaper" in the period between
his plea and his sentencing. 4' Loathsome as those views may be, it is hard to
justify the judge's reprimand over their mere expression in print. But rather
than express any concern about the appropriateness of such a reprimand, the
Seventh Circuit upheld the conditions and described the reprimand only to
highlight "the importance of specificity in formulating conditions of super-
vised release." 42
Even more troubling are those cases in which the trial judge explicitly
engages in moral or political "education." A common variant on this theme
involves cases in which the offender is forced to associate with people or
groups that hold a "more enlightened" viewpoint. One example stems from
a 1991 incident in which an offender threw a can of beer at New York City
Mayor David N. Dinkins as he marched with a group of gay participants in the
city's Saint Patrick's Day Parade.543 Although the offender denied that he
threw the can for discriminatory reasons, he was sentenced to serve forty
hours of community service in the Mayor's Office for the Lesbian and Gay
Community." The Mayor praised the sentence as a "learning experience" for
the offender, 4 ' thereby explicitly recognizing the effort to "educate" the
offender with respect to his views about homosexuality.
Along similar lines, a federal judge in Los Angeles ordered fourteen
members of the "Fourth Reich Skinheads" to participate in a three day pro-
gram explicitly designed to "educate" and "enlighten" the offenders.
5 46
Specifically, the offenders were ordered to meet with an African American
federal district court judge, with a prominent local preacher, with a group of
Jewish university students, and with two survivors ofthe Nazi death camps 5 47
In each of these two cases, the trial judges presumably had only the best
intentions in mind. But one need only invert the characters in the fact patterns
to see just how frightening a precedent these sorts of sentences can establish;
541. Showalter, 933 F.2d at 574.
542. Id. at 574 n.1.
543. See Ronald Sullivan, Beer-Flinger Sent to a Fitting Cooler: Gay-Rights Office, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 22, 1991, at B1.
544. Id.
545. Id.
546. Jim Newton, Skinheads Get Crash Course in Tolerance, STAR TRIB., Jan. 1,1994, at
5A; see also Garvey, supra note 63, at 786 (discussing Newton article).
547. Garvey, supra note 63, at 786; Newton, supra note 546. The offenders were also
required to tour a local jail, view the film "Schindler's List," and tour the Simon Weisenthal
Center's Museum of Tolerance. Id.
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imagine a judge who finds homosexuality to be morally offensive ordering a
gay offender to be "educated" or "enlightened" at the hands of virulently anti-
gay spokespersons, 4 ' or imagine a racist or anti-Semitic judge ordering an
offender to be "educated" or "enlightened" at the hands of avowed white
supremacists or neo-Nazis. The negative potential is obvious.
The cases cited above do not appear to be isolated anomalies; rather,
there seem to be good number of instances in which trial judges have used
their power to impose a certain view of morality upon offenders. An earlier
section of this Article discussed the obvious imposition of judicial morality
in cases involving reproductive or marital freedom. 49 Cases documented in
various media reports include trial courts ordering offenders to view films
such as "Mississippi Burning""' or "Boyz N the Hood,"551 ordering offenders
to read about and pass a quiz about the Holocaust,5 2 and ordering environ-
mental offenders to attend Sierra Club meetings.5 3 In one published court
opinion, the Court of Appeals of Georgia upheld the imposition of probation
conditions that required a drunk driver to complete the "written requirements
for Boy Scout merit badges on the subjects of traffic safety, law, and citizen-
ship in the community." ' 4 In another published court opinion, a federal
district court judge explicitly indicated that he imposed an unusual set of
probation conditions "in the hope that [the offender would] ... learn humility,
compassion, generosity, honesty, and, above all, a sense of respect for the
law.1555 While it may be difficult to contest the praiseworthiness of each of
those attributes, it is far less difficult to raise concerns about allowing an
individual trial judge to be the arbiter of praiseworthy attributes. While the
federal probation statutes arguably authorize a trial court to try to educate an
offender about obeying the law, one is quite hard pressed to find anything
authorizing a trial court to inculcate values such as humility, compassion,
generosity, honesty, or even respect for the law.
548. Indeed, UnitedStates v. Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1973), discussed in detail
supra notes 290-94 and accompanying text, makes it clear that anti-gay bias has by no means
been eliminated from the federal judiciary, even at very high levels.
549. See supra Part JIF.2 (discussing intrusion ofjudicial morality into marital freedom).
550. See Abramson, supra note 36 (describing this condition, imposed upon man who
rammed his truck into car driven by interracial couple, as "pure gimmick").
551. See Judge Orders Victim of Theft to Steal From Thief, ST. PETERBuRG TMEs, Oct
3, 1991, at 7A (stating offender ordered to watch "Boyz N the Hood" or spend three weekends
injait).
552. Michener Offers to Teach Vandals About Holocaust, Car TRIB., June 7, 1990, at
C24.
553. Felsenthal, supra note 32.
554. Mangiapane v. State, 344 S.E.2d 756,757 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
555. United States v. Posner, 694 F. Supp. 881, 884 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
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IV A Proposed Response
The preceding sections of this Article should make readily apparent both
the potential for and the actuality of the widespread abuse of the power of
sentencing. Now onto the more complicated task of proposing some potential
solutions. Many of these solutions have been proposed in some form in the
past, although never in this sort of comPrehensive fashion. Nonetheless, the
beginnings of a solution to the most pervasive aspects of the problems de-
scribed above do not involve any particularly radical new legal concepts or
departures from otherwise accepted legal practices, but rather involve the
application of widely recognized legal doctrine in a somewhat different
setting.
A. Eliminating Barriers to Substantive Appellate Review
First and perhaps most important, appellate courts must establish their
willingness to review and supervise the sentencing practices of individual trial
judges. While most appellate courts have a well established history of almost
complete deference to those sentencing practices, that history has begun to
change in the face of complex and multi-factored sentencing guidelines. The
federal court system clearly provides the best example, as the circuit courts
have become inundated with cases in which the parties dispute the proper
application of the sentencing guidelines. Thus, the concept of engaging in
substantive appellate review of trial court sentences should not be completely
foreign to most appellate courts.
As discussed in Part II of this Article, several significant barriers inter-
fere with the possibility of substantive appellate review, the most important
of which is the fact that probationary sentences are rarely appealed. 56 This
fact appears unlikely to change dramatically, regardless of any changes in the
rules applied to such appeals. The emotional and economic costs connected
with pursuing an appeal are not likely to be affected, and it is predictable that
an extremely high percentage of those defendants sentenced to probation
would continue to decide not to pursue an appeal challenging the conditions
of their probation. In some sense this is precisely as it should be, as one can
assume that the substantial majority of cases involve the imposition of rela-
tively standard and inoffensive probation conditions. Nonetheless, to the
extent that pursuing a legitimate appellate challenge of the validity of proba-
tion conditions is inhibited by appellate procedures and prior rulings, those
obstacles must change.
As noted earlier, one of the more obvious and pervasive barriers to the
filing of an appeal is the offender's fear, often well justified, that a "success-
556. See supra Part IIA (discussing barriers to appellate review).
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fu" legal challenge to a probation condition will result in the court's vacating
the plea or remanding the case for resentencing, opening up the possibility of
incarceration."s 7 If such a result is possible, even the clearest and most
flagrant judicial abuses will generally evade challenge on appeal. It is the rare
defendant indeed who will risk incarceration in order to avoid compliance
with any non-jail condition, no matter how inappropriate, onerous, or constitu-
tionally intrusive. Courts must universally announce and follow the rule set
forth in Fiore v. United States,55 in which the Second Circuit explicitly
refused to remand a case for resentencing after it invalidated a challenged
probation condition. 9 The court in that case correctly observed that forcing
an offender to take "a gamble" in order to raise a valid claim would clearly
"chill" the valid assertion of important rights.5" The appropriate appellate
rule would simply treat probation conditions as severable from the remainder
of the sentence.
Having eliminated the most obvious disincentive to the filing of an
appeal, the courts must then abandon in their entirety the different variations
on the theme that an offender has waived his or her right to substantive appel-
late review by accepting the imposition of the sentence. The old workhorses
that by all rights should have been abandoned years ago - that probation is an
"act of grace" or that a defendant who has accepted a probationary sentence
has entered some form of contractual agreement561 - must be explicitly and
finally rejected. This is no radical concept of appellate practice, as the United
States Supreme Court has expressed its disdain for these doctrines on several
occasions." The description of a probationary sentence as an "act of grace"
can no longer be justified under any fhir view of the current criminal justice
system; indeed, in many settings, a probationary sentence is the norm rather
than some sort of lenient anomaly. 63 Further, the description of a probation-
ary sentence as some form of contractual offer and acceptance defies any
common sense notion of the actual legal setting in which the criminal sentence
occurs. One can hardly imagine a setting in which the bargaining position of
the two parties is less equal or in which the element of coercion plays a
stronger role.
557. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (stating offender's fear of incarceration
is often justifiable).
558. 696 F,2d 205 (2d Cir. 1982).
559. Fiore v. United States, 696 F.2d 205,211 (2d Cir. 1982).
560. Id. at211.
561. For a discussion of these legal doctrines, see supra Part 1A-2 & 3.
562. See supra notes 50, 76 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court cases
rejecting "act of grace" and contract theories in probation conditions).
563. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text (showing widespread use of probation).
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The more popular waiver rule in today's cases suggests that the absence
of a specific objection to a particular probation condition precludes substan-
tive appellate review of that condition. This sort of rule has its most obvious
application in cases that are resolved by a negotiated plea agreement, but it
has also been widely applied in post-trial sentence cases." 4 While the object-
or-waive rule appears to originate largely from appellate rules applied to
evidentiary issues, the primary rationale offered in support of such a rule does
not apply in any compelling way to criminal sentencing. In the evidentiary
setting, the objection requirement generally is justified by the need for the
trial judge to be alerted to the legal issue and provided with an opportunity to
rule. 65 In the criminal sentencing setting, there is rarely, if ever, an analogous
need to highlight for the trial judge the various ways in which he or she may
be infiinging on the rights of the accused; the trial judge is normally fully
aware of those rights, particularly when they are of constitutional magnitude.
To the extent that the object-or-waive rule is justified in terms ofjudicial
economy, far stronger policy concerns should prevail when the legitimacy of
a trial judge's use of the enormous power of the criminal justice system is at
stake. It is the public at large, not just the individual offender, who has the
greater stake in assuring that the power of the system is not amenable to
individual and idiosyncratic abuse. Indeed, the notion that an individual
offender can, by his or her consent or acquiescence, make legitimate an other-
wise illegitimate criminal sentence, flies in the face of some of our most
deeply held notions of fairness and justice. When one considers the disincen-
tives that generally prevent an individual offender from objecting to any non-
jail conditions,"' the importance of a rule that automatically preserves the
right of a probationer to appellate review of probation conditions becomes
even clearer. It is not difficult to envision such a rule in practice. One need
do little more than treat any challenged condition as though it were "plain
error, 567 thereby obviating the need for preservation below.
B. Making Substantive Appellate Review Truly Substantive
The best way for an appellate court to discourage the filing of an appeal
on a particular issue is to relegate its review ofthat issue to the legal waste bin
564. See supra Part IIA.2 (discussing waiver rule).
565. See, e.g., ROGER C. PARKETAL.,EVDENcELAW § 2.03 (1998) (stating that objection
gives judge opportunity to correct error).
566. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (describing disincentive of fear of
incarceration).
567. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) ("Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights
may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court."); FED. R. EViM.
103(d) (providing that court may "tak[e] notice of plain error affecting spbstantial rights
although they were not brought to the attention of the court").
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of "abuse of discretion" review. Nothing sends a clearer message to a litigant
that the court has little or no interesting in reviewing an issue or that his or her
appeal has virtually no chance of success.5" Sadly, this standard of review is
the state of the law as regards legal challenges to probation conditions. If the
appellate courts are to take seriously their role as guardians of the use and
abuse of the enormous power of judicial sentencing, they must abandon the
abuse of discretion standard and begin to conduct truly substantive appellate
review.
The first step in such a process would be to require that the imposition
of any probation condition be based upon explicit findings of fact, made on
the record and supported by evidence found in the record. In addition, the
imposition of any probation condition must be justified by the articulation of
a particular reason or set of reasons. Requiring the creation of such a record
would make judicial reliance on pop-psychology much more difficult, suggest-
ing that the judge must enlist some expert testimony before speculating on
how a particular condition might affect a particular offender. The imposition
of conditions for illegitimate purposes would also be easier to identify and to
regulate under this sort of regimen. Indeed, it would seem difficult to argue
against the making of such a record in an area in which judges have histori-
cally enjoyed virtually unfettered discretion.569
Operating on the basis of such a record, an appellate court could engage
in something approaching a de novo review on the law. Certainly, deference
to the trial judge's fact-finding would continue to be the appropriate mode of
review, so long as those facts are supported by sufficient credible evidence in
the record. But working from an established set of facts, the appellate court
is just as able as the trial court to balance the rights of the individual offender
against the articulated purpose of any given condition. As in most areas of
law, significant appellate guidance over time would provide both a structure
and a set of guidelines for trial judges to follow, allowing for greater unifor-
mity in sentencing and eliminating many of the idiosyncratic or eccentric
abuses of judicial discretion.
Most important, probation conditions that intrude on an offender's funda-
mental or constitutionally protected rights must be subjected to strict scrutiny
upon appellate review. This proposal, which would require a court to find that
the condition is the least restrictive alternative available to meet a legitimate
568. See David N. Dorfinan, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J.
CiRM. L. 455, 466-69 (1999) (discussing review of judicial factfinding of witness credibility).
569. Several other commentators have proposed requiring judges to articulate on the record
the justifications for a particular probation condition. See, e.g., Weissman, supra note 62, at
391 (stating tribunal should specify purpose of conditions); Alternatives to Incarceration, supra
note 25, at 1967 (stating judges should openly explain goals of innovative probation condi-
tions).
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specified objective, is neither legally novel nor difficult to imagine in practice.
A number of jurisdictions purportedly impose such a standard today in the
context of reviewing probation conditions.57° Some critics have argued that
the application of such a standard to the review of probation conditions places
too many limitations on judicial sentencing practices, treating the offender as
though he or she is entitled to precisely the same level of constitutional
protection as one who has not been convicted of a crime.5" This criticism is
off target because it fails to recognize that the state has far more latitude in
determining what would qualify as legitimate objectives when dealing with
a convicted criminal than it would if it sought to apply a restrictive condition
in another setting. A less rigorous standard of review displays an insufficient
level of respect for the continuing constitutional rights of offenders. Any
hope that an offender might be rehabilitated or have some respect for the
criminal justice system in the future would seem to follow more naturally
from the imposition of a sentence that respects the rights and dignity of the
offender than from the imposition of a sentence that shows a disregard for
those vital issues." 2
C. Reducing the Permissible Range ofJudicial Innovation
The best approach to reducing or eliminating "creative" or "innovative"
sentencing is to establish a rule, as several courts have, that a probation condi-
tion that is not within the realm of commonly accepted sentences in the juris-
diction is not a statutorily authorized sentence. These courts have reasoned
that sentences that deviate from clearly established norms constitute judicial
legislation, and that it is up to a legislature, not an individual judge, to deter-
mine the appropriate range of sentences available for a particular offense.
While one may ordinarily think of the legislative role simply in terms of
establishing minimum and maximum periods of incarceration, this view is not
570. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictions that claim to take
more serious look at conditions that infringe on constitutional rights).
571. See, e.g., Bartrum, supra note 81, at 1045 (arguing such standard ignores probation-
ers' diminished liberty interests).
572. Several courts have expressed the concern that the imposition of unreasonable or
arbitrary probation conditions can undermine the rehabilitative process by eroding the proba-
tioner's respect for the criminal justice system. For example, in Inman v. State, 183 S.E.2d 413,
413-14 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971), the court vacated a probation condition that required the proba-
tioner to maintain "a short haircut" The court noted that, "[w]hile few young men would
choose to serve a sentence rather than cut their hair, even fewer would finish with a sense of
respect for criminal justice." Id. at 416.
573. See, e.g., People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315, 320 (11. 1997) (stating that authority to
define punishment is for legislature); People v. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146, 151 (N.Y. 1995)
(same); State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 87 (Tenn. 1996) (same); see also Ballenger v. State,
436 S.E.2d 793, 796 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (Blackburn, J., dissenting) (same).
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accurate. Indeed, it is important to remember that a trial court's authority to
impose probation is at the discretion of the legislature," 4 which could revoke
the jurisdiction's probation statute in its entirety. In fact, it is not extraordi-
nary to find state statutes that expressly authorize special probation conditions
under particular facts and circumstances. For example, a number of state
legislatures have explicitly expanded the menu of sentencing options available
to trial judges in the area of drunk driving. 5  Thus, the enforcement of a rule
that restricts sentencing innovation to the legislative realm is not difficult to
imagine, not only because it has been followed by a number ofjurisdictions,
but also because it is far more consistent withthe strong national trend toward
uniformity in sentencing.
Critics of this kind of limitation on judicial creativity have raised two
primary concerns. First, they have maintained that any limitations on creativ-
ity will reduce the effectiveness of criminal sentencing practices because
judges are prevented from making the sentence fit the individual. 76 This
claim is premised on the notion that sentences are currently individualized in
a fashion that is rational, conceptually coherent, and founded on legitimate
evidentiary fact finding. Further, this claim presumes that current sentencing
practices have some established level of effectiveness. In fact, there does not
appear to be any evidence supporting either of these premises. Second, the
critics have maintained that, in the absence of viable creative alternatives,
judges will be more likely to resort to incarceration when some lesser alterna-
tive might serve the same correctional ends.577 This claim is premised on the
notion that so-called "alternative sanctions" generally are imposed in lieu of
what would otherwise have been ajail sentence. In fact, the evidence seems
to suggest the opposite, indicating that alternative sanctions are almost-univer-
574. See supra text accompanying note 553 (stating that legislatures define appropriate
sentences).
575. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 32114 (Supp. 1999) (authorizing sentence requiring use of
ignition interlock device for drunk drivers); MMIN. STAT. § 168.041(6)(a) (Supp. 1999) (autho-
rizing use of distinct license plates for drunk drivers); Nay. RLrV. STAT. § 484.3792(lXa)(2)
(1999) (authorizing sentence to perform community service while "dressed in distinctive garb"
that identifies the defendant as a drunk driver); OHIo REv. CODEANN. § 4503.231 (West 1999)
(authorizing use of distinct license plates for drunk drivers). Other states have considered and
rejected similar legislative initiatives. In New York, for example, the legislature in 1983
rejected a proposal to investigate the use of special license plates for convicted drunk drivers.
People v. Letterlough, 655 N.E2d 146,150 n.5 (N.Y. 1995).
576. See, e.g., Connally, supra note 220, at 532 (arguing for "a minimum of legislative
interference" under theory that allowing court to individualize probation conditions "mak[es]
the most of the probation and thereby enhanc[es] its effect").
577. See, e.g., Dana Wordes, Penal Law, 70 ST. JOHN's L. Rxv. 421,433 (1996) (arguing
that "discouraging judicial creativity" could encourage courts to incarcerate when non-jail
conditions might be appropriate).
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sally imposed on those who would not have been incarcerated in any case and
have little or no impact on those who the courts will continue to incarcerate." 8
This phenomenon is known in the field as "net-widening. '579
Leaving innovative sentencing concepts in the legislative domain has
several distinct advantages. In many instances, the imposition of an innova-
tive sentence involves the striking of a balance between several competing
issues of public policy. Such policy balancing is more properly conducted in
the legislature, which has been elected to decide such issues, than by an
individual judge in an individual case. The wisdom or potential efficacy of
an innovative or new sentencing concept can be subjected to legislative study
and debate prior to its adoption on a broader scale. Having adopted such a
concept, the legislature can then commission studies to evaluate how such
conditions are imposed in practice and to evaluate their potential effective-
ness.58 Adoption of permissible sentences through the legislative process
reduces the possibility that individual trial judges will respond inappropriately
to public pressure and places constraints on the ability of trial judges to act
upon their personal biases and prejudices, personal morality, or pop-psycho-
logical theories. In turn, the public's perception of the system as essentially
fair, just, and even-handed would undoubtedly be enhanced by the elimination
of quirky, eccentric, and idiosyncratic sentencing practices.
V Conclusion
Trial judges in the United States enjoy vast and almost completely unfet-
tered discretion in imposing probation conditions on criminal defendants.
While state and federal legislatures have significantly reduced judicial sen-
tencing discretion by imposing mandatory minimum sentences, purportedly
in the name of enforcing some uniformity and predictability in sentencing,
they have not taken any steps to reduce broad disparities in the imposition of
probation conditions. As a consequence, many trial judges have taken full
advantage of the opportunity to impose probation conditions that significantly
infringe upon the offender's constitutional or basic human rights. Much like
578. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 247, at 625 & n.135 (stating alternative sanctions do not
substitute for imprisonment); Doris Layton Mackenzie & Claire Souryal, A "Machiavellian"
Perspective on the Development ofBoot Camp Prisons: A Debate, 2 U. CBL L. SCIL ROUND-
TABLE 435, 438 (1995) (stating alternative sanctions are not for those who would have been
incarcerated); Michael Tomny, Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing Reform, 2 U. CBI L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 391,397 (1995) (asserting alternative sanction program rarely achieves goals of
diverting offenders from prison).
579. See supra note 578 (listing supporting authority).
580. At least one commentator recently has suggested the opposite approach, allowingjudi-
cial innovation to lead to and inform legislative study and debate. See Alternatives to Incarcera-
tion, supra note 25, at 1977-80 (stating expertise of trial courts makes them best suited to lead).
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the state and federal legislatures, the appellate courts have abdicated their
responsibility to protect probationers from trial judges who have abused their
judicial power, creating a system in which judges are free to impose their own
values or morality on a probationer or to follow their intuitive best guess
about the effectiveness of a particular probation condition.
These problems are not obscure or isolated in nature. With several mil-
lion Americans under some form of probationary supervision at any given
time,581 one can only hazard a guess at how many have been ordered to com-
ply with inappropriate or constitutionally invasive conditions. In order to
highlight the severity and nature of the problems, this Article has engaged in
an extended analysis of the types of abuses that currently exist and some of
the many problems that they both create and perpetuate.5" The long list
includes the violation of virtually every conceivable constitutional right,
including the rights to freedom of speech, association, and religion, and the
violation of rights that are best described as basic human rights, such as the
right to dignity and the right to freedom of thought. 83
This Article has proposed several steps that should be taken in order to
address these judicial abuses of power.584 First, the appellate courts need to
create rules that both support and encourage probationers to seek appellate
review of potentially offensive or inappropriate probation conditions. As
things stand today, there are significant, often insurmountable, barriers that
interfere with the ability or willingness of a probationer to file an appeal.
Those barriers must be reduced if an appellate court is to play any role in
supervising a trial court's exercise of its sentencing discretion.
Second, the appellate courts must abandon the incredibly deferential
abuse of discretion standard, engaging in a substantive review on the merits of
the appropriateness of a particular probation condition. In order to conduct a
substantive review, the appellate courts must insist that sentencing decisions
be articulated and justified on the record and that the courts making the deci-
sions acted in reliance on evidence obtained in the proceeding below. When
a probation condition intrudes upon constitutional rights, the court should
apply a strict scrutiny analysis.
Third, the ability of an individual sentencing judge to experiment with
innovative sentences must be significantly curtailed. Appellate courts should
reject probation conditions that fall outside of well established norms within
the jurisdiction, leaving the task of creating new or innovative sentencing
581. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (documenting number of Americans
on probation).
582. See supra Part IR (describing "parade of horribles").
583. See supra Part III (describing "parade of horribles").
584. See supra Part IV (elaborating proposals to remedy problems).
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concepts to the legislature. Through that sort of regime, the vast opportunities
for the biases, prejudices, personal morality, or pop-psychology of an individ-
ual judge can be reduced significantly.
In the end, we as a society have a significant interest in the fair and just
operation of the criminal justice system. When the system allows an individ-
ual judge to impose his or her personal morality on a criminal defendant,
when the system allows an individual judge to practice psychology on a crim-
inal defendant with neither a degree nor any expert advice, when the system
allows an individual judge to act on his or her personal biases, stereotypes,
and prejudices, we have all been injured. We can no longer close our eyes to
the pervasive judicial abuse of the power of sentencing, and we must insist
that our courts and our legislatures no longer abdicate their vital roles as
protectors of the rule of law.
